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Abstract
This thesis consists of three studies that share a common subject of investment strate-
gies in a retiree’s decumulation phase. The importance of appropriate retirement
distribution plans that adequately cater for the risks in retirement is an integral
component of retirement planning. The first study compares alternative withdrawal
strategies in retirement to a life annuity benchmark using Australian data. By adopt-
ing the Epstein-Zin utility preferences, we are able to disentangle relative risk aversion
(RRA) from elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) and examine how retiree
preferences are impacted by the means-tested age pension. For the second study,
I derive the portfolio choice and consumption patterns for retirees with Hyperbolic
Absolute Risk Aversion (HARA) utility who have bequest or capital preservation
needs and access to deferred life annuities. I find that investing in deferred annuities
leads to significant welfare gains, that is, there is a real option to delay annuitisation
(RODA) for retirees at all risk aversion levels. Whilst risk averse retirees want to
delay annuitising in retirement, they prefer a shorter delay to a longer one. Retirees
derive more utility in purchasing annuities with shorter deferral periods over longer
periods and benefit from purchasing deferred annuities over self-annuitisation. The
final study compares the performance of the commonly nominated default retirement
investment option, the lifecycle fund, to alternative investment strategies during the
retirees’ decumulation phase. Under different shortfall risk measures, I find that bal-
anced portfolios with constant exposure to stocks, stock dominated portfolios as well
as ‘reverse lifecycle’ portfolios that increase exposures to stocks over time consistently
outperform the conventional lifecycle portfolio. Using a utility-of-terminal wealth
approach which allows for loss aversion as in prospect theory, I find the balanced
portfolio to dominate the alternative strategies at low thresholds. With increasing
threshold levels, investment strategies with high constant stock allocations become
dominant. The lifecycle portfolio is dominated by the ‘reverse lifecycle’ portfolio at
all threshold levels.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
Human mortality has decreased significantly in the last century and today, people
are living longer than ever before. Given a relatively long lifespan, appropriate in-
vestment strategies are necessary for retirees to maintain their available wealth in
retirement years. Findings by Oeppen and Vaupel (2002) reveal that female life
expectancy among the longest living populations in the last 160 years has been in-
creasing steadily by almost three months every year. Australians are among the
longest lived populations on the planet with longevity continuously improving. A re-
cent Global Financial Stability Report.1 by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
suggests that the Australian government helps to insure against longevity risks by
developing their annuity markets and introducing reverse mortgages. The report ex-
plains that underestimating life expectancy could add up to about 50% to the cost of
providing for retirement in Australia (Uren, 2012). The IMF says countries around
the world have consistently underestimated improvements in longevity by about 3
years every 20 years. While institutional authorities expect the rate of improvement
to slow down, the continuous advances in medical science suggest otherwise.
The more realistic predicted scenario is much more dramatic. After
allowing for mortality improvements on a cohort basis it’s estimated that
retirees aged 65 now (i.e. in 2010) will live until 86 for men and 89 for
women.
By 2050 the average life expectancy for people aged 65 is projected to
have improved to 92 for men and 93 for women. And this is an average.
1This report is available online here.
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Many will live longer than this. (Australia’s Longevity Tsunami, 2012,
pg. 6)
Increasing life expectancy will thus have major implications for retirement incomes
policies. With 84% of Australians over the age of 65 receiving some form of gov-
ernment payments, aged care is currently the eighth largest part of the government
expenditure. The Government’s age pension is a non-contributory payment for peo-
ple satisfying age and residence requirements and whose income and assets are below
certain limits. The purpose of this pension is to ensure that senior Australians have
adequate means of support.
For men, the current qualifying age for Age Pension is 65 years whilst the qualifying
age is gradually being increased to 65 years for women. The Intergenerational Re-
port (2010) explored the fiscal sustainability of the age pension system and Treasury
calculations forecast that age pension expenditure will rise from the current 2.7% of
GDP to 3.9% in 2050. While this may not appear to be a steep increase, 1.2% of
GDP represents nearly $20 billion per annum in today’s terms (Australia’s GDP is
currently around $1.6 trillion). The debate on increasing the Age Pension qualifying
age has been trending, with the Actuaries Institute, the body representing the ac-
tuarial profession in Australia, calling on government to consider an increase of the
eligibility age in line with increases to life expectancy. On 13 May 2014, the Govern-
ment delivered the 2014-15 Federal Budget,2 and among other things, revealed plans
to increase the Age Pension age from the current 65 to 70 in 2035. From 1 July 2025,
the Age Pension qualifying age will continue to rise by six months every two years,
from the qualifying age of 67 years that will apply by that time, to a qualifying age
of 70 years by 1 July, 2035.
If gains in life expectancy were predictable, they would have been taken into account
when planning for retirement, thereby making an insignificant effect on retirement
finances. Unfortunately, mortality improvements and life expectancy are difficult to
model. In this regard, longevity risk is associated with the risk that future mor-
tality occurrences and life expectancy outcomes may differ from what is expected.
Longevity risk refers to the uncertainty of the age of death giving rise to the possibil-
ity of an individual outliving her investment portfolio. As a result of this uncertainty
surrounding future changes in mortality and life expectancy, retirees run the risk of
outliving their available resources forcing them to reduce their standard of living in
2An overview of the Australia Federal Government’s 2014-2015 Budget is available here.
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old age.
There is the need for appropriate investment measures to be taken whilst individuals
receive income and have adequate human capital to build a good portfolio to cre-
ate wealth in the accumulation years. Similarly, it is important that retirees invest
optimally to ensure that they do not outlive their wealth. To ensure that a decumu-
lation strategy is appropriate and sustainable, the relevance of longevity insurance
in retirement investment cannot be overlooked. With increasing life expectancies,
appropriate investment products and strategies are necessary to minimise the risk of
retirees outliving their wealth. Wealth decumulation strategies have become partic-
ularly important in recent years with baby boomers moving into retirement and the
manifold growth in number of the Defined Contribution (DC) plans over the Defined
Benefit (DB) plans.
1.2 The Shift from Defined Benefit to Defined Contri-
bution Pension Plans
In the last three decades, we have witnessed the gradual takeover of the Defined Ben-
efit (DB) pension plan by the Defined Contribution (DC) plan. The sponsor of the
DB retirement plan bears all investment risks and ensures that the plan participant
receives her benefits regardless of the market outcome. The DB plan gives the plan
member certainty about her future benefit, typically by the use of a formula approach.
The Australia superannuation system, like many other pension systems all over the
world, is predominantly DC in nature, where the benefits of the participant depend
on the accumulated contributions and investment returns. The retiree is therefore
responsible for the effective management of her retirement wealth to ensure that it
meets her consumption needs.
The evidence of reduction in the DB plan numbers is absolute. Globally, DC plans
assets have increased from 38% in 2003 to 47% in 2013 (Towers Watson, 2014). As
of June 2013, total assets (for entities with more than four members) consisted of
approximately 83.6% ($891.0 million) allocated to defined contribution accounts and
16.4% ($174.6 million) allocated to defined benefits accounts in Australia. DC plans
in the United States are up to 58% of total retirement plans. Under Australia’s su-
perannuation plan, employers are required to make a mandatory contribution, which
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is currently 9.5% into individual accounts in privately managed pension funds. Re-
search has been extensive on the reasons for this transition from DB to DC plans and
studies have attributed several factors to this shift. Milevsky and Abaimova (2005)
cite the high economic cost of financing and maintaining DB pension plans as a rea-
son for the failure of the DB to meet retirees’ current demands. Their research goes
further to point out the poor performance of the stock markets, low interest rates
and increasing life expectancy of plan holders as other factors which are believed to
compromise the effectiveness of the DB plan.
Past studies suggest that the DC plan is perceived to be a cheaper alternative to
the DB plans. The DC plan also gives the participant more flexibility with invest-
ment options and is less risky compared to the DB plan, in that there is very little
potential of loss to the plan participant should the corporate sponsor go insolvent
(Mitchell & Schieber, 1998). DC plans also provide much if not absolute control of
the plan participant’s asset allocation as well as transparency in investor’s investment
dealings. The DC plan benefits are received by plan participants in the form of a
lump-sum, instalment payments or a life annuity, providing a lot more flexibility and
liquidity, unlike the DB plan which comes either as a lump sum or in the form of a life
annuity. In these respects, the DC plan is applauded by many as a move in the right
direction. The DC plan however has its shortcomings which cannot be overlooked.
Many poorly informed DC plan holders are at risk of running a poor investment by
making irrational portfolio choices. The DC plan does not provide security against a
plan participant outliving her resources. In other words, the DC plan does not insure
the plan holder against longevity risk. It is one major risk associated with pension
investment. Other risks include inflation and consumption risk, sequencing risk of
returns as well as investment and portfolio risk. These risks associated with pension
investment comprise the major deficiency of the DC plan which calls for strategies
to help preserve the investor’s resources in retirement.
An effective decumulation plan should be able to adequately hedge against market
and longevity risks. Whilst there is extensive academic research on how individuals
can build a well-diversified and sustainable investment portfolio during their work-
ing lives, the same cannot be said for dissaving wealth after their retirement. This
doctoral dissertation seeks to examine the diverse possibilities available in the decu-
mulation or retirement distribution phase of retirement. I explore different portfolio
withdrawal strategies to enhance a retiree’s utility from her available wealth in retire-
ment. I further explore available products such as annuities and in particular deferred
annuities for the retirement phase and discuss retirement investment strategies with
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the view of helping retired individuals to make informed decisions in retirement.
1.3 Motivation
With the DC plan being the more popular of the two main pension plans, the rel-
evance of asset allocation, innovative retirement products and post-retirement plan-
ning is greatly emphasised. A retiree’s standard of living is dependent on her level
of wealth at retirement, as this is the major determinant of the consumption levels
she is able to spend from her accumulated wealth. In other words, the income an-
nuity level used to replace the retiree’s pre-retirement income is dependent on the
size of her DC account at retirement. Inflation may erode the purchasing power of
such retirement income and this is a major risk to the retiree. A rise in price levels
increases the investor’s consumption rate as she requires more money to keep up with
her standard of living. The value of money in these terms is reduced and the investor
is at the risk of prematurely exhausting her assets in a period of soaring inflation
rates. On the effects of inflation shocks on Australia’s economy, Mallick and Mohsin
(2007) assert that both in the short and long run, inflation has a negative impact on
both durable and non-durable consumption as well as investment.
Investment risk can be defined as the probability or likelihood of occurrence of losses
relative to the expected return on any particular investment. When market volatil-
ities cause fluctuations in the capital market early in retirement, the retiree stands
the risk of a depleted portfolio which may be unable to stand the stress of regular
withdrawals. These risks highlight the importance of effectively managing a portfo-
lio’s withdrawal to sustain the individual’s consumption in retirement without facing
portfolio ruin. Portfolio ruin occurs when the retiree exhausts her retirement wealth
whilst she is still alive. To generate income in retirement, investor may choose to
hold a diversified portfolio from which they make annual withdrawals to meet their
consumption or decide to purchase an annuity to receive periodic income over their
years. Retirees who self-annuitise their lump sum at retirement have no insurance or
longevity protection in retirement and are at risk of portfolio ruin. Portfolio ruin is
eliminated by holding life annuities. The cost to the annuitant may however come in
the form of credit risk, which involves the possibility of loss due to the inability of
the life company to fulfil its financial obligations.
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The major shortfall of the DC plan is its inability to provide security against a plan
participant outliving her resources. Longevity risk is covered under the DB plan
where the onus lies on the plan sponsor to bear all investment risks and ensure that
the plan participant receives her benefits regardless of the market outcome. The
DC plan however leaves the benefits of the participant dependent on retiree’s con-
tributions’ accumulated wealth level. The failure of the DC plan to replicate this
important aspect of insurance makes the use of securities and investment strategies
indispensable in retirement planning to help preserve the investor’s resources. It is
commonly believed that a life annuity is the best insurance against a retiree outliv-
ing her wealth. However, empirical studies have shown evidence of annuity aversion
among retirees. In Australia, Ganegoda and Bateman (2008) argue that this is the
result of retirees having a range of benefit options with their retirement fund; con-
verting their wealth into one or more lump sums, a phased withdrawal or a life or
term annuity.
With the longstanding evidence of annuity aversion among retirees, researchers have
sought to find the appropriate wealth distribution programs in retirement that meet
retirees’ individual preferences. A primary objective of a retirement savings account
is to minimise the uncertainty regarding prospective retirement spending. In retire-
ment, the correct choice of distribution program is necessary to meet this objective.
What is the appropriate drawdown strategy in retirement for rational retiree prefer-
ences with government pensions? Studies have compared the most popular alterna-
tive self-annuitisation options available for the post-retirement phase and presented
findings based on various analysis in the context of the mandatory annuitisation,
shortfall analysis, bequest motives and varying risk aversion levels for the Constant
Relative Risk Averse (CRRA) retiree (Dus, Maurer, & Mitchell, 2005; Horneff, Mau-
rer, Mitchell, & Dus, 2008). While the assumption of the CRRA retiree is widely
accepted in pension literature, recent findings in experimental economics have shown
that individual preferences may be different to what is assumed for the CRRA in-
vestor concerning consumption. Brown and Kim (2013) show that subjects prefer
early resolution of uncertainty and have elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS)
greater than the reciprocal of Relative Risk Aversion (RRA). The CRRA preferences
assume EIS as being the reciprocal of RRA but current studies suggest that this is
not the case. Retirees’ exhibiting Epstein-Zin preferences, which allows a separation
of RRA from EIS, opens up an avenue of further research and exploration of the
comparison of these alternative retirement distribution programs. Furthermore, pre-
vious comparison of alternative distribution plans have failed to recognise the impact
of government pensions on such outcome. These are the key motivations behind the
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first essay of this doctoral dissertation.
The need for innovative retirement products is a primary concern with the current
ageing populations prevalent in many developed countries. There are many products
available in the accumulation phase to help individuals diversify their saving through
target date and balanced funds (Gomes, Kotlikoff, & Viceira, 2008). There are also
lifestyle investment options for individuals to accumulate wealth to meet their lifestyle
needs and wealth goals. In the post-retirement phase however, products are not as
developed as those in the accumulation phase. There are distribution products such
as income annuities, which pay retirees regular income for a fixed period or for life
for an initial premium paid to the insurance company. This income may be fixed, in-
dexed for inflation, or variable based on returns of an underlying asset and may have
options such as deferred income and capital preservation. The existence of annuities
dates back to the Middle Ages and detailed records exist for annuity pools in France
as early as the 17th Century (Poterba, 1997). Annuities became very popular after
the Great Depression of the 1930s which followed the stock market crash of 1929.
People purchased financial products from life insurance companies because they were
deemed more stable than holding shares on the financial markets. Since then an-
nuities have expanded to many parts of the world over the years. Some insurance
companies have life insurance products with withdrawal features available to retirees.
There are also a number of investment products that allow individuals to invest in
a variety of mutual funds mainly focussed on decumulation. These funds centre on
the creation of investment products that can create a stream of income to fund re-
tirementm (Hawkins, 2010). The option of lump sum at retirement still remains the
predominant choice for retirees and retirement products see less patronage in many
Anglo-American countries. [See The World Bank (1999), Financial Services Inquiry
Report 2014]
There has been a long-standing interest in researching annuitisation in retirement.
In his seminal study on the theory of a lifecycle consumer, Yaari (1965) asserts that
in the absence of bequest motives, it is optimal for the investor to hold life annu-
ities rather than liquid assets. Davidoff, Brown, and Diamond (2003) demonstrate
theoretically the benefits and optimality of holding life annuities in retirement under
less restrictive conditions than the Yaari model. One promising annuity option is the
deferred annuity. The deferred annuity, also called the longevity annuity, commences
periodic payments to the annuitant at some pre-specified future date conditional on
survival. Deferred annuities are available in the US and the UK annuity markets but
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are not available in Australia. This is because pension rules prescribe minimum with-
drawals during the deferred period and do not permit deferred earnings to be eligible
for tax benefits. The leading provider of annuities in Australia, Challenger Limited,
expects the price of a deferred annuity purchased by a 65-year-old man which begins
payouts of $8,000 annually from age 80 to cost as low as $10,000 (Uren, 2012). There
are plans to introduce deferred annuities on the Australian market in the near future
and this is one of the motivations for this thesis. Whilst the benefits of this annuity
option are widely discussed in the literature, the suitable timing of deferred annuities
has not been examined. The length of the annuity’s deferral period is another side of
this product that is not discussed in previous literature. This leaves room for further
research on the timing and length of deferred annuities and the benefits of including
this product in a retirement portfolio both in the presence and absence of government
means-tested age pension.
It is widely considered that asset allocation is an important driver of portfolio in-
vestment returns over the long horizon. This is sufficiently demonstrated by studies
such as Brinson, Hood, and Beebower (1986) and Blake, Lehmann, and Timmer-
mann (1999). The DC plan lasts over long horizons, typically the entire working life
an individual. This makes asset allocation an important aspect of such a plan and
a significant determinant of returns and final wealth. With continuously decreasing
mortality, the average life expectation for a 65 year old female Australian is expected
to rise to age 93 in the year 2050. Australian retirees will live to an expected average
of 28 years in retirement. This represents a substantially long distribution horizon
and planning in retirement as well as asset allocation in this phase of life is increas-
ingly important. Cooley, Hubbard, and Walz (2001) propose that at least 50% of a
retirement portfolio should be invested in stocks and their findings show increased
sustainability of the pension fund as it tilts more towards equities. They show that
the presence of bonds is mainly to restrain portfolio volatility and provide liquidity to
cover an investor’s living expenses. Bengen (2004) advises that if the future market
follows the trends of behaviour in the past, then a retirement portfolio should contain
50-75%equity allocation.
In the last two decades, allocation to bonds in the seven largest pension markets have
decreased by 12% (40% to 28%), with cash allocations reducing from 6% to 1% in
the same period. Equity investments on the other hand have increased by 3% to 52%
of total pension allocations, with the remaining 18% allocated to alternative assets
which include real estate, private equity, hedge funds and commodities (Towers Wat-
son, 2014). Are these changes moving in the right directions? The conventional rule
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of thumb to pension investment states that the investors should allocate a percentage
of 100 minus their current age in risky assets (such as stocks) and the remainder in
low risk assets such as bonds and cash. The lifecycle strategy is probably the most
popularly used default investment plan and in Australia, lifecycle funds are increasing
rapidly (QSuper, 2014). The strategy invests massively in stock at the onset when the
investor is still young, because the younger investor is able to assume more risk than
the older investor, according to Utkus (2005), who also believes that there is always
time to regain losses if stocks should decline in the early years of investment. This
investment is gradually switched to low risk assets as the individual nears retirement
and the asset mix changes. Since the allocation to stocks (risky assets) and bonds
and cash (non-risky assets) is unidirectional, investment in stocks reduces as that in
bonds and cash increases. This has been firmly supported by works such as Malkiel
(1999) who asserts that the plan participants should consider cutting back on riskier
assets and increase investment in bonds and cash as they grow older.
While the lifecycle investment option is predominantly accepted in the accumulation
phase, decreasing investment in risky assets with increasing age is prevalent in retire-
ment phase as well. Retirees generally do not change their asset allocations in the
retirement phase, leaving them in the default strategy, which is mostly the lifecycle
plan. Retirees’ reluctance to exercise their option of investment choice in retirement
is due to the perceived lack of financial literacy. Biases in human behaviour is also
recognised as one factor influencing this inaction, with retirees perceiving the default
investment option available to them as an endorsement or recommendation by the
plan provider (Beshears, Choi, Laibson, & Madrian, 2009). With studies showing
that pension sustainability is immensely improved with high levels of equity in accu-
mulation, there is growing interest in what allocations are optimal in the retirement
phase (Arnott, Sherrerd, & Wu, 2013; Estrada, 2012). Investment strategies in the
decumulation phase are fairly new to the retirement literature and leave a lot of room
for exploration. Fundamental decisions such as holding a strategic static asset allo-
cation (SAA) as opposed to a decreasing risky asset investment in the decumulation
phase are still left unanswered. Based on historical returns, are retirees better off
with the default lifecycle style of investing or exploring alternative methods? Some
of these alternative methods such as increasing risky assets with age have been found
to provide higher wealth levels and better downside performance in the accumulation
phase. Do these alternative methods improve retirement wealth outcomes in the de-
cumulation phase when retirees face the stress of regular income withdrawals and the
imminent shocks to expected government pensions? These are some of the questions
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that motivate the final essay of this thesis.
1.4 Research Objective
In Australia, about half of superannuation benefits in retirement are paid as lump
sums; the remaining half is paid as income streams. Individuals who wish to convert
their superannuation assets into a retirement income stream may choose between
Account-Based Pensions (ABP) and annuities. ABPs allow retirees to choose their
investment strategy; they have the option of taking lump sums at any time whilst
the remaining balance is drawn down according to the retirees’ preference subject to
legislative prescribed minimums. Annuities are financial products which provide the
buyer with a series of regular payments in return for an upfront lump-sum investment
or a series of smaller payments. Income from the annuities may be received over a
specified time horizon (fixed-term annuities) or for the remainder of the individual’s
life (lifetime annuities). Account-based pensions account for at least 94% of current
pension assets. This means retirees choose to manage their retirement benefits rather
than investing in annuities that will provide them with regular periodic income. This
decision entails that retirees are responsible for the size and timing of lump sums
should they decide to take one as well as their choice of drawdown strategy. What
constitutes an appropriate drawdown strategy is discussed in the first essay. Sec-
ondly, retirees are in charge of managing their longevity risks by choosing the ABPs.
How to appropriately incorporate longevity risk management tools in the retirement
plan is studied further in the second essay. Finally, retirees’ asset allocation of her
funds is deemed an important determinant of portfolio performance. I study different
asset allocation strategies in retirement and compare the alternatives under several
shortfall measures to emphasise the need for appropriate allocation strategies in a
retirement account.
With the empirical evidence of annuity aversion in various countries globally, the im-
portance of appropriate retirement distribution plans which adequately cater for the
risks in retirement is increasingly becoming an integral part of retirement planning.
While there are studies that compare distribution strategies under various scenarios
and preferences, there are yet a number of issues that have not been addressed. Promi-
nent among these is the assumption of Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) of
retirees for the purpose of distribution choice. More recent studies have shown that
retirees have RRA levels which exceed the inverse of EIS levels. This means retiree
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preferences in retirement are better modelled by Epstein-Zin preferences, allowing
the disentangling of the two relevant preference parameters. This dissertation incor-
porates this knowledge in the retirement distribution plans literature, analysing a
retiree’s preference of distribution plans when she is not only interested in the size
of her income but also smoothing her consumption over her retirement years. This
study further considers how such preferences are impacted by government sponsored
pensions. The presence of pension systems such as Australia’s Age Pension may
significantly affect a retiree’s choice of drawdown plan and this is extensively investi-
gated in the first study of this thesis. The inclusion of pensions in the drawdown plan
choice analysis is a novelty in this dissertation as previous studies have generally been
silent on the impact of government sponsored pensions on distribution plan choices.
Other sensitivites regarding increasing life expectation and bequest motives are also
discussed.
The plan participant of a DC account has a variety of options at retirement; promi-
nent among these is the option to take a lump-sum benefit. There may be restrictions
in some countries on how much of a lump sum one may access at retirement. Since
the DC plan is unable to cater for longevity risks, it is important that the retiree in-
vests in some form of insurance at retirement to cater for this risk. There are several
reasons explaining retirees’ aversion to life annuities, the perceived best insurance
against longevity risk. An important factor accounting for this aversion is the high
cost of annuities and the loss of liquidity through the purchase of this security as the
decision to annuitise is generally irreversible. Pension products are generally short
sold as investors are not presented clearly with the value of such products and how
these products improve their financial wellbeing. A retirement product should be easy
to implement and should be easily understood by customers. The deferred annuity is
one innovative pension product of immense value which provides the longevity insur-
ance retirees require at a low cost and can be purchased with a fraction of retirees’
wealth leaving a large portion for the retiree to self-annuitise. Such a product should
be more attractive to retirees if the value of this is apparent.
The evidence of the presence of bequest motives among the elderly is unquestion-
able, as has been amply demonstrated in academic literature. Marshall (1949, pg.
228) acknowledged the bequest motive when he said that family affection is the main
motive for saving, and that “a man is concerned about leaving his family to start
from a higher round of the social ladder than on that which he began.” Becker and
Tomes (1976) reason that parents spend resources to improve the quality or lifetime
income of their children and they derive utility from doing so irrespective of what
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the children may do with their boosted income. Of striking significance is the work
of Kotlikoff and Summers (1980) who find that at least 80% of US capital stock is
accrued through intergenerational transfers. Hurd (1989) asserts that the bequest
motive is egoistic, triggered by the desire of the elderly to leave behind a positive net
worth at time of death. He claims that most bequests are accidental and are a result
of precautionary measures taken by individuals in the absence of complete insurance
markets.
With the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis wiping out several millions of dol-
lars of retirement funds, retirees will look to preserve some capital should there be
another market crisis again in the near future. Retirees’ need for capital preservation
and meeting bequest motives is incorporated in a retirement investment strategy via
a portfolio insurance model and the retiree is given the option to annuitise a por-
tion of their retirement wealth in a deferred annuity spanning different withdrawal
periods. The preserved capital may serve as a retiree’s bequest at the time of death
and the deferred annuity caters for longevity risk. I employ the Omega Ratio as the
investment performance measure to compare various available investable alternatives
and this is a novelty of this study as this measure has previously not been used in
the retirement literature. I use this measure for its simplicity and appropriateness
in ranking preferences based on individual’s preference of higher utilities over lower
utilities.
There are growing concerns regarding the appropriateness of the lifecycle strategy
which is widely used as a default investment strategy. The final essay looks at asset
allocation strategies in the retirement decumulation phase. Whilst there are many
programs and securities available for the accumulation phase, not much attention
has been given to the allocation of asset in the distribution phase. The final essay
of this thesis investigates the appropriateness of the lifecycle strategy in retirement,
specifically comparing this widely accepted strategy to various alternative hybrids
of the lifecycle model as well as varying levels of stock in SAA strategies. Further
analysis using utility functions motivated by Prospect Theory helps to rank various
alternative investment models for different wealth thresholds. I conduct shortfall
analyses using different measures to compare the various decumation asset allocation
strategies.
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1.5 Thesis Structure and Research Description
The three essays in this dissertation share a common subject of investment strategies
in the retiree’s decumulation phase. Although I provide a general introduction and
literature review, each essay has its own introduction and review of related litera-
ture. The rest of the thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 2 presents the general
literature review which shapes the scope of this thesis and introduces the relevant
studies in pension literature, investments and portfolio performance measures. The
first essay is presented in Chapter 3; I study the effect of Means-Tested Age Pension
on decumulation plan choices when a retiree has Epstein-Zin preferences. Chapter
4 presents the second essay, a study of the timing and deferral periods of deferred
annuities in a retirement decumulation plan for retirees with bequest motives. The
final essay is presented in Chapter 5 and I discuss the investment glidepath illusion
and compare the lifecycle style investment to alternative strategies under different
shortfall measures. Finally, I conclude in Chapter 6 and point out some possible
avenues for future research.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
This chapter consists of six sections. In Section 2.1, I discuss the global decreasing
mortality rates and the impact of this on retirement planning as increased life expec-
tation serves as a major motivation for research in a retiree’s decumulation phase. I
discuss asset allocation and sustainable withdrawal strategies in Section 2.2, focussing
on the different asset allocations recommended in various studies for the decumula-
tion phase and the different withdrawal rates as suggested in previous literature. I
review the history and development of the life annuity in Section 2.3. I discuss the
various annuity types and demand for annuities on various markets. The section
concludes with a brief discussion of the annuity puzzle and the way forward for life
annuities. Section 2.4 reviews the evidence of bequest motives among individuals
and the influence of bequest on consumption and asset allocation. In Section 2.5,
I review the Epstein-Zin preferences and utility and examine its appropriateness in
the retirement drawdown and bequest analysis. I discuss the measures of investment
performance used in this thesis in Section 2.6; 2.6.1 introduces the Omega Ratio used
in the second study and 2.6.2 discusses different alternative shortfall measures which
are used in the third essay.
2.1 Mortality Improvements and the Need for Retire-
ment Planning
The two major phases of peoples’ financial life are their wealth accumulation and
decumulation years. The importance of saving for retirement is apparent and many
countries have well-structured pension plans to enable individuals to save up for their
retirement. Individuals must face the task of taking appropriate measures to prepare
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for anticipated longer retirement lifetimes whilst governments and policy makers in-
creasingly face concerns regarding aged-care, pension and welfare policies. Whereas
there is extensive academic research to constructing well-diversified and sustainable
investment portfolio during the working life of individuals, the same cannot be said
for dissaving wealth after the individual’s retirement. The importance of wealth dis-
saving strategies has become more pronounced with the increase in life expectation
especially in developed countries and the growth in numbers of the DC plans over
the DB plans.
The last two centuries has seen life expectancy more than doubling, from roughly
25 years to about 65 for men and 70 for women (Riley, 2005). The Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)1 defines life expectation as a
measure of how long on average a person of a given age can expect to live, if prevail-
ing death rates do not change (OECD, 2013). The life expectancy for a population
is directly read from mortality tables, also called a life table, which is a statistical
model used to represent mortality for a given population. A recent report by the
United Nations (UN)2 reveals that the 10 countries with the highest life expectancies
for the period 2010-2015 have an average of 81.7 years for both sexes combined. For
the same period, 57% of the world population live in countries with life expectancy
above 70 years, while 9% of the global population has a life expectancy reaching 80
or higher. Very few countries remain at life expectancy levels below age 60, with only
9% of the world population living in these countries. Between sexes, women have a
life expectancy advantage of 4.5 years on average, with this advantage decreasing for
less developed countries and increasing for more developed countries.
Disparity between life expectations is not only observed for the different sexes but also
for geographical locations and significantly for different income levels. While these
findings report the life expectancy at birth, a vital aspect of mortality expectation
is the conditional survival probabilities at different ages. The conditional survival
probabilities are most relevant in actuarial finance and for retirement planning. The
life table provides the probability of death or survival within any one given year,
thus translating an age group x into a probability of dying, qx, during the next year.
For example q60 is the probability of an individual dying before her 61st birthday
assuming she is alive at age 60. The probability of dying by definition is 0 ≤ qx ≤ 1
and qN = 1 for some large enough number say N = 110. The conditional probability
1The OECD is an international economic organisation of 34 countries founded in 1961 to stimulate
economic progress and world trade.
2United Nations (2013)
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of survival in year x is the complement of qx, or 1− qx, usually denoted by px. The
conditional probability of survival provides an estimate of surviving n more years
given that the individual has survived x years. This is denoted in actuarial notation
by3:
npx =
n−1∏
i=0
(1− qx+1) (2.1)
npx is the conditional probability of survival for n years given an individual age x.
The value of npx declines with increasing age as the probability of living for n = 10
years is higher when one is x = 65 years of age than when one is x = 90 years of age.
Table 2.1 shows an extract of Australian Life Tables 2005-2007 (2009) which includes
estimates of px and px+10 from my calculations. The calculations of conditional
probabilities help actuaries determine the expectation of life to various ages. This
helps in the provision of technical and statistical knowhow for financial planners and
policy makers on survival expectations of cohorts at given survival to specific ages.
An example is the probability of a cohort of retirees at age 65 surviving to age 85.
Table 2.1: Extract from ALT 2005-2007 (Females)
Age(x) lx dx px qx 10px
65 92,152 626 0.9932 0.0068 0.89918
66 91,526 680 0.9926 0.0074 0.88137
67 90,846 742 0.9918 0.0082 0.86814
68 90,104 813 0.9910 0.0090 0.85335
69 89,291 894 0.9900 0.0100 0.83665
70 88,398 986 0.9888 0.0112 0.81788
80 72,308 2,647 0.9634 0.0366 0.47897
90 34,635 4,535 0.8691 0.1309 0.10492
100 3,634 1,028 0.7172 0.2828 0.0000
109 105 39 0.6320 0.3680 0.0000
lx–number of persons surviving to exact age x
dx–number of persons dying at exact age x
qx– proportion of persons dying between exact age x and exact age x+ 1
px–proportion of persons surviving between exact age x and exact age x+ 1
10px–proportion of persons surviving between exact age x and exact age x+ 10
From the extract, a 65-year-old retiree has up to 89.9% chance of surviving 10 more
years in retirement while the 90-year-old has 10.5% probability of surviving to age
100. Calculations based on Australia’s recent life table4 show that 50% of Australian
females aged 65 will live to age 87 as opposed to age 84, which is the life expectation
at birth. One in five 65-year-old women can be expected to live to age 93 and one in
3Milevsky (2006)
4Australian Life Tables 2010-2012 (2013)
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10 to at least age 96. This requires a retiree who wants to be 90% certain that her
superannuation savings last as long as she lives to plan her consumption and savings
for up to 31 years.
According to the OECD (2013) report, the advances in healthcare, healthier lifestyles
and improved living conditions before and after people reach age 65 significantly con-
tributes to the observed decreasing mortality rates. With increasing life expectation
in retirement, the onus lies on policy makers to ensure that welfare policies are put in
place which incorporate the expected improvements in life expectancies. Individuals
are responsible for planning and ensuring that their savings and accumulations dur-
ing their working years can adequately sustain them in the event of long retirement
horizons. Life expectancy is underestimated by many and this is evidence in a recent
report by the International Monetary Fund which cautioned that the underestimation
of life expectancy could add up to about 50% of the cost of providing for retirement
in Australia (Uren, 2012). In the US, the American Society of Actuaries found that
more than half of Americans surveyed underestimate their life expectancy, and per-
ceive very short financial planning time horizons in retirement. The survey conducted
by the Society, of the retirees and pre-retirees, found about 4 in 10 underestimated
their life expectancy age by five or more years and another 2 in 10 underestimated
it by 2 to 4 years. More importantly, regarding the median life expectancy, only
4 in 10 retirees correctly responded that about half of 65-year-old men and women
can expect to live until median life expectancy. This report is published by Lifetime
Income Risk Task Force (2012). There is a strong indication that variability of life
expectancy is not well understood by the populace.
2.2 Asset Allocation and Sustainable Portfolio Withdrawals
The need for optimal asset allocation in investors’ dissaving phase is essential to
ensure that they do not outlive their available resources. The importance of asset
allocation is highlighted in the seminal work by Brinson et al. (1986) who find that
up to 94% of variation in their sample pension funds’ total return is explained by
the choice of asset classes and their relative weights in a portfolio. For the accu-
mulation phase, there are several popular investment models which investors employ
with the hope of saving adequately for retirement. There is the Strategic Asset Al-
location strategy (SAA), a static allocation strategy which is representative of the
optimal combination of different asset classes where the aggregate asset classes are
assumed to be efficiently priced. (Radcliffe, 1997). The SAA is akin to the buy
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and hold strategy and the assets are periodically rebalanced to the target alloca-
tions as investment returns skew the original asset allocation proportions. A more
active strategy is the Tactical Asset Allocation (TAA) which is not static but allows
for a range of proportions for each asset class. This allows the investor to take ad-
vantage of market volatility by altering the asset proportions. This is particularly
useful when an investor believes asset classes are mispriced. In terms of the length
of investment horizons, while the SAA decisions relate to long investment horizons,
the TAA is usually useful for shorter horizons, typically a year or less (Haugen, 1990).
Conventional wisdom suggests that individuals are more risk averse as they grow
older and their investment horizons get shorter. Individuals should therefore invest
more in stock when they are young with long investment horizons and switch to more
conservative investments as they grow older. Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson (1992),
Bodie (2003) and Samuelson (1989), among others, have agreed with such a proposi-
tion. Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sunden (2003) in their empirical study find evidence of a
downward trend in stock allocation with age among US retirement accounts over the
period 1995–98. However, other studies find the reduction in stock exposure with age
to be insignificant (see Ameriks & Zeldes, 2004; Gomes & Michaelides, 2005; Poterba
& Samwick, 2003). An investment approach that explicitly becomes more defensive
with age is usually referred to as a lifecycle plan.
Lifecycle strategies periodically rebalance the investments in line with a specific asset
allocation target. The strategy invests massively in stock at the onset when the in-
vestor is still young, cutting back on stocks as the investor grows older. Utkus (2005)
supports this as a prudent method as the younger investor is able to assume more risk
than the older investor, adding that there is time to regain losses should they occur
early in retirement. Other studies suggest the lifecycle as a reasonable default op-
tion with Malkiel (1999) agreeing that the plan participants should consider cutting
back on riskier assets and increase investment in bonds (conservative assets) as they
grow older. The lifecycle is probably the most popularly used default investment plan.
The optimality of this strategy has been questioned in recent academic literature.
Shiller (2005) believes the earnings profile of individuals is hump-shaped; young peo-
ple earn relatively less income compared to their older colleagues and earnings peak
at middle age. Therefore investing heavily in stock in the early years when there is
very little wealth and conservatively in the later years when earnings are bigger does
not help in achieving an optimal allocation. Basu, Byrne, and Drew (2011) suggest a
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high investment in growth assets at the beginning of the investment cycle, when the
investment is able to achieve the investor’s wealth accumulation target, the asset mix
is adjusted to reduce allocation to stock and increase allocation to bonds and cash
(conservative assets). This is continually evaluated and the asset mix is readjusted
to increase growth assets allocation if at any point in time, wealth value should run
down below the investor’s accumulation target.
DC plans often offer a great variety of investment choices to their members, from very
conservative to more aggressive investment strategies. This confronts individuals with
the challenge of choosing investment strategies that most suits their individual needs
and risk preferences. Even with the varied investment options available, research has
shown that the majority of retirees for various reasons choose to invest in the retire-
ment fund’s default option. As most plan members have limited financial knowledge,
most default strategies simplify complex savings decisions, which in turn may en-
courage higher participation rates. Another reason for the high participation rates in
default strategies, Beshears et al. (2009) suggest, is the so called endorsement effect.
Individuals tend to perceive the default investment strategy as an endorsement of a
particular course of action by the plan sponsor or provider. Whilst many retirees
leave their retirement fund in the default investment because of non-participation,
other retirees actively choose the default option as their investment of choice. The
statistics on plan members in default investment strategies are startling with over
80% of Australian superannuation plan participants actively or passively choosing
the default option. Other countries such as the United States of America and the
United Kingdom have up to 80% and 60-100% of plan participants in the default
strategy respectively (IOPS, 2012). On the pros of choosing such a default strategy,
studies by Madrian and Shea (2000) show that default funds which are specifically
designed to reflect the needs of pension plan members come with numerous benefits.
Since some individuals have very little financial knowledge, a well-suited default plan
simplifies the savings process thereby increasing participation rates. This benefit is
echoed by Byrne, Blake, Cairns, and Dowd (2007).
In the decumulation phase, asset allocation remains an important part of investment
and determines the sustainability of a retiree’s portfolio. Bengen (2004) advises that
if future markets follow the trends of past behaviour, then a retirement portfolio
should contain 50-75% equity allocation; allocating the remaining to low-risk assets.
Works by Milevsky (2001) and Ameriks, Veres, and Warshawsky (2001) demonstrate
through simulation, the need for holding a substantial equity allocation in retirement
portfolio. Cooley et al. (2001) propose that at least 50% of a retirement portfolio
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should be invested in stocks and their findings show increased sustainability of the
pension fund as it tilts more towards equities. They show that the presence of bonds
is mainly to restrain portfolio volatility and provide liquidity to cover an investor’s
living expenses. The benefit of an equity-dominated portfolio in retirement is well
documented in literature.
Bierwirth (1994) formulates future financial and investment strategy decisions in re-
tirement by using historical data of past retirees’ investment decisions and outcomes
to forecast possible future retirees’ range of outcomes. He asserts that based on ac-
tual observed experiences, one is able to predict better the ranges of future outcomes.
With this assumption, a number of studies on retirement fund sustainability predict
future returns based on actual historical returns. Results from asset allocation mod-
els based on historical returns have however produced mixed results for the lifecycle
strategy. Milevsky and Kyrychenko (2008) demonstrate that investors with downside
protection in the form of ‘longevity puts’ assume 5% to 30% more risk exposure than
the investors without such protection. This evidence shows that in the presence of
insurance for asset allocation in retirement investment, plan participants defy the con-
ventional approach to investment, where investors’ allocation to risky assets decreases
with increasing age and take up more risk. The need for a more aggressive portfolio
in retirement is echoed in a study by Basu et al. (2011) who suggest that investors are
richer on average with a glidepath that is in reverse to the conventional lifecycle path.
Arnott et al. (2013) show that the lifecycle strategy fails to meet the basic objective
for a retirement solution; resulting in lower terminal values compared to the static
balanced and the inverse glidepath portfolio approaches. This subsequently results
in a low level of annuity income generated from the lifecycle approach in retirement.
Surz (2009) strongly disagrees with the proposal of an inverse glidepath arguing that
the risks associated with such a model outweigh the investment returns as proposed.
In his subsequent work, Surz (2013) stresses that what matters most in retirement
planning is not the direction of allocations or glide paths but saving enough before
retirement. He emphasises that no glidepath is able to compensate for inadequate
savings. With disagreements on the glide path paradigm, this thesis seeks to explore
how the need for equity dominated portfolios yielding superior returns and terminal
wealth translates to retirees’ asset allocation choices and the role of glidepath in such
investments in the decumulation phase.
At retirement, the retiree is left with the task of ensuring that her nest egg is able to
meet her income needs as long as she is alive. Several questions arise in the retiree’s
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quest to meet this motive. How much income is sufficient to meet her needs in retire-
ment? How long will her portfolio last if she continues to withdrawal at her preferred
rate? How long is she expected to live? Should asset allocation be changed in the
retirement phase? These are a few of the important retirement decisions that need
to be addressed for a comfortable retirement. At retirement, the retiree may choose
to fully or partially annuitise her wealth or self-annuitise. By annuitising, a retiree
pays a non-refundable lump sum to an insurance company in exchange for a guar-
anteed life-long consumption stream that cannot be outlived. By self-annuitising, a
retiree chooses to maintain full liquidity of her wealth by investing in a diversified
portfolio and withdrawing a stipulated amount annually to meet consumption needs.
This way, the retiree tries to mimic the income stream received from the annuity
(Milevsky, 1998).
In his pioneering work, Bengen (2004) suggests that to withdraw from a retirement
portfolio without exhausting the retiree’s assets, he should adopt a “safe” withdrawal
rate which is annually adjusted for inflation and a corresponding asset allocation in
the retiree’s portfolio based on her risk tolerance. For retirees 60-65 years, he advises
a withdrawal rate of 4% and a 50-75% stock allocation. This formed the basis of
the popular 4% Withdrawal Rule which is well accepted in both theory and practice.
In his subsequent works, he presents findings which support the 4% withdrawal rule
(Bengen, 1996, 1997, 2001). Cooley et al. (2001) make analysis based on portfolios
using annual overlapping historical returns data on S&P 500 and high grade corpo-
rate bonds and suggest a relevant range of withdrawal between 3 and 4% as being
sustainable for fixed periods of up to 30 years in retirement. In their most recent
study, Cooley, Hubbard, and Walz (2011) suggest an annual withdrawal rate of 4
to 5% which is annually adjusted for inflation. Hubbard (2006) considers different
withdrawal rates and various portfolio allocation strategies using S&P 500 and high
grade US corporate bonds. He analyses the sustainability of withdrawals over fixed
periods of up to 30 years using overlapping monthly asset returns and emphasises the
benefit of holding an equity dominated portfolio.
Some influential studies use the Monte Carlo simulation to explore thousands of
possible future scenarios of returns on assets. Ameriks et al. (2001) demonstrate
through Monte Carlo simulation and by using historical returns, the need for holding
a substantial equity allocation in retirement portfolio. Using a portfolio of returns
on S&P 500, bonds and cash, they conclude, based on both approaches, that in-
creasing the stock market exposure of portfolios increases the portfolios probability
of sustaining systematic withdrawals. Their analysis suggests an annual withdrawal
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rate of 4.5% that is adjusted for inflation annually and different fixed horizons of up
to 40 years. Pye (2000) uses the Monte Carlo simulation of returns to analyse the
sustainability of various withdrawal rates in real terms, that is, after these rates have
been reduced for tax and other expenses. He suggests up to 3.5% annual withdrawal
over a 35-year pension horizon.
Works by Spitzer, Strieter, and Singh (2007)) and Spitzer (2008) have questioned
the widely accepted 4% rule as being an ‘oversimplification of a complex process’.
They suggest the distribution process is a complex decision involving asset allocation,
risk tolerance, withdrawal size and expected returns and a fixed 4% rule adjusted for
inflation is not always a safe rate but a dynamic approach that performs better in
the context of these complexities. More recent works by Zolt (2013) support the idea
of a dynamic withdrawal approach to withdrawal, suggesting that retirees forego the
proposed annual inflation increases when portfolio performance is less than expected.
While Harris (2009) agrees that the distribution process is a complex one, he finds
that sustainability is primarily determined by sequencing risk. He suggests with-
drawal rates of 2 to 4% as being safe. For different underlying assumptions regarding
the distribution of portfolio returns, Athavale and Goebel (2011) find that a with-
drawal rate of 2.5% is sustainable for a 35-year retirement horizon.
With the 4% rule remaining debatable, researchers believe its underlying philosophy
is useful in outlining the liability aspect of retirement planning and helps in retirees
forming realistic expectations (Drew & Walk, 2014). There are several possible with-
drawal strategies and it is important that the retiree makes a choice that optimises
her utility based on her preferences and remaining life expectation. Popular distribu-
tion rules include the fixed withdrawal, fixed percentage of wealth, the ‘1/T’ rule and
the 1/E [T] rule, with studies comparing these strategies to life annuities (see Dus
et al., 2005; Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, & Dus, 2008). The fixed withdrawal strategy
involves the retiree withdrawing a fixed dollar amount of her wealth every year. This
amount may or may not be adjusted for inflation. The fixed percentage withdrawal is
a strategy in which the individual makes a withdrawal of a defined percentage of her
remaining wealth year after year. Although, the fixed percentage may fluctuate ex-
cessively with market volatility, the retiree never runs into retirement ruin. The ‘1/T’
rule is a strategy in which one divides her wealth into a number of parts, the parts
representing the maximum possible duration of her payout plan. The ‘T’ is usually
set to the limiting age according to a mortality table and therefore diminishes with
age, increasing her withdrawal as she consumes a fraction of her wealth each year.
The third strategy, the 1/E[T] rule is similar to the second but the investor adjusts
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her consumption level annually based on her expected remaining lifetime rather than
keeping a fixed lifetime expectation across the whole investment horizon. The opti-
mality of these strategies and what influences retirees’ choice of withdrawal strategy
is an open discussion among researchers. The selection of withdrawal strategy that is
best for retirees based on their preferences is also an important area for policy makers
in post-retirement planning.
I believe modelling a withdrawal plan over a fixed horizon is an unsuitable method
of analysis since there is no guarantee for life expectation over such fixed periods. It
becomes an increasingly ineffective planning strategy when we put this in the per-
spective of decreasing mortality which is evident globally. The use of rolling estimates
in financial planning, which assume that the returns on assets in the future will be
in the exact sequence as experienced in the past, is another area of concern. This
assumption is a weak one since there is a very small probability of this occurrence in
the same sequence. The recent Global Financial Crisis (GFC) also gives a different
view to the subject of investment sustainability. Although the withdrawal strategies
discussed may suit the pre-GFC period, they may not necessarily be a perfect se-
lection for planning since the possibility of another shock to the financial markets
cannot be discounted and future planning needs to account for this possibility. To
account for these shortfalls, the investment models proposed in this doctoral disser-
tation depend on stochastic lifetimes that are based on life expectation experiences
from the appropriate life tables. I use block bootstrap resampling methodology that
requires less restrictive assumptions about data distribution and characteristics. I
also use a rich dataset spanning 85 years of daily returns on US stocks, bonds and
bills (1928-2013). I discuss these models in detail in Chapters 3, 4, and 5.
2.3 Life Annuities
A life annuity is a series of payments made continuously or in equal intervals, such as
monthly, quarterly or annually while a given life survives (Bowers & Hickman, 1997).
Annuities may be limited to a given term of years or payable for the whole of life
with payments beginning immediately or deferred over an agreed period. Annuities-
due refers to annuity payments due at the beginning of the payments intervals while
annuities-immediate commences payment at the end of the payment interval. For
an agreed initial premium, a life company agrees to make regular payments to an
annuitant over the agreed period. The existence of single premium life annuities
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dates back to the Middle Ages and detailed records exist for annuity pools in France
as early as the 17th Century. Although annuities were available at different times,
they only became commercially available to individuals in 1812, when a life insur-
ance company in Pennsylvania began marketing contracts to individuals. The post
stock market crash of 1929 marked the beginning of tremendous growth in the sale
of annuities. People purchased annuities because they were deemed more stable than
holding shares on the financial markets. The first variable annuity was sold in 1953 by
the Teachers Insurance and Annuities Association College Retirement Equity Fund
(TIAA-CREF) and since then many features have been added to the traditional fixed
income annuity. Annuities have expanded to many parts of the world over the years
(Poterba, 1997).
The United States of America (US) and the United Kingdom (UK) have very well-
developed annuity markets. Though the US has the largest pension fund industry
in the world, the UK has the biggest annuity market, setting up about 500,000 an-
nuities each year. The Australian market is not as well developed as the US and
UK. This may be due to the various options available to retirees in Australia such
as the government sponsored means-tested pension scheme (Evans & Sherris, 2009).
The demand for annuities is however growing; annuity sales have grown from $514
million in 2007 to $2 billion in 2011 and are expecting to further increase by 25% in
2012 (Uren, 2012). Life annuity sales by Challenger Ltd, Australia’s biggest annuity
provider, for the March 2014 quarter were $496 million, an increase of 29% on the
prior corresponding period (Challenger Limited, 2014). Annuities are sold only by
life insurance companies. In Australia, life insurance companies are controlled by
the Life insurance Act 1995 and regulated by the Australian Prudential Regulation
Authority (APRA).
There are many annuity types, with the primary ones being the term, life and deferred
annuities. The term annuity pays the annuitant or beneficiary an agreed payout in-
come over a fixed period whether or not the annuitant survives. The life annuity pays
the annuitant regular income contingent on the annuitant being alive and ceases upon
death. Finally, the deferred annuity offers payments to the plan participant only af-
ter a specified age determined at the time of purchase. This is referred to as the
deferred period, and payments are made on condition that the annuitant survives
the specified age. A fixed payout annuity provides periodic fixed dollar amounts to
the plan participant, and the level of payment is usually agreed on at the time of
purchase. Annuities can include a variety of features such as escalation guarantees
in the form of inflation indexation using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) or variable
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payouts when the annuity is dependent on the performance of the underlying invest-
ment fund. There are also annuities which provide the option of a return of capital
if the annuitant rescinds her decision within a limited period.
There is the Joint and Survivor (J&S) annuity, where the annuitant specifies that
upon death, a surviving spouse will continue to receive income as long as the spouse
lives. There is the period certain annuity which guarantees that if the annuitant dies
early, a beneficiary will receive income payments until an agreed future period. An-
nuities can be purchased at any age, and at all ages females receive less payment per
period than males. This is because females live longer on average and the life com-
pany compensates for making more payments by making lower payments (Milevsky,
2006). There are also enhanced annuities, providing income to people in poor health
and terminal conditions such as cancer patients. These incomes are usually higher
than incomes received by healthy annuitants.
In discrete time, the actuarial present value paying a unit amount at the end of each
year the annuitant x survives. Whole life annuity immediate is denoted by:
ax = (1 + Lx)
w−x∑
t=0
tpx
(1 + rt)t
(2.2)
ax is the actuarial present value of the life annuity at age x
rt denotes the yield on a zero coupon bond maturing at time t
tpx is the conditional probability of an individual age x surviving to age x+ t
Lx is the Insurance Loading Factor charged at issue age x.
The Insurance Loading Factor covers the commissions, all expenses and taxes. This
amount is multiplied by the pure annuity premium to arrive at the annuity’s market
price (Milevsky, 1998). The work of Mitchell, Poterba, and Warshawsky (2000) as-
serts that the loading factor increases with increasing issue age and this reasoning is
applied to the annuity pricing in this thesis.
In his seminal work on the theory of a lifecycle consumer, Yaari (1965) asserts that
in the absence of bequest motives, it is optimal for the investor to hold life annuities
rather than liquid assets. Since the work by Makeham Yaari, there have been several
studies emphasising the benefits of individuals holding life annuities in retirement.
Duff (2001) suggests that annuities are the only products that offer the guarantee
of a lifetime contingency that cannot be duplicated by any other financial strategy
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in investment. Ameriks et al. (2001) suggest that in the same logic of diversifying
a portfolio to avert financial ruin, it is prudent to annuitise an individual’s wealth
to hedge longevity risk. Panis (2003) shows that retirees who purchase life annuities
maintain their level of satisfaction during retirement, whilst retirees who do not pur-
chase annuities become less satisfied over time. Davidoff et al. (2003) demonstrate
theoretically the benefits and optimality of holding life annuities in retirement under
less restrictive conditions of the Yaari model. More recently, Bateman and Kingston
(2007) describe annuities as the only form of retirement benefit that insures against
longevity risk while Blake, Wright, and Zhang (2011) suggest that a life annuity is a
critically important component of a well-designed retirement portfolio since it abso-
lutely caters for longevity.
With knowledge of the numerous benefits of annuitising, governments in some coun-
tries institute policies, which ensure mandatory annuitisation at certain ages after a
period of phased withdrawals. In Chile for example, James, Martinez, and Iglesias
(2006) find that up to two-thirds of all retirees have annuitized. They argue that
this high rate of annuitisation is explained by the country’s guarantees and regula-
tions that place restrictions on payout choices, and insurance they receive through
minimum pension guarantee as well as elimination of DB plan components, giving
insurance companies selling annuities a competitive advantage. In Switzerland, the
inclusion of annuitisation as a default choice in retirement, a legal guarantee of bene-
fits and favourable tax structure among others are believed to explain the high rates
of annuitisation according to Avanzi (2010). The Reister Personal Pension Account
plan in Germany provides some tax inducements for participants who voluntarily save
in Individual Pension Accounts (IPA) during the accumulation phase. This accen-
tuates the government’s interest in enhancing the asset accumulation of its citizens
in Germany’s ageing population. At retirement, a lump sum amount of 20% of the
individual’s accumulated assets can be withdrawn from the IPA and the remainder
is drawn out in the form of a life annuity or a phased withdrawal5 (Bo¨rsch-Supan,
Coppola, & Reil-Held, 2012). The phased withdrawal amounts are either constant or
increasing and relapse into an immediate annuity at age 85. In the UK, a portion of
the accumulated funds can be withdrawn as a lump sum at retirement. Until April
2006, the plan participant was legally obligated to purchase an annuity at age 75 with
the remainder of her accumulated assets Blake (2006). In Canada, the retiree must
purchase a life annuity with her tax-sheltered savings or create a managed withdrawal
plan at age 69 (Milevsky & Robinson, 2000).
5This was increased to 30% in the Riester’s 2005 reforms.
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In the United States on the other hand, annuitisation is not compulsory for 401(K)
plan participants. The retirees thus roll them into Individual Retirement Accounts
(IRA) and manage these accounts themselves. Tax laws require that minimum dis-
tributions begin at age 70.5. Similarly, there is no obligation to annuitise retirement
wealth in Australia. Retirees have a range of benefit options with the retirement fund;
they can convert their wealth into one or more lump sums, a phased withdrawal or a
life or term annuity (Ganegoda & Bateman, 2008). Annuity sales in Australia have
been steadily growing since the last quarter of 2011, an indication that the life annu-
ity is gradually gaining some popularity in the market. Research predicts that 2013
should record the highest annuity purchases in Australia since 2004 (Plan for Life,
2013).
Despite the impact of government support and theoretical benefits of annuitisation
well documented in literature, there is considerable empirical evidence of voluntary
annuitisation aversion among investors (Blake, Cairns, & Dowd, 2003). This has led
to what economists call the annuity puzzle. There are some conflicting yet interesting
interpretations of the annuity puzzle. Firstly, people believe in receiving support from
families and the ability to pool longevity risk within families and this deters them
from annuitizing their wealth at retirement (Kotlikoff & Spivak, 1981). Friedman
and Warshawsky (1990) suggest the ‘actuarially unfair’ pricing of annuities accounts
for its low voluntary patronage under plausible assumptions. Their suggestion is
based on findings that the annuity yield is emphatically depressed due to the loading
factor imposed by the life office to cater for transaction costs and adverse selection
among annuitants. Brown (2001) suggests this aversion could be attributed to in-
vestors’ knowledge of their subjective survival probabilities. Therefore, investors in
poor health will avoid purchasing annuities since the decision to purchase annuities is
irreversible. Another reason for the annuity aversion, according to Munnell, Sunde´n,
Soto, and Taylor (2002) is the presence of other annuitised resources such as Social
Security and employer-sponsored defined benefits plans. In Australia, this could be
explained by the availability of the means-tested public age pension.
The evidence of retirees aversion to annuitising based on bequest motives is however
mixed. Hurd (1987) suggests that the bequest motive has no influence in the decumu-
lation arrangements, and hence the annuitisation decision of the elderly. Bernheim
(1992) refutes the no bequest argument and suggests that the decision not to annui-
tise wealth is due to strong bequest desire of individuals; he adds that many investors
would not convert all their assets to annuities even in a perfect market. Brown (2001)
finds that the bequest motive does not have a significant effect on the annuitisation
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decision and suggests that people in poor health are less likely to annuitise their
wealth. More recently however, Lockwood (2012) finds that people with plausible
bequest motives are likely to be better off not annuitising any wealth at available
rates.
According to Ganegoda and Bateman (2008), the demand for life annuities in Aus-
tralia is very low relative to other developed countries such as the UK, the US and
Switzerland. This is unfortunate as empirical and theoretical utility maximising stud-
ies by Poterba and Wise (1998) and Mitchell et al. (2000) show that even with high
insurance loading factors, the individual with rational utility function parameters is
better off annuitising. The latter study concludes that the life annuity is attractive
because of the protection it provides individuals against the risk of outliving their
own assets, given uncertainty of remaining lifetime.
With increasing life expectancy and uncertain financial market returns, the annuiti-
sation topic remains a field of great interest. Life companies are constantly finding
ways to make annuities attractive to retirees and their efforts need to be comple-
mented by policy makers to help reduce the cost of age care, especially in developed
countries with ageing populations. A government-supported annuity scheme will help
ease the burden on the private sector and reduce adverse selection. This will encour-
age competitive products and reduce the loading factor on annuities making them
more attractive. Governments can also provide viable markets for hedging longevity
risks facing the life annuity providers by offering securities such as longevity bonds,
which pay future returns based on an index of future mortality, or other reinsur-
ance based contracts (Blake, Cairns, Dowd, & MacMinn, 2006). Some researchers
believe that since the government has the strongest credit rating, it is able to provide
the assurance of contract performance that many private sectors cannot (Evans &
Sherris, 2009). I strongly believe that annuitising should be an important part of a
retirement plan and this doctoral thesis seeks to find innovative ways of including an-
nuities in a retirement plan and making the annuity attractive to the ordinary retiree.
2.4 The Evidence and Influence of Bequest Motives
The evidence of the presence of bequest motives among the elderly is undeniable;
however, the reasons for bequests and its influence on individual decision making
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remain unresolved in academic literature. Early works by Marshall (1949) acknowl-
edge that the elderly indeed have bequest motives and believes that family affection
is the driving factor for saving. Becker and Tomes (1976) suggest that parents spend
their resources to improve the quality or lifetime income of their children and they
derive utility in doing so irrespective of what the children may do with their boosted
income. Findings by Masson (1988) also suggest that households derive some utility
from bequests. Of striking significance is the work of Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981)
who find that at least 80% of US capital stock is accrued through intergenerational
transfers6. Laitner and Juster (1996) [hereafter referred to as L&J] find that about
half the respondents in their dataset of TIAA-CREF households have significant be-
quest motives. Their work draws conclusions based on data from both households
with and without children. More recent works on the presence of bequest motives
by Kopczuk and Lupton (2007) find that households with bequest motives spend
about 25% less on consumption expenses compared to households without bequest
motives. They also find that both the presence and magnitude of bequest motives are
statistically and economically significant. They conclude that among elderly single
households, about 80% of their net wealth will be bequeathed with approximately
half this amount attributed to bequest motives. More recent studies by Ameriks,
Caplin, Laufer, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2011), who investigate Public Care Aversion
(PCA) and bequest motives among individuals, find that the desire to leave a bequest
is more prevalent than previously believed.
There are others who believe that intergenerational transfers should not be necessarily
concluded as individuals meaning to meet bequest motives. According to Modigliani
(1988), the pure bequest motive, the accumulation of wealth solely for the purpose
of being distributed to heirs and not for an individual’s own consumption, is a char-
acteristic of a rather small number of households. These are mostly located in the
highest income and wealth brackets. Among the lower income brackets, intergener-
ational transfers are mostly a precautionary motive reflecting uncertainty about the
length of life and not due to a pure bequest motive. He asserts that bequests origi-
nating from the precautionary motive are different by nature from those dictated by
the bequest motive, with the former belonging to the pure life cycle accumulation.
6Based on his empirical work, Modigliani strongly disagrees with this finding and claims that life-
cycle saving was the primary source of capital accumulation and share of wealth received through
transfer does not exceed one-fourth (Modigliani, 1988). Ando and Modigliani (1963) proposed the
life-cycle hypothesis of saving under the key assumption that individuals neither expect to receive
nor desire to leave inheritance.
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Hurd (1987) hypothesised that if the pure bequest motive is an important source
of terminal wealth, then retired households with living children should have more
wealth and consequently save more than households without children. He however
finds that households with children have similar decumulation patterns as households
without children and concludes that the bequest motive is not important for a broad
cross section of households. To this, I believe the work of L&J employs a more gen-
eralised and acceptable dataset unlike Hurd, who assumes the set of households with
children to be the set of households with bequest motives. In his subsequent work,
Hurd (1989) asserts that the bequest motive is egoistic, triggered by the desire of
the elderly to leave behind a positive net worth at time of death. He claims that
most bequests are accidental and are a result of precautionary measures taken by
individuals in the absence of complete insurance markets.
Whether bequests are a result of pure bequest motives or precautionary savings, their
presence cannot be ignored. Distinguishing between pure bequest and precautionary
motives is extremely difficult as precautionary savings can also serve the bequest
motive (Dynan, Skinner, & Zeldes, 2002, 2004). The relevance of incorporating the
bequest desires of retirees into their portfolio build-up and withdrawal rate selection is
important. Jousten (2001) studies the consumption and wealth profiles of retirees in
the presence of bequest motives. He introduces incorporating the bequest motive into
the standard life-cycle model and finds that consumption is monotone non-increasing
in the linear bequest parameter for the simplest certainty case; however this result
does not hold when life-span uncertainty is incorporated in the model except in the
case of a strictly interior solution. The impact of bequests on consumption and
saving decisions still remains an open discussion. This is important as assumptions
regarding the desire to leave bequests are a central element to policy recommendation
related to the distribution of wealth, taxation, and charitable contributions in many
countries. This thesis aims to address the gap by providing insight into this aspect
of pension decumulation and seeks to identify suitable consumption patterns as well
as investment strategies for individuals with substantial bequest motives.
2.5 Epstein-Zin Preferences and Utility
In the intertemporal additive expected utility standard model, the intertemporal EIS
is confined to the inverse of the coefficient of RRA. As a result, RRA and EIS cannot
be distinguished(Attanasio & Weber, 1989; Hall, 1985; Zin, 1987). Previous attempts
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to remedy this issue have led to intertemporal inconsistencies. As Blake et al. (2011)
explain, risk aversion measures the desire of individuals to stabilise their consumption
across different states of nature in a given time period. An individual with a high
degree of risk aversion will want to avoid uncertainties in her consumption in a given
time period, or a reduction in consumption in a bad state of nature such as a fall
in equities. EIS measures the desire of the individual to smooth consumption across
time. An individual with low EIS will avoid consumption volatility over time and
more so will seek to avoid a reduction in her consumption level relative to previous
period consumption level.
Following the work of Kreps and Porteus (1978), Epstein and Zin (1989) introduce
a class of utility preferences which enable disentangling relative risk aversion from
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Using the Epstein-Zin utilities,[hereafter
referred to as E-Z], investor’s preferences are defined recursively over current con-
sumptions and the certainty equivalent of next period utility. Empirical observations
support the disentangling of relative risk aversion from elasticity of intertemporal
substitution. Using the term structure of asset returns, Schwartz and Torous (1999)
disentangle the EIS from the RRA based on Breeden’s (1979) capital asset pricing
model (CAPM). They show that while a high RRA is associated with a low EIS, the
inverse relations as assumed in the power utility are not an exact estimate. A more
recent empirical study by Blackburn (2008) found that RRA over the period 1996-
2003 changed dramatically whilst the EIS remained fairly constant. His conclusion
is based on observed S&P 500 option prices with a range of expiry dates over the pe-
riod and rejects the assumption of a reciprocal relationship between the two concepts.
The work by E-Z has become a standard tool in intertemporal models. Previous use
of this model in pension plans includes works by Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and Dus
(2008) and Blake et al. (2011). Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and Dus (2008) analyse the
utility cost of selecting different restrictive annuitisation strategies over the gradual
annuitisation using the E-Z approach. They find changing EIS to have a substantial
influence on asset allocation decision since life annuities offer a constant consumption
level that may be preferred by investors with low EIS. Blake et al. (2011) analyse
optimal funding and investment strategies of a rational lifecycle planner under E-Z
preferences and find EIS to have a marginal impact on optimal asset allocation both
before and after retirement. They assert that when EIS is greater than the inverse of
RRA, it is optimal after retirement for the individual to spend less than the pension
received and invest the saving in annuities.
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The use of E-Z preferences is relevant in this study as it opens up an insightful assess-
ment of retiree preferences and allows for an analysis of varying degrees of RRA and
EIS on consumption decision choice. Long term investors focus on the consumption
stream that a level of wealth is able to provide instead of the wealth level itself as
Campbell and Viceira (2002) note that they consume out of wealth and derive their
utility from consumption rather than from wealth. As a result, saving and investment
decisions in retirement are primarily driven by retirees’ preferences between current
and future consumption. As Chew and Epstein (1989) explain, it is perfectly rational
for an individual to care about the way consumption uncertainty resolves over time.
Following the work of Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and Dus (2008) and Blake et al.
(2011), the E-Z utility preference in this thesis is adapted to include the mortality
risk as observed from the Australia life table, Australian Life Tables 2005-2007 (2009).
The utility function is defined over a single consumption pattern that is selected at
retirement and remains the effective wealth decumulation strategy through retire-
ment. A retiree aged,x, has preferences defined by a discrete-time recursive utility
function denoted by:
Ux =
{
(1− β)× (Cx)1−
1
φ + βpx × (Ex[(Ux+1)1−γ ])
1− 1
φ
1−γ
} 1
1− 1
φ (2.3)
Ux is the level of utility at age x
Cx is the consumption level at age x
px is the one year survival probability at age x
β is the individual’s personal one-year discount factor
γ is the level of Relative Risk Aversion (RRA)
φ is the level of Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution (EIS).
The last surviving age in this analysis is age 100 when we assume p101 = 0 and
with individuals having no bequest motives, the recursive equation for the terminal
condition is given as:
U100 =
{
(1− β)× (C100)1−
1
φ
} 1
1− 1
φ (2.4)
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I include the impact of bequest motives on the utilities retirees derive from their
consumption and wealth7 assuming retirees derive their total utility from consump-
tion as well as the possibility of meeting their bequest motives. Motivation for the
modelling of bequest motives is discussed in works of Laitner (2002) and Gomes and
Michaelides (2005). To include the impact of bequest motive on the utility analysis,
I follow the study by Gomes and Michaelides (2005) and use a slightly different form
of the E-Z utility function given by:
Ux =
{
(1− βpx)× (Cx)1−
1
φ + βEx
[
(Ux+1)
1−γ + (1− px)b(Wx+1/b)
1−γ
1− γ
] 1− 1φ
1−γ
} 1
1− 1
φ
(2.5)
with the terminal condition being given as:
U100 = b
(W101/b)
1−γ
1− γ (2.6)
where b determines the strength of the bequest motive and Wx is the remaining
wealth level at age x and all remaining parameters as defined earlier.
2.6 Measures of Investment Performance
Measuring investment performance is of significance to this thesis as I evaluate dif-
ferent investment strategies and portfolio distribution rules as well as asset allocation
strategies. For evaluating investment strategies, the most widely used model in fi-
nance is the classic mean-variance analysis of Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) as
developed by Markowitz (1952). Markowitz uses expected return of individual assets
and their variance-covariance to derive an efficient frontier such that all portfolios
lying on this frontier have maximised their expected returns for their levels of vari-
ance. This gave investors a formal mathematical approach to asset selection and
portfolio management. The main shortcomings of Markowitz risk-return approach
is the assumption of variance giving a complete assessment of risk for portfolios and
the assumption of returns following a normal distribution. The assumption of nor-
mal returns is rejected by many analysts as well as practitioners (Michaud, 2008).
It is generally accepted that portfolio selection based on the mean return and vari-
ance of return is a simplification relative to including additional moments that might
7The presence of bequest motives is one important explanation given to explain the annuity
puzzle. It is believed that retirees with bequest motives are reluctant to annuitise since they lose
their liquidity by purchasing annuities with their retirement wealth.
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more completely describe the distribution of returns of the portfolio. Studies by Lee
(1977) and Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) suggested different portfolio measures that
included higher moments such as skewness while other studies such as Fama (1965)
and Elton and Gruber (1995) provide more realistic descriptions of the distribution
of returns of portfolios. More recently, theories such as the Omega Ratio by Keating
and Shadwick (2002) enable the incorporation of all portfolio return moments in the
calculation and ranking of alternative portfolios. I use the Omega Ratio approach to
evaluate alternative investment strategy performances discussed in the second essay
of this thesis.
2.6.1 The Omega Ratio
The Omega Ratio proposed by Keating and Shadwick (2002) is a preference-free per-
formance measurement that is used to rank and evaluate portfolios. It is able to
capture higher moment effects beyond the traditional mean-variance for a financial
returns distribution and requires no strict assumptions regarding the distribution of
returns as they are all encoded in the Omega Ratio. The Omega is especially suited
for financial performance where investors are interested in the risk and reward charac-
teristics of various investment options. It involves partitioning returns into losses and
gains relative to a return threshold. For each return level, Omega Ratio calculates a
probability weighted ratio of returns above and below the partitioning. It operates
under the simple rule of investors preferring more to less. Given the choice between
two portfolios with the same predicted return, investors should prefer the portfolio
with the highest Omega Ratio. This maximises the potential for making the desired
level of return, and minimises the probability of extreme losses.
Keating and Shadwick (2002) define the Omega as:
Ω(u) =
∫ b
u [1− F (x)]dx∫ u
a [F (x)]dx
(2.7)
Where (a, b) is the interval of returns
F is the cumulative distribution of returns
Ω(r) is the probability weighted ratio of gains to losses relative to the threshold r
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The Omega Ratio requires no estimates, unlike standard statistical estimators, and
as such faces no sampling uncertainties as inference are made directly from the ob-
served distribution. Keating and Shadwick assert that the different ranking of funds
and portfolios derived from alternative measures such as Sharp ratios, Alphas or
Value at Risk is due to the additional information incorporated in Omega. When
higher moments are of little significance however, we find the Omega to agree with
the traditional measures of portfolio performance. For a range of thresholds covering
a distribution, the different Omega Ratios for the range of thresholds form an Omega
Function.
2.6.2 Alternative Shortfall Analysis
Different investment and income shortfall measures are used in the third essay of
this study. To compare asset allocation strategies quantitatively, we usually require a
risk-return framework for decision making under uncertainty. One of the approaches
taken by financial economists is to maximise expected discounted value of a time-
separable utility function for uncertain future benefits, which may include expected
bequest in some cases. The constant relative risk aversion utility is commonly used
and I refer to studies by Blake et al. (2003) and Milevsky and Young (2007) who use
such an approach. A limitation of this approach as Pye (2000) points out is the lack
of an explicit measure of retiree’s risk aversion. I refer to risk-value approach models
which use explicit measures of risk and value with functions reflecting the associated
trade off. I compare strategies based on their actual observed value levels and accom-
panying standard deviations. I measure return as being the level of income generated
from retiree’s wealth as well as the expected possibility of bequest, and risk as the
possibility of not reaching a desired level of consumption. Previous studies define the
operative risk measure as the probability of ruin; which occurs when the retiree runs
out of money before her uncertain date of death after regular periodic withdrawals to
meet consumption. Ruin occurs whenever the retiree’s desired consumption exceeds
her available wealth level at the time of consumption. This is demonstrated in previ-
ous studies (see Albrecht & Maurer, 2002; Ho, Milevsky, & Robinson, 1994; Milevsky,
1998; Pye, 2000). Milevsky and Robinson (2000) explain that the probability of ruin
is the probability that the Stochastic Present Value (SPV) is greater than the initial
wealth to support the consumption.
Expressed in a mathematical framework, an individual is currently age x with an
initial wealth of W0 = w and a desired lifelong consumption stream of k real dollars
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per annum. For a fixed time of death, T , usually represented by the terminal age on
the life table used and a fixed real interest rate r, the present value of the individual’s
desired consumption is given by:
ka¯T er = k
∫ T
0
e−rtdt =
k(1− e−rt)
r
(2.8)
If Equation 2.8 is greater than the initial wealth, w, the individual does not have
enough to meet her consumption stream and ruin occurs with certainty.
Further to shortfall analysis based on explicit terminal wealth levels, as Campbell
and Viceira (2002) suggest that long term they consume out of wealth and derive
their utility from consumption rather than from wealth, I consider other shortfall
measures based on consumption levels. These are income levels that the retiree is
able to generate from her level of wealth. Arnott et al. (2013) further echo that for
retirement purposes, it makes sense to gauge the success of a portfolio in terms of
annuitised income rather than notional portfolio gains or losses. I follow the work of
Dus et al. (2005) and incorporate into the shortfall calculations the size of shortfall
when it occurs. This measure incorporates the possible size of shortfall should it
occur. Based on the resulting wealth levels of wealth from alternative asset allocations
in retirement and the resulting income levels, the size of shortfall is measured relative
to benchmark such as income generated by a life annuity purchased at retirement.
Shortfall Probability (SP) relative to an income benchmark is represented as:
SP (Bt) = P (Bt < z) (2.9)
This is a measure of the probability that an income or withdrawal level Bt, derived
from the individual’s current wealth is less than the chosen benchmark z, a life annuity
income level. A further shortfall measure to incorporate the severity of shortfall
referred to as the Shortfall Expectation (SE) by Dus et al. (2005) and denoted by:
SE(Bt) = E[max(z −Bt, 0)] = MEL(Bt) · SP (Bt) (2.10)
Shortfall Expectation represents the sum of losses weighted by their probabilities,
the unconditional average loss. MEL is the Mean Excess Loss and measures the
conditional expected shortfall given that shortfall occurs, measuring how badly on
average a strategy performs (Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, & Heath, 1999). This measure
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is expressed as:
MEL(Bt) = E[z −Bt|Bt < z] (2.11)
This thesis bases on these shortfall measures to analyse income levels resulting from
wealth accumulations from alternative asset allocation strategies in retirement.
Chapter 3
Comparative Study of
Post-Retirement Withdrawal
Plans
3.1 Introduction
Wealth decumulation choices have become particularly important in recent years with
baby boomers moving into retirement and the manifold growth in number of Defined
Contribution (DC) plans over Defined Benefit (DB) plans around the world. In a
typical DC plan, the benefits depend on the accumulated value of the participant’s
contributions and the investment returns. The participant has a choice to receive the
benefits as a lumpsum at retirement or annuitise. Empirical evidence, both in the US
and other countries, suggests that the former is overwhelmingly preferred to the lat-
ter. In doing so, most participants effectively assume the responsibility of managing
their own retirement assets to meet consumption needs over their remaining lifetime.
This is a significant responsibility as their self-managed decumulation plans need to
bear the associated investment and longevity risks.
It is commonly believed that the life annuity is the best insurance against a retiree
outliving her wealth. Yet the decision of whether to annuitise one’s retirement sav-
ings is a complex one. Apart from the prevailing annuity prices, several other factors
including availability of government pensions, family support, life expectancy, and be-
quest motives need to be considered. There is much empirical evidence demonstrating
retirees’ aversion to voluntary annuitisation. Whilst many researchers attribute this
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to the high cost of annuities, the impact of other factors is also highlighted in the ex-
tant literature. For example, Brown (2001) suggests this aversion could be attributed
to investors’ knowledge of their subjective survival probabilities where investors in
poor health will tend to avoid purchasing annuities since the decision to purchase
annuities is irreversible. The presence of bequest motives can also discourage an-
nuitisation (Bernheim, 1992).
In this study, I investigate the alternative decumulation choices for Australian re-
tirees. Given the annuity aversion observed among Australian retirees, I explore the
desirability of following alternative decumulation plans, akin to self-annuitisation by
the retirees, vis-a`-vis purchasing a life-annuity at retirement. In each of these plans,
the retiree invests in a pool of assets and withdraws a fixed or variable amount period-
ically to support consumption. These decumulation plans have advantages in terms of
meeting liquidity requirements, offering the possibility of greater consumption over
a lifetime, and bequeathing unspent assets in the event of early death. However,
they can also expose the retiree to investment and longevity risk. Uncertainty in
investment returns means that the value of pension assets would be volatile and the
corresponding withdrawal amounts can rise above or fall below the level of benefits
offered by a life annuity. Also, the uncertainty about remaining lifespan means the
retiree would always run the risk of outliving her assets irrespective of whether they
make fixed or variable withdrawals from their pool of assets.
The Australian case is of particular interest due to its unique institutional and policy
settings. Australia has had a compulsory superannuation system since 1992 which
makes it mandatory for all employers to make contributions towards their employees’
superannuation to a fund of their choice. The minimum contribution rate is currently
set at 9.5% of an employee’s gross earnings but will increase to 12% by 2022. The
system is dominated by DC plans which hold 83.6% of the $1.6 trillion total superan-
nuation assets as at 30 June 2013 (APRA, 2014). Despite putting in place a regime
backed by strong public policy to ensure retirement savings while in employment,
Australia has no defined policy for decumulation as workers move into retirement.
Once retired, workers have the option to withdraw their accumulated savings either
as a lumpsum or as a series of regular payments over an identifiable period of time.
If a retiree opts for the former, she can either self-manage her assets (and spending
withdrawals) or purchase a life annuity from the market providers at the prevailing
price. If the latter option is taken, the retirement savings either continue to be in-
vested by the fund in nominated assets from where the retiree can make withdrawals
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as required1, or exchanged for a regular income usually guaranteed for life or for a
fixed term. Therefore, irrespective of whether the retiree opts for lumpsum or phased
withdrawal, a choice has to be made by the retiree between self-managing their de-
cumulation and annuitisation.
The uniqueness of the Australian system is also characterised by a universal, means-
tested age pension. Unlike the pay-as-you-go Social Security system in United States,
the age pension in Australia is paid from general tax revenues and provides all citizens
above 65 years of age with an income stream the rate of which is determined by their
income and asset level relative to certain thresholds 2. Thus the age pension provides
a basic level of sustenance for all retirees. However, even in the presence of this
safety net, retirees require supplementary income to maintain a comfortable lifestyle
in retirement. The Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia (ASFA) Re-
tirement Standard estimates this amount to be $41,190 per year an individual retiree
and $56,236 per year for a retired couple (ASFA, 2013)3. The full rate of govern-
ment age pension as of September 2013 provides an annual income of $21,913 per
retiree and $33,036 per couple. The full rate pension serves about 41% of the 76%
of Australians over 65 years of age who are on some form of government pension.
The remainder of retirees depend on the part rate age pension and pension income
through the Department of Veteran Affairs (CRIR, 2013). Therefore, even in the
presence of government support, it is essential for the retirees to manage their decu-
mulation efficiently in order to live a comfortable retired life.
The uniqueness of this study is the inclusion of a pension model in the retirement
decision making. I use the Means-Tested Age Pension, which is characteristic of
the Australian pension system. A previous study by Butt and Deng (2012) includes
the presence of the means-tested government pension in their asset allocation study.
They find that a 100% allocation to growth assets is optimal for retirees who desire
large expenditure relative to their initial balance. Other asset allocations are sensitive
to changes in initial balance and desired expenditure levels, as well as interactions
with the Age Pension. The influence of government sponsored pensions has hitherto,
not been considered in decumulation drawdown choices by retirees. I investigate de-
cumulation drawdown plan choices for retirees in the presence and absence of these
pensions. I also control for bequest motives and allow for mortality improvements.
1Payments in this case need not be made at regular intervals and the payment amount can also
vary. However, there is a minimum withdrawal amount specified under current legislation.
2I elaborate on the means-tested age pension in the next section.
3These estimates are based on the assumption that the retiree owns her residential dwelling.
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Whereas previous studies addressing the issue of withdrawal plan choice adopt the
CRRA utility, recent studies have shown that individuals prefer early resolution of
uncertainty and have RRA levels, which are greater than the reciprocal of the EIS.
This finding is consistent with the predictions by recursive preferences such as the
Epstein-Zin (Brown & Kim, 2013). I incorporate this finding into this study, with re-
tirees desiring smooth consumption over a variable consumption and deriving utility
from consumption smoothing. The model retiree has Epstein-Zin preferences, which
enables a separation between RRA and the EIS. Whilst risk aversion relates to the re-
tiree’s desire to stabilise consumption across different states of nature in a given time
period, the EIS measures the desire of the individual to smooth consumption over
time. In the real world, since returns on investments are volatile, variable withdrawal
strategies return varying consumption levels that may not be utility enhancing for a
retiree with the desire to smooth her consumption across time and different market
states. For this reason, the Epstein-Zin preferences provide a very useful basis for
making comparisons between different forms of self-annuitisation and annuitisation.
This is another innovation this study introduces to the literature.
My results are generally consistent with the existing literature on asset allocation for
sustainability of self-managed portfolios. I find that an increase in the allocation to
equities in the retiree’s portfolio reduces the shortfall probabilities. However, higher
allocation to equities also increases the volatility in returns and withdrawal levels for
variable withdrawal strategies. A retiree with Epstein-Zin preferences who may want
to reduce the variability in her level of income will moderate the equity allocation
of her retirement fund to maintain a reasonably smooth consumption. I find the
ranking of alternative strategies to be different from those observed under the CRRA
utility assumptions. Pensions and bequest motives also play significant roles in re-
tirees’ choice of withdrawal. Annuities dominate phased withdrawals in the absence
of bequest motives and are the least preferred strategy otherwise. The presence or
absence of pension income determines which of the alternate withdrawal strategies
dominates in my set up. The impact of pension is thus seen as a significant condition
for retiree’s choice of drawdown program.
The remainder of this study proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the literature on
sustainable portfolio withdrawals, pension income, life annuities, and post-retirement
distribution choices. The data and methodology is described in Section 3.3. Section
3.4 presents the analysis of my results and Section 3.5 concludes.
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3.2 Literature Review
3.2.1 Sustainable Withdrawal Strategies
Bengen (2001) suggests that if the future market conditions follow historical trends,
a retirement portfolio should contain 50-75% equity allocation. For retirees aged be-
tween 60 and 65 years, he suggests an annual inflation-adjusted withdrawal rate of
4.3%, and the corresponding asset allocation to be based on investors risk tolerance.
In his subsequent study, Bengen (2004) proposes a ‘safe’ withdrawal rate of 4.58%
when the withdrawal rates are allowed to vary over the retirement years based on
investment performance. Other studies by Cooley et al. (2001) and Hubbard (2006)
are in agreement that a retiree’s pension fund should be composed of a significant
amount of equities to be sustainable. The former argues that the presence of bonds
is mainly to restrain portfolio volatility and provide liquidity to cover an investor’s
living expenses. They suggest withdrawal rates between 6-8% as being sustainable
up to 30 years in retirement. They use annual overlapping historical returns data in
their analysis. The latter study analyses the sustainability of different withdrawals
rates over fixed periods of up to 30 years by using overlapping monthly asset returns.
Other important studies by Ameriks et al. (2001), Pye (2000), Stout and Mitchell
(2006) and Mitchell and Kovar (2011) use the Monte Carlo simulation method to
explore a wide range of possible future scenarios under different asset returns. Their
conclusions are in unison emphasising the need for an equity dominated retirement
portfolio. However, these studies are not in agreement about sustainability of with-
drawal rates, with prescription ranging from 3.5-8% of retiree’s remaining wealth.
Although the Monte Carlo simulation remains an acceptable approach to portfolio
analysis, I believe the general acceptance of a single withdrawal rate for annual wealth
decumulation is an oversimplification for countries like Australia that have regulations
regarding minimum drawdown rates for tax purposes. Rather than a fixed percentage
of wealth used in previous literature, my study uses withdrawal rates based on the
Australian Government’s minimum drawdown rules. I elaborate on this withdrawal
strategy in Section 3.3.
3.2.2 The Age Pension
The age pension referred to in this study is the Australian means-tested age pension.
Australians who reach the required age are eligible for this age pension. The current
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required age for a male is 65 and 64.5 for female, increasing to 67 by July 2023.
The single rate age pension is set to 27.7% of Male Total Average Weekly Earnings
(MTAWE). The pension payment is indexed to the CPI. The amount of pension a
person receives depends on several factors such as the individual being single or with
a partner, and owning a house or not. Most importantly, the pension amount is
directly linked to the lower of two assessments; an income and asset test.
Income levels lower than $152 per fortnight and assets less than $196,750 for a home-
owner make her eligible for full rate pension. The maximum fortnightly income for
a single female homeowner as at March 2013 is $808.40. This rate decreases with
increasing level of assets and income, providing the retiree with a part-rate pension.
Beyond an upper threshold, which is $1,768.80 income per fortnight and $735,750 in
assets, the individual is disqualified from receiving any pension income. The indi-
vidual’s income is based on the lower of the two tests and is disqualified if she fails
either of the tests. The assets and income tests applied are based on reported figures
as at March 2013.4
3.2.3 Life Annuities
The annuity is the major type of longevity risk management security available on
the market. Many investors believe the best way of insuring against longevity risk is
by purchasing a life annuity, a financial product that allows the purchaser to receive
periodic payments, fixed or variable, as long as they are alive, in exchange for an
initial premium (Brown, 2001). There has been a long-standing interest in research-
ing life annuities. In his seminal study on the theory of a lifecycle consumer, Yaari
(1965) asserts that in the absence of bequest motives, it is optimal for the investor
to hold life annuities rather than liquid assets.5 Davidoff et al. (2003) demonstrate
theoretically the benefits and optimality of holding life annuities in retirement under
less restrictive conditions of the Yaari model.
4See http://www.humanservices.gov.au/customer/services/centrelink/age-pension for further de-
tails on Australia’s means-tested age pension.
5The existence of annuities date back to the Middle Ages and detailed records exists for annuity
pools in France as early as the 17th Century (Poterba, 1997). Annuities became very popular after
the Great depression of the 1930s, which followed the stock market crash of 1929. People purchased
financial products from life insurance companies because they were deemed more stable than holding
shares on the financial markets. Since then annuities have expanded to many parts of the world over
the years.
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There are many annuity types; this research however focuses on the level Single Pre-
mium Immediate Annuity (SPIA). The annuity provides fixed level periodic payouts
that commences one period after purchase. Annuities can include a variety of features
such as escalation guarantees in the form of inflation indexation and return of capital.
In discrete time, the fixed immediate annuity paying one dollar per year contingent
on the survival of the annuitant is priced as:
ax = (1 + Lx)
w−x∑
t=0
tpx
(1 + r)t
(3.1)
Where ax is the cost of a $1 income paid annually for life for an annuitant age x, tpx
denotes the conditional probability of an individual age x surviving to age x+ t, the
discount function which is expressed by 1/(1 + r)t with r being the discount rate or
the interest rate at which the annuity is compounded annually. I include in the an-
nuity pricing, an Insurance Loading Factor, L, charged at issue age x. The Insurance
Loading Factor covers the commissions, all expenses and taxes. This amount is mul-
tiplied by the pure annuity premium to obtain the annuity’s market price (Milevsky,
1998). The work of Mitchell et al. (2000) asserts that the loading factor increases
with increasing issue age and this reasoning is applied to the annuity pricing in this
study.
3.2.4 The Distribution Plan Choice
The ostensibly poor value of life annuities has driven the search for new retirement-
income drawdown programs. Retirees seek to match the benefit of life annuities
through these programs whilst still maintaining their liquidity and bequest poten-
tial. The natural alternative to annuitisation is investment among the various asset
classes such as equity, fixed income and real estate with periodic withdrawals, which
creates an income stream equivalent to that generated by the annuity to support
consumption and bequest, in some cases, during retirement. The choice of drawdown
plan, commonly referred to as self-annuitisation or phased withdrawal plan depends
on several factors such as adequacy, reliability and the possibility of leaving a bequest
for heirs. Pension programs such as the Riester plan in Germany provide tax induce-
ment and encourage life-long pension income for individuals in an annuity fashion.
Until April 2006, plan participants in the UK were legally obligated to purchase an
annuity at age 75 with the remainder of their accumulated assets. In Canada, a re-
tiree must purchase a life annuity with her tax-sheltered savings or create a managed
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withdrawal plan at age 69 (Milevsky & Robinson, 2005).
Some important studies on the decumulation distribution plan choice include works
by Blake et al. (2003) who compare the life annuity to different distribution programs
with differing equity exposures assuming mandatory annuitisation at 75. They find
the best distribution program does not usually involve a bequest, the most important
decisions depend on equity distribution, the optimal program also depends on relative
risk aversion and the program choice fairly insensitive to bequest. Dus et al. (2005)
quantify the risk and return profiles for fixed and variable withdrawal strategies to a
life annuity benchmark using a shortfall framework. Using German data, they com-
pute the expected present value of benefit payments and bequest potential, analysing
four phased withdrawal programs; a Fixed, Fixed Percentage, 1/T rule and 1/E[T].
‘T’ refers to the remaining lifetime according to the chosen life table and ‘E[T]’ refers
to the individual’s expected lifetime. They find 1/E[T] is attractive as a standalone
strategy but not attractive with mandatory annuitisation. Another important study
by Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and Dus (2008) compares life annuity to phased with-
drawal strategies and a combination of both. They adopt a Constant Relative Risk
Aversion utility framework and work with differing levels of risk aversion. The study
concludes that the Fixed Percentage is preferred across a broad range of risk prefer-
ences while the 1/E[T] is preferred at low and moderate risk aversion but not for the
very risk averse. Fixed strategy is not appealing to retirees because of the chance of
ruin, and they find the 1/T strategy to be the worst performer over the long term.
The annuity is attractive for high risk averse retirees with no bequest motive.
This study compares the level income SPIA to three withdrawal strategies, the Fixed,
the Fixed percentage, hereafter referred to as the Percentage of Wealth strategy and
the 1/E[T] which I refer to as the Life Expectancy withdrawal strategy. I omit
the fourth strategy, the 1/T rule as previous studies find this to be the worst per-
forming strategy. I use Australian returns data and mortality data and find the
dominant strategies at various conditional survival ages for retirees with Epstein-Zin
preferences. I allow for mortality improvements and further analyses incorporate the
impact of bequest motives. A novelty of this study is the inclusion of pension income
and an investigation of its impact on retirees’ choice of drawdown strategy when they
have Epstein-Zin preferences.
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3.3 Data and Methodology
3.3.1 Data
An important factor in any robust analysis on retirement planning is the inclusion
of mortality. Many earlier pension models that disregarded the stochastic nature of
life expectation overstated or understated the chances of portfolio sustainability and
ruin. Recent studies however, make use of the stochastic life expectations to model
the pension plans. Milevsky and Robinson (2005) introduce the concept of stochas-
tic present value in the retirement withdrawal modelling whilst Stout and Mitchell
(2006) perform sustainable spending analysis under stochastic life expectation.
The model used in this study depends on stochastic lifetimes based on life expectation
experiences from the Australian life tables 2005-2007 provided by the Australian Gov-
ernment Actuary (AGA). This life table provides mortality experiences and captures
the mortality observations among Australians over the three-year period centred on
the 2006 Population and Housing Census. The price of annuity and annual annu-
ity payments are obtained from the life table with discrete observations between the
initial age, typically the retirement age (65 years), and the terminal age (100 years).
The life table estimates the male and female life expectancies at birth as 79 and 84
years respectively.
All simulated returns are based on annual returns data from Dimson-Marsh-Staunton
Global Returns Data (DMS Global)6 spanning 111 years over the period 1900 through
2011. The simulated returns, which are descriptive of historical asset class returns,
are assumed to represent future asset class returns.
I make the government-sponsored pension income calculations based on the Aus-
tralian System. I refer to pension rates provided by Department of Human Services
for a single female homeowner. At smaller retirement balances, the retiree receives a
higher pension income and vice versa. This complements the retiree’s drawdown and
helps to avoid retirement ruin which occurs in the absence of pensions.
An analysis of the life table in Figure 3.1 shows that the conditional survival proba-
bilities for retirees are indeed higher than the life expectancy at birth values. Whilst
life expectancy at birth for females is estimated at age 84, we expect one in every two
females age 65 will live to age 86, the median life expectation in retirement. Another
6 (Dimson, Marsh, & Staunton, 2012)
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Figure 3.1: Retirees Conditional Survival Probabilities (Females)
This figure presents the conditional survival probabilities of a female Australian aged 65 surviving
to given ages using the probability distributions from the ALT 2005-2007. It shows the median life
expectation in retirement as well as the 10th percentile.
significant observation is that with respect to the life tables, one in every 10 females
in retirement is expected to live until age 96, requiring a retirement planning horizon
for up to 31 years. This implies that a retiree who wants to be 90% certain that her
superannuation savings last as long as she lives is required to plan her consumption
and savings for up to 31 years. The conditionality of these calculated survival rates
makes them vital tools in retirement investment planning.
The annuity analysed in this study is the level Single Premium Immediate Annuity
(SPIA). The annuity provides fixed level periodic payouts that commences one period
after purchase. I embed the annuity prices with a loading factor that increases with
age at a rate of [0.2 + 0.005(x)]. The loading factor, otherwise called the insurance
load refers to the increment in the price of annuity due to taxes, commissions and
other expenses charged by the life office. The annuity’s market price is obtained from
the pure actuarial premium after weighting the premium by the loading factor. The
choice of the loading factor and its rate of increase are informed by literature on
annuity pricing in earlier works. (see Ganegoda & Bateman, 2008; Milevsky, 1998;
Mitchell et al., 2000).
3.3.2 The Epstein-Zin Preferences and Consumption
Epstein and Zin (1989), hereafter referred to as E-Z, introduce a class of utility
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preferences which enable disentangling RRA from the EIS. Using the E-Z utilities,
investor’s preferences are defined recursively over current consumptions and the cer-
tainty equivalent of the next period’s utility. Previous use of this model in pension
plans includes works by Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and Dus (2008) and Blake et al.
(2011). Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and Dus (2008) analyse the utility cost of select-
ing different restrictive annuitisation strategies over the gradual annuitisation using
the E-Z approach whilst Blake et al. (2011) analyse optimal funding and investment
strategies of a rational lifecycle planner under E-Z preferences.
The use of E-Z preferences is relevant in this study as it opens up an insightful
assessment of retiree preferences and allows for analysis of varying degrees of RRA
and EIS. The utility function is defined over a single consumption pattern that is
selected at retirement and remains the effective wealth decumulation strategy through
retirement. A retiree aged x, has preferences defined by:
Ux =
{
(1− β)× (Cx)1−
1
φ + βpx × (Ex[(Ux+1)1−γ ])
1− 1
φ
1−γ
} 1
1− 1
φ (3.2)
Ux is the level of utility at age x
Cx is the consumption level at age x
px is the one year survival probability at age x
β is the individual’s one-year discount factor
γ is the level of RRA
φ is the level of EIS.
Following previous studies, the E-Z utility preferences in this study are adapted to
include the mortality risk as observed from the Australia life table, ABS ALT 2005-
2007 7 that I truncate at age 100. The last surviving age in this analysis is 100
when we assume p101 = 0 and with individuals having no bequest motives, I obtain
a recursive equation for the terminal condition as:
U100 =
{
(1− β)× (C100)1−
1
φ
} 1
1− 1
φ (3.3)
Retirees who employ the phased withdrawal strategy derive their consumption from
the annual withdrawals from their investment portfolios. Retirees who choose to an-
nuitise at retirement derive their annual consumption from their annuity income. I
assume retirees derive their entire utility from the level of consumption at any age x.
I also include the impact of bequest motives on the utilities retiree derive from their
7Australia Bureau of Statistics, Australian Life Tables (2005-2007)
Chapter 3 49
consumption and wealth.8 I assume retirees derive their total utility from consump-
tion as well as the possibility of meeting their bequest motives. Motivation for the
modelling of bequest motives is discussed in works by Laitner (2002) and Gomes and
Michaelides (2005). To include the impact of bequest motive on the utility analysis,
I follow the study by Gomes and Michaelides (2005) and use a slightly different form
of the E-Z utility function given by:
Ux =
{
(1− βpx)× (Cx)1−
1
φ + βEx
[
(Ux+1)
1−γ + (1− px)b(Wx+1/b)
1−γ
1− γ
] 1− 1φ
1−γ
} 1
1− 1
φ
(3.4)
with the terminal condition being given as
U100 = b
(W101/b)
1−γ
1− γ (3.5)
Where b determines the strength of the bequest motive and Wx is the remaining
wealth level at age x. All remaining parameters are as defined earlier.
3.3.3 Parameter Calibration
I derive the lifetime consumption utilities from the different withdrawal paths for
the investor and make comparison with the utility derived from annuity payouts for
a retiree with similar characteristics. I assume the hypothetical retiree to be a 65-
year-old female with a retirement balance accumulated from her defined contribution
superannuation plan during her working life. The retiree has no other source of in-
come besides the government-sponsored Age Pension. I assume the retirees have a
risk aversion range of γ=2–5, an intertemporal substitution coefficient of φ=0.1–0.5.
I choose these baseline preference parameters in line with lifecycle literature such
as Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005), Horneff, Maurer, and Stamos (2008) and
Blake et al. (2011). In the attempt to estimate a value of the discount factor from
household consumption patterns, empirical studies find values close to one (Laibson,
Repetto, & Tobacman, 2007). In line with this and previous pension literature, I set
the hypothetical retiree’s discount factor to β=0.96 (Blake et al., 2011; Cocco et al.,
8The presence of bequest motives is one important explanation given to explain the annuity
puzzle. It is believed that retirees with bequest motives are reluctant to annuitise since they lose
their liquidity by purchasing annuities with their retirement wealth.
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2005; Horneff, Maurer, & Stamos, 2008).
By setting the baseline parameter values as above, the E-Z utility function collapses
to the CRRA utility, where φ=1/γ. I use this reference point to analyse the robust-
ness of the results with different parameter values. I begin with a bequest motive
b=0 and the subjective survival probabilities are obtained from the Australian Life
Tables. When bequest is present, b=2.5, in line with previous literature (see Gomes
& Michaelides, 2005; Laitner, 2002). The annuity is priced using the life tables with a
loading factor of L=0.205. I base the choice of the loading factor on a recent annuity
quote by Challenger Limited reported in The Australian (Bullock, 2012).
3.3.4 Sensitivity Analysis
I find the changes in the utility levels for the annuity and different withdrawal strate-
gies using varying preference parameter levels. The EIS coefficient is varied between
φ=0.1 and 0.5 to ascertain the effects it has on retirees’ utility of consumption. I
maintain the discount parameter and bequest level while keeping the risk aversion
level fixed. Next, I hold the EIS coefficient constant and for varying levels of risk
aversion between γ= 2 and 10, I investigate the changes to utility for retirees on
condition that they live to 100 years. I extend this analysis by investigating the
consumption utility paths for a retiree with bequest motives. This is done for the
baseline preferences. By varying the levels of risk aversion and EIS, I find the util-
ity levels to change in trends similar to that observed for the case without bequest
motives. Also, I analyse the utility paths for different asset allocations and analyse
the impact on the consumption and hence the utilities of consumption. Finally, I
analyse the retiree’s drawdown choices in the presence and absence of means-tested
pensions.9
3.3.5 Portfolio Simulations
I create an investor’s portfolio that consists of equities, bonds and bills from Aus-
tralia. I assume different allocations of these assets and observe their growth over
the retirement horizon in the simulations. I use bootstrap resampling of historical
observed returns and 10,000 iterations to generate future returns. The assumption
is that the individual annual historical returns contained in the total set of historical
9Graphs of different asset allocations are not displayed in this study due to space limitation but
are available upon request
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returns have an equal probability of occurring in the future, but without regard to
any sequencing of returns contained in the historic data. This methodology over-
comes the statistical problems of using overlapping multi-period returns.
I set retirees’ initial retirement account balances to $500,000. I choose this account
balances since the average aggregate personal balance for Australian account based
pensions and Self-Managed Superannuation Funds (SMSF) are $275,000 and $466,909
respectively according to Australian Tax Office (ATO) and Australian Prudential
Regulation Authority estimates (CRIR, 2013). SMSFs are used by over 1 million
Australians and makes up close to a third of total superannuation wealth with cur-
rent median SMSF account balance exceeding $500,000 (ATO, 2014). This informs
my choice of starting wealth. The bootstrap simulations I employ are performed over
three different portfolio allocation strategies. Previous literature on asset allocation
in retirement recommends a 50-75% equity allocation (see Bengen, 2001, 2004; Coo-
ley et al., 2001). I set the baseline asset allocation to a balanced portfolio allocation
of 50/50% equity-bonds/bills proportions. The other asset allocations used in this
analysis are 30-70% equity-bonds/bills, and 70-30% equity-bonds/bills allocations.
3.3.6 Withdrawal Strategies
I analyse four different withdrawal strategies. The choices of these withdrawal strate-
gies are based on prior literature and the objective of making a meaningful comparison
with annuity payouts. The strategies are described below.
◦ A Fixed withdrawal strategy in which the retiree withdraws a fixed amount from
her portfolio each year. This is done till the retiree’s death or the complete depletion
of her wealth, whichever happens earlier. This strategy is made to mimic the returns
from a fixed annuity purchased with the same amount of wealth, that is, I set the size
of the withdrawal to equal the life annuity payout divided by the initial wealth.10
◦ A variable withdrawal strategy, which I call the Percentage of Wealth strategy,11
where the retiree receives a specified portion of her wealth every year. This with-
drawal has the advantage of not running into ruin no matter how long the retiree
survives. The disadvantage is that the withdrawal is very volatile and increases
10This is akin to the 1/a¨y rule used in Blake et al. (2003) and the ‘fixed benefit approach’ by
Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and Dus (2008)
11I refer to this strategy as Percent of Wealth in Tables and Figures for paucity of space
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or decreases depending on how well the portfolio performs. I link the Percentage
of Wealth withdrawal to the minimum withdrawal payments for Australia’s current
account based pensions as regulated by the Superannuation Industry Supervision
Regulations 1994 and the Retirement Savings Accounts Regulations 1997. Hence,
unlike past studies, the Percentage of Wealth withdrawn from the retiree’s pension
fund is not fixed, but adjusted after every five years or decade to meet the required
minimum withdrawal quota as shown in Table 3.1.
◦ The final phased withdrawal strategy is the 1/E(T ) rule (I refer to as Life Ex-
pectancy strategy). E(T ) refers to the retiree’s expected remaining lifetime. The
level of withdrawal relates to the investor’s remaining life expectation. The investor
consumes a larger fraction of her wealth as her remaining lifetime E[T (x + t)] de-
creases.12 This is similar to the 401(k) drawdown rule employed in the US to ensure
that retirement savings are not left to bequest.13 The Australian Life Tables 2005-
2007 (2009) for Females are used to provide the expected remaining lifetimes.
The Percentage of Wealth withdrawal strategy used in this study follows the cur-
rent minimum drawdown payments as shown in Table 3.1. I assume withdrawals are
made at the beginning of the year and the portfolios are annually rebalanced after
withdrawal to assume the set allocations. This is repeated annually until the earlier
of the demise of retiree or depletion of retiree’s wealth.
Table 3.1: Minimum Annual Pension Payments
(For Account-Based Pensions)
Regular Percentage Temporary relief
factors 2012/13 year
Age
65-74 5% 3.75%
75-79 6% 4.50%
80-84 7% 5.25%
85-89 9% 6.75%
90-94 11% 8.25%
95 or older 14% 10.50%
Source: Adapted from Schedule 7, Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regula-
tions 1994 and Federal Government news releases dated 18 February 2009, and 12
May 2009, and 30 June 2010, and 29 November 2011.
12The complete expectation of life is calculated as E[T (x+ t)]=
∑w−x
t=0 tpx. These values are given
in the Australian Life Tables 2005-2007 (2009). x refers to the age of the retiree and t to the retiree’s
expected remaining lifetime.
13(see Dus et al., 2005; Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, & Dus, 2008).
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In addition to the income retirees receive from their invested assets, they are also enti-
tled to a government-sponsored pension. The amount of pension income they receive
depends on the amount of assets they own and income they earn from their assets.
For this study, I assume a 65-year-old female homeowner whose retirement balance
and her income drawdown respectively define her assets and income. Her pension
income is based on the level of her assets and is adjusted annually by the CPI. For
income and asset levels above an upper threshold, retirees are disqualified from re-
ceiving government pension. Retirees qualify for full government pension when their
income is below the lower threshold and part rate pension if they fall within the set
thresholds.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Baseline Asset Allocation and Preferences
Asset allocation is a major determinant of investment performance in explaining vari-
ation in investment performance (see Brinson et al., 1986; Brinson, Singer, & Bee-
bower, 1991; Ibbotson & Kaplan, 2000). In Australia, there exist some fundamental
differences between the asset allocations of SMSFs and other types of superannuation
funds. One difference is the high allocation to cash, property, shares and trusts by
SMSFs (Valentine, 2011). To examine the variation in asset allocation, consistent
with Ellis, Tobin, and Tracey (2008), I analyse the samples based on the proportion
invested in growth and defensive assets. With uncertainty in the literature relating to
the definition of asset allocation categories such as cautious, conservative, balanced,
growth and aggressive, I set up two broad categories for the analysis. I define a con-
servative asset allocation to a 30/70 growth to conservative assets proportion and a
growth asset allocation as a 70/30 growth to conservative asset allocated proportions.
Hence the baseline asset allocation is a balanced portfolio allocation of 50/50 growth
to defensive asset proportions.
Chapter 3 54
T
a
b
l
e
3
.2
:
S
u
m
m
ar
y
of
P
or
tf
ol
io
V
al
u
es
fo
r
S
im
u
la
te
d
R
et
u
rn
s
in
th
e
p
re
se
n
ce
of
P
en
si
o
n
In
co
m
e
(A
)
S
im
u
la
te
d
re
tu
rn
s
o
n
a
5
0
/
5
0
g
ro
w
th
/
d
ef
en
si
v
e
a
ss
et
a
ll
o
ca
te
d
in
v
es
tm
en
t
p
o
rt
fo
li
o
w
it
h
$
5
0
0
,0
0
0
st
a
rt
in
g
va
lu
e
sh
ow
in
g
p
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
o
f
ru
in
,
av
er
a
g
e
en
d
in
g
p
o
rt
fo
li
o
a
n
d
th
e
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
o
f
th
e
en
d
in
g
p
o
rt
fo
li
o
va
lu
es
.
‘F
ix
ed
’
re
p
re
se
n
ts
a
fi
x
ed
re
a
l
w
it
h
d
ra
w
a
l
a
m
o
u
n
t
o
f
$
3
0
,0
0
0
m
a
in
ta
in
ed
th
ro
u
g
h
o
u
t
th
e
re
ti
re
m
en
t
h
o
ri
zo
n
.
T
h
e
‘P
er
ce
n
t
o
f
W
ea
lt
h
’
ta
k
es
a
4
%
w
it
h
d
ra
w
a
l
o
f
re
m
a
in
in
g
w
ea
lt
h
a
n
n
u
a
ll
y.
T
h
e
‘L
if
e
E
x
p
ec
ta
n
cy
’
p
a
tt
er
n
d
ep
en
d
s
o
n
w
it
h
d
ra
w
in
g
a
fr
a
ct
io
n
o
f
w
ea
lt
h
re
la
ti
v
e
to
re
ti
re
es
’
re
m
a
in
in
g
li
fe
ex
p
ec
ta
ti
o
n
.
S
P
IA
re
fe
rs
to
a
S
in
g
le
P
re
m
iu
m
Im
m
ed
ia
te
A
n
n
u
it
y
p
ay
in
g
le
v
el
in
co
m
e
to
th
e
re
ti
re
e
fo
r
li
fe
.
P
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
o
f
ru
in
re
p
re
se
n
ts
th
e
p
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
o
f
th
e
p
o
rt
fo
li
o
b
a
la
n
ce
g
o
in
g
n
eg
a
ti
v
e
w
h
il
st
re
ti
re
e
is
st
il
l
a
li
v
e.
M
ea
n
s-
te
st
ed
a
g
e
p
en
si
o
n
in
co
m
e
is
in
cl
u
d
ed
in
th
e
w
it
h
d
ra
w
a
l
a
m
o
u
n
ts
.
T
h
e
si
m
u
la
ti
o
n
s
a
re
ca
p
p
ed
a
t
a
g
e
1
0
0
.
A
v
er
a
g
e
P
er
ce
n
ti
le
s
o
f
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
o
f
W
it
h
d
ra
w
a
l
T
y
p
e
A
v
er
a
g
e
w
it
h
d
ra
w
a
l
P
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
E
n
d
in
g
en
d
in
g
p
o
rt
fo
li
o
(S
ta
n
d
a
rd
d
ev
ia
ti
o
n
)
o
f
ru
in
P
o
rt
fo
li
o
5
2
5
5
0
7
5
F
ix
ed
3
5
,5
3
0
(5
,8
4
6
)
3
.0
3
%
1
,2
2
1
,0
7
4
7
1
,4
9
8
4
9
1
,3
6
3
7
0
5
,6
4
9
1
,3
4
7
,8
6
5
P
er
ce
n
t
o
f
W
ea
lt
h
4
9
,2
1
8
(2
9
,0
8
6
)
0
%
8
3
8
,5
2
8
3
4
0
,8
6
3
5
2
2
,5
2
4
6
9
8
,8
2
6
9
9
7
,5
2
9
L
if
e
E
x
p
ec
ta
n
cy
6
7
,5
4
5
(3
3
,6
8
6
)
0
%
4
7
3
,7
8
0
5
5
,1
5
2
2
3
4
,7
1
0
4
9
1
,5
9
6
6
4
0
,0
9
3
S
P
IA
4
0
,0
2
6
(0
)
0
%
0
0
0
0
0
Chapter 3 55
The results of portfolio simulations for different withdrawal strategies are reported
in Table 3.2. The Fixed withdrawal strategy has a ruin probability of 3.03% and a
high average ending portfolio value that is over 200% the size of the starting value.
This represents the only phased withdrawal strategy with a ruin probability. The
high ending portfolio values at all percentiles could explain retirees’ high utility from
bequest demonstrated by their dependence on a level of consumption independent
of their wealth. Alternatively, these ending portfolio values show large consumption
foregone due to the limiting nature of the withdrawal strategy.
The Percentage of Wealth withdrawal has a high average withdrawal of $49,218 per
annum with a standard deviation of $29,086. It has an average ending wealth of
1.3 times the starting value. The Percentage of Wealth average ending portfolio and
distribution of portfolio ending values are fairly balanced, with the 25th percentile
being higher than the starting value and the 5th percentile below the starting value
but never running into ruin. The ending portfolio value percentiles of the Percentage
of Wealth withdrawal are lower than that of the Fixed strategy at higher percentiles
but higher at lower percentiles. This means for those who end up with terminal
wealth values below the 50th percentile, the Percentage of Wealth withdrawal pro-
vides a higher average consumption as well as higher average ending portfolio needed
to meet bequest motives. On the upside, the Percentage of Wealth provides lower
terminal values than the Fixed withdrawal strategy, showing less allocation to be-
quest but less consumption forgone as the average consumption level is higher for the
former.
The Life Expectancy withdrawal has the highest withdrawal rate, averaging $67,545
with a standard deviation of $33,686. Since this strategy does not run into ruin and
its terminal values are the lowest among the strategies under study up to the 50th
percentile, this portrays an efficient spending by the retiree. The SPIA has an aver-
age withdrawal of $40,026 and zero standard deviation. The annuity is irreversible
and hence there is no return of capital or chance of bequest.
The differences between the alternative withdrawal strategies may not be striking but
I am able to rank the strategies based on their probabilities of ruin, and their average
withdrawal and standard deviations. The Fixed withdrawal strategy has the lowest
average withdrawal and a deviation of 16% about the mean. This strategy may not
be attractive for its low withdrawal levels as well as its chance of ruin, although the
ruin probability is low. The Percentage of Wealth and Life Expectancy withdrawal
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strategies do not run into ruin and are attractive for retirees as they give them a
guarantee of income as long as they are alive. These two strategies however have the
highest deviations about the mean consumption level, with deviations of up to 60%
and 50% about the mean consumption level for the Percentage of Wealth and the
Life Expectancy withdrawals respectively.
Although retirees with bequest motives may avoid full annuitisation, annuities are
attractive in this study for two reasons. Firstly, annuities provide a high average
withdrawal with minimal standard deviation; the level SPIA has zero standard de-
viation. Although the level of the annuity payments depend on the initial premium
and a number of factors at purchase, the regular income received from annuities is
unaffected by market returns and hence wealth changes. Secondly, annuities provide
income with lifetime certainty and hence retirees never run into ruin. With less vari-
ation and no chance of ruin, annuities serve as an appropriate benchmark for retirees
in the absence of bequest motives. The impact of bequest motives is explored later
in my analysis.
Figure 3.2: Withdrawal-to-Wealth patterns for Alternative Withdrawal
Strategies
I show the withdrawal-to-wealth ratios for the three different withdrawal strategies. I denote the
Fixed withdrawal strategy path by a line with stars; the Percent of Wealth withdrawal path by
a line with circles and the Life Expectancy withdrawal path by a line with triangles. The plot
represents the average of 10,000 simulated withdrawal paths for a $500,000 initial investment.
Figure 3.2 shows the withdrawal-to-wealth patterns of the various withdrawal strate-
gies conditional to the retiree surviving to the age of 100 years. The Fixed withdrawal
strategy shows a decreasing profile with increasing age, making the Fixed withdrawal
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a smaller portion of investor’s total wealth. This is expected as I find terminal wealth
to increase on average with increasing age. The Percentage of Wealth increases in
a stepwise manner as the retiree ages. This increase is attributed to the increase in
the minimum drawdown ratios applied to ensure that retiree meets the tax-exempt
rules. After every few years, a larger proportion of wealth is withdrawn, increasing
the withdrawal to wealth ratio. The Life Expectancy withdrawal strategy ends with
the retiree depleting her wealth at the final surviving age. As the retiree’s withdrawal
amount is a ratio of her expected remaining lifetime, she withdraws higher propor-
tions of her wealth as she grows older and has lower remaining life expectation. Her
wealth is depleted rapidly in the latter years, withdrawing over 60% of remaining
wealth at age 99 and withdrawing the remainder of her wealth in the subsequent year
as she does not expect to live beyond age 100.
3.4.2 Utilities from Alternative Withdrawal Strategies
I calculate the expected utilities retirees derive from their consumption and bequest
from choosing any of the three alternative withdrawal strategies by using the Epstein-
Zin utility function. I also calculate the expected utility a retiree derives from con-
sumption by choosing to fully annuitise her wealth at retirement age 65. I set retiree’s
baseline preference to a moderate RRA level of γ=5, an EIS level of φ=1/5. I set the
hypothetical retiree’s discount factor to β=0.96. I choose these baseline preference
parameters in line with lifecycle literature (see Blake et al., 2011; Cocco et al., 2005;
Horneff, Maurer, & Stamos, 2008).
I measure the impact on expected utility of varying RRA levels for a given level
of EIS for all the alternative withdrawal strategies. I also investigate the response
of expected utility to different EIS levels for set RRA. The EIS coefficient is varied
between φ=0.1 and φ=0.5 to ascertain the effects it has on retirees’ utility of con-
sumption. I study a range of RRA between γ=2 and gamma=10 and investigate the
changes to expected utility for retirees between retirement age 65 and age 100. I show
the expected utility plots of varying EIS and RRA for various withdrawal strategies
from the baseline asset allocation in Figure 3.3.
For the lowest level of relative risk aversion of 2, I find expected utility to be signif-
icantly high and decrease with increasing levels of risk aversion. Increasing levels of
risk aversion sees the expected utility to decrease for a given level of EIS. I make a
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Figure 3.3: Expected Utilities with varying RRA and EIS
(a) Fixed (b) Life Expectancy
(c) Percent of Wealth (d) SPIA
number of significant findings from calculating the expected utilities for the alterna-
tive withdrawal strategies’ consumption streams and terminal wealth levels. Firstly,
I find the decrease in utility for increasing RRA to be steep for the Annuity, decreas-
ing in steepness for the Fixed, Percentage of Wealth through to the Life Expectancy
strategy in that order. Taking the inverse of RRA as the estimate of EIS, as in the
case of a CRRA investor as a baseline preference estimates, I compare the impact
of having RRA levels that are increasing or decreasing relative to the baseline level.
Whenever RRA is less than the inverse of EIS, the individual derives higher utility
from her consumption and bequest levels and will thus find the strategies whose util-
ity increase steeply with increasing RRA appealing. Hence, when retirees have lower
risk aversion than dictated by the inverse of EIS, they will prefer the Annuity over
the phased withdrawal strategies. Among the phased strategies, the Fixed strategy
will be the dominant strategy while the Percentage of Wealth is preferred over the
Life Expectation strategy. However, when RRA is greater than the inverse of EIS,
I find the reverse preference ranking to be true. The high risk averse retiree will
want to avoid the possibility of no consumption or bequest in the event of portfolio
ruin, and hence will prefer a phased withdrawal strategy that neither ends in negative
balance or loss of consumption. The utility levels decreases smoothly with increasing
RRA for a given level of EIS and retirees’ preferences respond to this. The phased
withdrawal strategies become more utility enhancing than the annuity; with retirees
preferring the Life Expectancy drawdown to the two alternative phased strategies.
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The Percentage of Wealth ranks higher than the Fixed withdrawal and the annuity
is the least preferred. The preference of phased withdrawals over annuities and RRA
levels being higher than the inverse of EIS is consistent with prediction by recursive
preferences.
Compared to the CRRA investor, an investor who is willing to accept consumption
volatility over time or late resolution to uncertainty has increased expected utility
only if he is less risk averse (has RRA lower) than predicted by the inverse function
for the EIS coefficient. Retirees’ time to resolution of uncertainty determines how
much utility they derive from their wealth levels and consumption streams. This is an
important finding as previous studies have overlooked the influence of EIS in retirees’
withdrawal strategy selection. The impact of the EIS is significant and the timing of
resolution informs the drawdown plan choice for retirees of various risk aversion levels.
I rank the different withdrawal strategies for various RRA and EIS coefficients and
find the dominating strategies at different combinations of the preference parameters.
The results of the dominant strategies are shown in Table 3.3. I show the dominant
strategies based on conditional survival to age 86 and again unconditional to sur-
vival capped at age 100. Panel A ranks the alternative strategies based on retiree’s
surviving to age 86. I find that for a low risk averse retiree, that is γ=2 and γ=3,
the Life Expectancy withdrawal strategy dominates other withdrawal strategies at
low EIS levels and gives way to dominance by the Percentage of Wealth strategy
and Annuities at moderate to increasing EIS levels. As RRA increases beyond γ=3,
the Life Expectancy withdrawal dominates the other withdrawals and Annuities, the
Percentage of Wealth is the second preferred strategy and is closely trailed by the
Fixed withdrawal strategy.
The Annuity remains the least preferred strategy. At age 86, the Life Expectancy
strategy is reaching its peak withdrawal levels and it is preferred over the other
strategies for the high withdrawal levels and high bequest potential. The Percent-
age of Wealth withdrawal, which is next in preference is also attractive for its high
average withdrawal and high portfolio ending values. The Fixed withdrawal strat-
egy, although with a lower average withdrawal level has good bequest potential and
therefore is preferred to the Annuity. Annuities in this case become unattractive
as retirees receive utility not only from their level of withdrawals but also from the
possibility of meeting bequest motives.
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Table 3.3: Dominating Withdrawal Strategies (A)
I rank the alternative withdrawal strategies according to their expected utilities. I denote the
Percentage of Wealth withdrawal by P, the Fixed withdrawal by F, the Life Expectation by L and
Annuitisation by A. I present Panels A and B showing the dominant strategies conditional on retiree
surviving to age 86 and unconditional on retiree’s survival capped at age 100 respectively.
Panel A Dominating Withdrawal Strategies at age 86
RRA\EIS 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
2 L,P,F,A L,P,F,A L,P,F,A L,P,F,A L,P,F,A
3 P,F,A,L L,P,F,A P,F,A,L P,F,A,L P,F,A,L
4 L,P,F,A L,P,F,A L,P,F,A L,P,F,A L,P,F,A
5 L,P,F,A L,P,F,A L,P,F,A L,P,F,A L,P,F,A
7 L,P,F,A L,P,F,A L,P,F,A L,P,F,A L,P,F,A
10 L,P,F,A L,P,F,A L,P,F,A L,P,F,A L,P,F,A
Panel B Dominating Withdrawal Strategies at age 100
RRA\EIS 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
2 P,L,F,A L,P,F,A L,P,F,A L,P,F,A L,P,F,A
3 P,L,F,A L,P,F,A P,F,A,L P,F,A,L P,F,A,L
4 L,P,F,A P,L,F,A P,L,F,A P,L,F,A P,L,F,A
5 L,P,F,A L,P,F,A L,P,F,A L,P,F,A L,P,F,A
7 L,P,F,A L,P,F,A L,P,F,A L,P,F,A L,P,F,A
10 L,P,F,A L,P,F,A L,P,F,A L,P,F,A L,P,F,A
Panel B shows the dominating strategies at age 100. I find the rankings of the with-
drawal strategies to follow a similar trend in the long term. A major difference is
the increase in dominance of the Percentage of Wealth withdrawal to γ=4. There
is now a fair balance between the Life Expectancy and the Percentage withdrawals
making these two the most preferred strategies for retirees with bequest motives. The
dominance of these two strategies is consistent with findings of previous literature
(Dus et al., 2005).
3.4.3 Changing Asset Allocations
I vary the retirement portfolios’ asset allocations from the baseline proportions to
see the impact on the average ending portfolios, probability of ruin and the average
withdrawals for the different withdrawal strategies. I do this for the conservative and
growth portfolios and analyse the summary statistics of the simulations in Table 3.4.
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Comparing the summary statistics from the conservative and growth portfolios, I
make three main observations. Firstly, with the exception of the Fixed withdrawal
strategy, the growth portfolio provides higher average consumption in other with-
drawal strategies than the conservative portfolio. The higher average withdrawals
however come with higher deviation about the mean, and this is especially signifi-
cant for the two variable strategies, the Life Expectancy and the Percent of Wealth.
Secondly, the growth portfolio has lower ruin probabilities compared to the conser-
vative portfolio. Although the difference in ruin probability for the Fixed withdrawal
strategies between the two asset allocation categories looks marginal, the probability
is reduced by about 13.9% in response to asset allocation changes. Finally, I find
the ending portfolio values to be higher for the growth portfolio than the conserva-
tive portfolio. This means for the purpose of meeting bequest motives, the growth
portfolio provides higher terminal values and is more attractive than a conservative
portfolio.
I find increasing the allocation of growth assets of a retirement portfolio to come with
several advantages. Varying asset allocation from a conservative, through a balanced
to a growth portfolio increases the average ending portfolios significantly for all the
withdrawal strategies. Since the average withdrawal levels for the variable strategies,
the Percent of Wealth and the Life Expectancy, respond to changes in wealth lev-
els, I observe significant increases in their withdrawals. The remaining withdrawal
strategy, the Fixed withdrawal, which is wealth independent, does not make any sig-
nificant increases to the average withdrawals but shows increased ending portfolio
values for increasing growth assets allocations. The Fixed withdrawal strategy actu-
ally decreases in average withdrawal size with increasing growth asset proportions as
the higher wealth levels will account for low pension income, gradually eroding the
average withdrawal size. The increased terminal wealth reduces the ruin probabili-
ties, making portfolios with higher growth allocations less likely to be depleted while
the retiree is still alive compared to portfolios with less growth asset allocation.
3.4.4 Decreasing Mortality and Alternative Asset Allocations
I run further comparative withdrawal strategy simulations based on the survival pat-
terns from the Australian Life Tables. I begin with conditional survival to ages 86,
92 and age 100 for the baseline asset allocation strategy. Whilst life expectancy at
birth for females in Australia is estimated at age 84, we expect one in every two
females aged 65 will live to age 86, the median life expectation in retirement. The
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Australian Life Tables 2008-2010 (2011) provide mortality experiences and capture
the mortality improvements observations among Australians for the past 25 and 100
years as well as projected mortality improvements over 25 and 100 years. With the
incorporation of the 25-year mortality improvements, the median life expectation in
retirement is expected to increase to age 92. I simulate the withdrawal patterns and
wealth dynamics for retirees who live until age 86, and the results are based on the
conditional probability of retirees surviving to this age. Further to that, I construct
summary tables based on the expectation of improved mortality experiences, condi-
tional on retiree’s survival to age 92. Also, I show tables for conditional survival to
age 100, which is the final age for the life tables, incorporating all withdrawal and
portfolio dynamics based on the retiree surviving 35 years in retirement. Finally, I
show the wealth patterns for retirees which are unconditional on survival, and I cap
this at age 100.
I present the summary statistics in Tables 3.5 and 3.6.
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From Table 3.5, I find the average withdrawal levels for the Fixed withdrawal strat-
egy to decrease with increasing surviving age. This is explained by examining the
increasing trend in ending portfolios for the strategy. The increasing average ending
portfolios result in lower allocated pension which declines the average withdrawal size
as retiree ages. The two remaining withdrawal strategies, the Percentage of Wealth
and Life Expectancy withdrawals also show increments with increasing survival for
the baseline asset allocation strategy. The Percentage of Wealth withdrawal increases
in a stepwise manner as the retiree ages. This increase is attributed to the minimum
drawdown ratios applied to ensure that retiree’s earnings are tax-exempt. The Life
Expectancy strategy’s withdrawal increases gradually with age and peaks at the age
of 88 years and thereafter depletes rapidly, creating a hump shape pattern for its
withdrawal stream.
Probability of ruin, as expected, is a direct function of age. Retirees are more likely
to deplete their assets the longer they live. The increasing probability of ruin in the
setting is able to partly explain the decrease in the average withdrawal levels for the
Fixed withdrawal strategy and increasing standard deviation of this withdrawal plan.
With the availability of pension income, retirees who deplete their retirement port-
folios are entitled to the full-rate pension, which is about a half of their income for
a retiree under the Fixed withdrawal strategy. The significant drop in consumption
decreases the retiree’s mean consumption and increases the standard deviation of her
withdrawal.
The terminal portfolio values for the Fixed withdrawal strategy increases with increas-
ing survival age. There is however, a wide range of wealth levels as some retirees run
into ruin and others have large portfolio values. This shows the diverse extremes
possible for those who live longer, the wealthy get wealthier, while the numbers of
retirees who experience portfolio ruin also increase among surviving population. The
average ending portfolio values for the Percentage of Wealth withdrawal decreases
gradually, whilst the Life Expectancy terminal values depletes significantly after the
withdrawal levels peak in the late eighties. Of all the strategies analysed, the Life
Expectancy strategy has the lowest payouts and terminal values in the latter years
of retirement.
With increasing life expectation in the population, the Life Expectancy and to some
extent, the Percentage of Wealth strategies are attractive to retirees due to the in-
creasing withdrawal levels with increasing age. These two strategies do not run into
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ruin and vary withdrawals in response to changes in wealth levels. The major dis-
advantage to this strategy is the large and increasing standard deviation with age,
making the retiree uncertain of meeting her consumption needs for any given year.
The Fixed withdrawals, although having lower average withdrawals and increasing
ruin probabilities with increasing surviving age also have some attractive features.
Retirees who desire a stable income will opt for the Fixed withdrawal strategy, which
is less volatile, although that comes at a cost, that is, a chance of ruin but is able to
maintain retirees’ lifestyle over a long period. The large ending portfolio values for
this strategy also make it attractive to retirees with bequest motives as the ending
portfolio values increase with increasing surviving age.
3.4.5 The Impact of Pensions on Baseline Asset Allocation
I further investigate the influence of the pension income in the analysis. I do this for
the baseline asset allocation as well as the conservative and growth portfolios. The
Australian Means-Tested Aged Pension scheme is a unique characteristic of Aus-
tralia’s pension system. The pension income received by retirees under this scheme
is dependent on the result of an asset and income levels test. For the purpose of this
study, I base the pension income level on retiree’s remaining wealth level at all times
in retirement prior to her death. The decreasing pension income with increasing
wealth levels in retirement and vice-versa has the tendency to smooth consumption
and possibly bias the results. This creates difficulty in comparing the result of this
study to others such as Dus et al. (2005) and Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and Dus
(2008) that are based in countries with no government-sponsored pension income.
To create a comparative analysis, I omit pension income for the various withdrawal
plans, repeat the simulations, and calculate the expected utilities for a retiree who
chooses any of the strategies or a level income annuity. I show a summary of with-
drawal and wealth levels in the absence of pension income in Table 3.7.
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Table 3.7 summarises the statistics for the alternative phased withdrawal plans and
the annuity in the absence of pension income. The Fixed withdrawal strategy remains
at a constant level at all ages and this level is equal to what is received as annuity
income should the retiree decide to annuitise. With no pension income, retirees who
deplete their retirement portfolios may borrow to meet their consumption needs. The
ruin probability, although low at the median life expectation in retirement, increases
with increasing age and this depresses the average ending portfolio for the Fixed with-
drawal plan. Whilst 2% of the surviving population run into ruin by age 86, further
analysis show 26.95% of surviving population at age 100 run into ruin. Overall the
cohort of 100,000 retirees show a 5% ruin probability accompanied by a reduction
in average ending portfolio values at age 100. Even with the reduction in terminal
wealth over the long horizon, the 5th percentile for the overall cohort shows higher
ending wealth levels compared to the 5th percentile of retirees who survive to age
86. There is a marginal increase in the average withdrawal level of the Percentage
of Wealth withdrawal plan over the long horizon but with a significant change in the
standard deviation. The average withdrawal level of the Life Expectancy is lower in
the long term compared to the short term as the average at age 86 is close to the with-
drawal’s highest peak after which withdrawal levels decrease for the remaining years
in retirement. With the decrease in withdrawal levels is an accompanying marginal
decrease in the standard deviation of withdrawal for this strategy.The average ending
portfolio values for the Percentage of Wealth withdrawal decreases gradually, whilst
the Life Expectancy terminal values are higher on average in the long term as they
vary over wide ranges.
The Life Expectancy and the Percentage of Wealth strategies remain attractive to
retirees due to the increasing withdrawal levels with increasing age. They are also
attractive because, unlike the Fixed withdrawal strategy, they do not run into ruin.
The major disadvantage to these strategies is the large standard deviations about
their average withdrawal levels, which creates difficulty for future financial planning.
The Fixed withdrawal strategy, although with lower average withdrawals and increas-
ing ruin probabilities with increasing surviving age, provides a stable income. The
Annuity provides similar benefit and has the advantage of not running into ruin. I
compare and rank the various strategies based on their expected utilities in Table 3.8.
In the short term, as shown in Panel A of Table 3.8, I find a dominating preference for
the Life Expectancy withdrawal strategy. Second in the preference is the Percentage
of Wealth withdrawal strategy followed by the Fixed withdrawal strategy and the
Annuity. Whilst the Life Expectancy strategy dominates for most combinations of
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Table 3.8: Dominating Withdrawal Strategies (B)
I rank the alternative withdrawal strategies according to their expected utilities. I denote the
Percentage of Wealth withdrawal by P, the Fixed withdrawal by F, the Life Expectation by L and
Annuitisation by A. I present Panels A and B showing the dominant strategies conditional on retiree
surviving to age 86 and unconditional on retiree’s survival capped at age 100 respectively.
Panel A Dominating Withdrawal Strategies at age 86
RRA\EIS 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
2 L,P,F,A L,P,F,A P,F,L,A P,F,L,A P,F,L,A
3 P,F,A,L L,P,F,A P,F,A,L P,F,A,L P,F,A,L
4 L,P,F,A L,P,F,A L,P,F,A L,P,F,A L,P,F,A
5 L,P,F,A L,P,F,A L,P,F,A L,P,F,A P,L,F,A
7 L,P,F,A L,P,F,A L,P,F,A ,LP,F,A L,P,F,A
10 L,P,F,A L,P,F,A L,P,F,A L,P,F,A L,P,F,A
Panel B Dominating Withdrawal Strategies at age 100
RRA\EIS 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
2 F,L,P,A L,F,P,A P,L,F,A P,L,F,A P,L,F,A
3 F,P,A,L L,F,P,A F,P,A,L F,P,A,L F,P,A,L
4 L,F,P,A F,L,P,A L,F,P,A L,F,P,A L,F,P,A
5 L,F,P,A L,F,P,A L,F,P,A L,F,P,A P,L,F,A
7 L,F,P,A L,F,P,A L,F,P,A L,F,P,A L,F,P,A
10 L,F,P,A L,F,P,A L,F,P,A L,F,P,A L,F,P,A
the preference parameters, I find the Percentage of Wealth strategy to be the most
attractive withdrawal strategy at low levels of risk aversion and high EIS. The Fixed
withdrawal strategy is also more attractive at low levels of risk aversion and high EIS
than at high risk aversion levels. Increasing risk aversion makes the chance of ruin a
significant concern and makes the Fixed strategy unattractive for retirees with a low
risk threshold. Whilst the Annuity has an advantage in this respect, the importance
attached to the presence of bequest motives underscores the benefit of annuitising.
In Panel B of Table 3.8, up to age 35 years in retirement, I find the Fixed and the
Percentage of Wealth strategies to dominate the other strategies at low levels of risk
aversion of γ = 2 to 3. The Life Expectancy and Annuity follow in rank respectively.
Although the Fixed withdrawal runs to ruin 4.99% of the time, this is significantly
low and overshadowed by the many who receive stable incomes throughout their life-
times. The strategy remains attractive for low levels of risk aversion with ending
portfolio levels reasonably high, only second to the Percentage of Wealth strategy
giving a rich bequest potential. For the moderate to high risk averse retiree, the Life
Expectancy withdrawal dominates the other withdrawal strategies. Next in prefer-
ence is the Fixed withdrawal, the Percentage of Wealth being the least preferred
phased withdrawal strategy is preferred to the Annuity. Life Expectancy withdrawal
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is preferred for its high levels of withdrawal and its ability to maintain bequest poten-
tial. The Fixed withdrawal is preferred for its stability but largely attractive for its
large bequest potential. The Percentage of Wealth withdrawal provides an average
terminal portfolio that is higher than that provided by the Fixed withdrawal plan.
A significant downside to this strategy is it’s moderate average withdrawal which
is just marginally higher than the Fixed withdrawal, albeit a rather large standard
deviation. This makes the Percentage of Wealth the least preferred among the alter-
native withdrawal plans when retirees have Epstein-Zin preferences in the absence of
pension income. The bequest motives of retirees reduce the importance of including
Annuities in the retirement plan.
In the presence of pensions, I find the Life Expectancy withdrawal to dominate the
other withdrawal strategies, with the Percentage of Wealth withdrawal being pre-
ferred at low levels of risk aversion. Next to the dominating Life Expectancy with-
drawal for a wide range of RRA and EIS levels is the Percentage of Wealth and
finally, the Fixed withdrawal strategy, with the Annuity being least preferred. In
the presence of pension income however, the Life Expectancy withdrawal contin-
ues to dominate the other withdrawal strategies with the Fixed withdrawal strategy
preferred at low risk averse levels. The Fixed withdrawal also becomes the second
preferred strategy after the Life Expectancy for a broad range of RRA and EIS. Of
significance is the dominance of the Fixed withdrawal over the Percentage of Wealth
withdrawal in the absence of pension income. The reason for this observation is that
the means-tested age pension serves as a buffer for retirees’ withdrawals, increasing
with less disposable wealth and vice versa. This makes high volatile wealth depen-
dent strategies such as the Percentage of Wealth attractive. The absence of pensions
reveal the extent of volatility and in many cases, the low levels of withdrawals for re-
tirees on this strategy when returns are low. On the contrary, the absence of pensions
show the stability from the Fixed withdrawal, which is useful for retirement planning,
making it more attractive for retirees compared to the Percentage of Wealth strategy.
3.4.6 The Influence of Bequest on Withdrawal Plan Choice
The impact of bequest is a significant part of any pension study. I investigate the in-
fluence of bequest on the results of this study. Our baseline analysis included pension
income and bequest motive, Section 3.4.5 investigates the results in the absence of
pension income. In this section, I analyse how retirees’ preference for the alternative
withdrawal strategies change when they have no bequest motives and their expected
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utilities are entirely based on withdrawals from their wealth in retirement. I do this
in two different scenarios; firstly, when retiree has access to pension income such as
the Means-Tested Aged Pension in Australia and secondly, in the absence of pension
income. I compare the former to the results of the baseline case and the latter to the
results from Section 3.4.2.
3.4.7 Pensions Present With No Bequest Motives
Table 3.9: Dominating Withdrawal Strategies (C)
I rank the alternative withdrawal strategies according to their expected utilities received from their
annual withdrawals. I denote the Percentage of Wealth withdrawal by P, the Fixed withdrawal
by F, the Life Expectation by L and Annuitisation by A. I present Panels A and B showing the
dominant strategies conditional on retiree surviving to age 86 and unconditional on retiree’s survival
capped at age 100 respectively.
Panel A Dominating Withdrawal Strategies at age 86
RRA\EIS 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
2 P,L,F,A P,L,F,A P,L,F,A P,L,F,A P,L,F,A
3 P,L,F,A P,L,F,A P,L,F,A P,L,F,A P,L,F,A
4 A,P,F,L A,P,L,F A,P,L,F A,P,F,L A,P,F,L
5 A,F,P,L A,F,P,L A,P,F,L A,P,F,L A,P,F,L
7 A,F,P,L A,F,P,L A,F,P,L A,F,P,L A,F,P,L
10 A,F,P,L A,F,P,L A,F,P,L A,F,P,L A,F,P,L
Panel B Dominating Withdrawal Strategies at age 100
RRA\EIS 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
2 P,A,F,L P,A,F,L P,A,F,L P,A,F,L P,A,F,L
3 P,A,F,L P,A,F,L P,A,F,L P,A,F,L P,A,F,L
4 A,L,F,P A,L,F,P A,L,F,P A,F,L,P A,F,P,L
5 A,L,F,P A,L,F,P A,L,F,P A,F,L,P A,F,L,P
7 A,L,F,P A,L,F,P A,L,F,P A,F,L,P A,F,L,P
10 A,L,F,P A,L,F,P A,L,F,P A,F,L,P A,F,L,P
At age 86, shown in Panel A of Table 3.9, I find the Percentage of Wealth with-
drawal to dominate other phased withdrawals and the Annuity at low levels of RRA,
that is, γ=2 to γ=3 and all levels of EIS. Next in preference is the Life Expectancy
withdrawal, the Fixed and finally the Annuity. The Percentage of Wealth strategy
is preferred for its high income and lower standard deviation compared to the Life
Expectation withdrawal, which has a high income as well but a greater level of disper-
sion about the mean income level coming in as the second in preference. At age 86,
the ruin probability for the Fixed Strategy is low and highly insignificant as retirees
choose this strategy over the Annuity at low risk aversion levels. As risk aversion in-
creases, the moderate and high risk averse retirees prefer to annuitise, with Annuities
dominating the phased withdrawal strategies. The Percentage of Wealth withdrawal
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shifts to be the second preferred strategy after the Annuity at moderate RRA level of
γ=4, and further dominated by the Fixed withdrawal plan at increasing RRA levels.
When retirees have no bequest motives and derive all their utility from their with-
drawals, they prefer stability in consumption over varying and volatile consumption.
The presence of pensions make the Fixed withdrawal more attractive for moderate
to high risk averse retirees as it increases the average withdrawal level with minimum
change in standard deviation. The two least preferred strategies at high risk averse
levels, the Life Expectancy and Percentage withdrawals, have high deviations about
the mean consumption level even in the early years in retirement. This amount of
volatility early in retirement is undesirable and reduces utility among retirees.
In the long term, as shown in Panel B of Table 3.9, the Annuity dominates phased
withdrawal plans for retirees with no bequest motives, crowding out the Percent-
age of Wealth withdrawal dominance for moderate to high risk averse retirees. The
Percentage of Wealth strategy is still preferred at low risk averse levels of γ=2 and
3, while retirees who are more risk averse will prefer to annuitise. With annuities
dominating the phased withdrawal plans, the Life Expectancy is preferred among
the three alternative phased withdrawal strategies. The next preferred is the Fixed
withdrawal, with the Percentage of Wealth strategy being the least preferred. After
the peak of withdrawal income in the late eighties, the Life Expectancy withdrawal
on average provides higher utilities than any other phased withdrawal strategy. At
low levels of EIS, the Life Expectancy withdrawal is only second to annuities for
moderate to high risk averse retirees. At high EIS levels however, the Fixed with-
drawal strategy is preferred to the Life Expectancy withdrawal as it has a reasonable
average withdrawal level as well as a lower dispersion about the mean withdrawal.
The Percentage of Wealth is the least preferred for retirees with no bequest mo-
tives.The Fixed strategy is preferred to the other phased withdrawals at high RRA
and high EIS for the stability in income it provides, it doesn’t run to ruin because
of the presence of pensions but decreases in level. Even with the decrement for re-
tirees who run out of wealth, the dispersion is minimal compared to that observed for
the remaining phased withdrawal strategies, with extremely high standard deviations.
Compared to the baseline result with pensions and bequest motives present, I find
that retirees’ choice of alternative withdrawal plan depends on their decision to be-
queath or not. Retirees choose annuities over phased withdrawals only if they have
no bequest motives. In the presence of bequest motives, the Life Expectancy and the
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Percentage of Wealth withdrawals are the dominant phased withdrawal strategies in
the long term. Annuities and the Life Expectancy withdrawal dominate when there
is no bequest motive.
3.4.8 No Pensions Present and No Bequest Motives
Table 3.10: Dominating Withdrawal Strategies (D)
I rank the alternative withdrawal strategies according to their expected utilities. I denote the
Percentage of Wealth withdrawal by P, the Fixed withdrawal by F, the Life Expectation by L and
Annuitisation by A. I present Panels A and B showing the dominant strategies conditional on retiree
surviving to age 86 and unconditional on retiree’s survival capped at age 100 respectively.
Panel A Dominating Withdrawal Strategies at age 86
RRA\EIS 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
2 P,L,F,A P,L,F,A P,L,F,A P,L,F,A P,L,F,A
3 L,P,F,A F,L,P,A L,P,F,A L,P,F,A P,L,F,A
4 F,A,P,L F,A,P,L F,A,P,L F,A,P,L F,A,P,L
5 F,A,P,L F,A,P,L F,A,P,L F,A,P,L F,A,P,L
7 F,A,P,L F,A,P,L F,A,P,L F,A,P,L F,A,P,L
10 F,A,P,L F,A,P,L F,A,P,L F,A,P,L F,A,P,L
Panel B Dominating Withdrawal Strategies at age 100
RRA\EIS 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
2 L,P,A,F L,P,A,F L,P,A,F L,P,A,F L,P,A,F
3 A,L,P,F A,L,P,F A,L,P,F A,L,P,F A,L,P,F
4 A,F,L,P A,F,L,P A,F,L,P A,F,L,P A,F,L,P
5 A,F,L,P A,F,L,P A,F,L,P A,F,L,P A,F,L,P
7 A,F,L,P A,F,L,P A,F,L,P A,F,L,P A,F,P,L
10 A,F,L,P A,F,L,P A,F,L,P A,F,L,P A,F,P,L
In the short term, as shown in Panel A of Table 3.10, analysing the ranking of
phased alternative withdrawal plans and the Annuity at age 86, I find the Percentage
of Wealth and Life Expectancy withdrawals to dominate the Fixed strategy and the
Annuity at low levels of RRA, th is, at γ=2 and 3 respectively at all levels of EIS. The
Fixed withdrawal is preferred to the Annuity at low levels of low risk aversion, mak-
ing the latter the least preferred strategy at low risk averse levels. As risk aversion
increases to γ=4, the dominating strategy is the Fixed withdrawal strategy, next in
preference is the Annuity, followed by the Percentage of Wealth and the Life Expecta-
tion strategies. As risk aversion increases, the moderate and high risk averse retirees
prefer the Fixed withdrawal and Annuities to the other alternative withdrawal plans,
with the Percentage of Wealth preferred to the Life Expectancy withdrawal. When
retirees have neither pension income nor bequest motives and derive all their utility
from their withdrawals, they prefer stability in consumption over varying and volatile
consumption. The Fixed withdrawal is more attractive in the early retirement years,
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in this case at age 86, with its moderate average withdrawal level and minimum stan-
dard deviation. It also has a low chance of ruin and this makes a fair comparison with
the Annuity. The Life Expectancy and Percentage withdrawals have high deviations
about the mean withdrawal levels, with the former beginning at very low levels and
increasing later in retirement.
In the long term, the Life Expectancy withdrawal dominates at low risk aversion level
of γ=2 and is closely trailed by the Percentage of Wealth withdrawal. The annuity is
preferred to the Fixed withdrawal plan. The more risk averse retirees prefer to annui-
tise, with annuities dominating all levels of EIS for RRA levels greater than 2. With
annuities dominating the phased withdrawal plans, the Fixed withdrawal is preferred
among the three alternative strategies. The next preferred is the Life Expectancy,
with the Percentage of Wealth being the least preferred. With neither pensions nor
bequest motives, annuities dominate for moderate to high risk averse retirees as they
provide a steady income which cannot be outlived. The preferred strategy among
the phased withdrawal plans, the Fixed withdrawal, performs a similar role as the
annuity albeit with a chance of ruin. Among the variable withdrawal strategies, the
Life Expectancy withdrawal is preferred to the Percentage of Wealth withdrawal for
its higher average withdrawal over the entire retirement horizon.
Compared to the results from Section 3.4.6 with pensions present but no bequest
motives, I find that retirees’ choice of alternative withdrawal plan depends to some
extent on the availability of pension income. While the annuity dominates in both
scenarios, there is a significant change in the ordering of the phased withdrawal strate-
gies. At low risk aversion levels, the Percentage of Wealth withdrawal plan dominates
when pension income is present whilst the Life Expectancy withdrawal dominates in
the absence of pension income. Overall, I find the Life Expectancy and Percent-
age of Wealth withdrawal plans to be more attractive when there are pensions than
when there is no pension income. The Life Expectation dominates the Percentage
of Wealth strategy in both cases as it has a higher withdrawal level with a lower
standard deviation to withdrawal proportion. The means-tested-aged pension acts
as a reserve income that makes these aformentioned strategies appear smoother, and
the retiree does not experience the severity of volatility from these strategies. When
this becomes more apparent in the absence of pensions, retirees are better off with
Fixed withdrawal strategy than the two variable strategies for long-term planning
and consumption purposes.
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3.5 Conclusion and Discussion
Just like a well-defined superannuation contribution scheme, it is equally important to
have well-structured drawdown rules in the decumulation phase. Investment strate-
gies are also critical to ensure that individuals’ accumulated wealth at retirement is
sustainable. Inappropriate decumulation strategies can cause serious repercussions
for the post retirement lifestyle. Using the institutional characteristics of annuity
markets in Australia, I show which drawdown strategies dominate the annuity and
vice-versa and retirees’ preferences under varying conditions. For retirees who are
willing to accept some financial risk in exchange for retaining the benefits of liquidity
and bequest, they choose one of three different withdrawal strategies which they de-
fault into at retirement: the Fixed, the Percent of Wealth and the Life Expectation
withdrawals. I analyse how these strategies compare to the life annuity in the pres-
ence and absence of pension income, bequest motives and improving mortality under
Epstein-Zin preferences.
By using the Epstein-Zin utilities, we are able to disentangle RRA from the EIS. An
individual with a high degree of risk aversion will want to avoid uncertainties in her
consumption in a given time period, or a reduction in consumption in a state such
as a fall in equities. An individual with low EIS will avoid consumption volatility
over time and more so will seek to avoid a reduction in her consumption level relative
to previous period consumption level. By varying the degrees of EIS and RRA, I
observe changes to the retirees’ choice of drawdown strategy based on the expected
utilities from the strategies. Most importantly, I find that for various levels of RRA
and a given level of EIS, whenever the inverse of EIS is greater than the RRA level,
there is increased utility from the same wealth and withdrawal profile and vice-versa.
Compared to the CRRA investor, an investor who is willing to accept consumption
volatility over time or has late resolution to uncertainty has a high expected util-
ity only if the investor is less risk averse than predicted by the inverse EIS for the
CRRA utility function. I find retirees choose to self-annuitise via phased withdrawal
strategies over buying annuities whenever risk aversion is higher than predicted by
the CRRA utility. High risk averse retirees look to avoid the possibility of portfolio
shortfall; resulting in having zero income and not meeting their bequest needs. These
risks are eliminated in two of the phased strategies considered in this study, the Life
Expectancy and Percent of Wealth withdrawal strategies, with retirees choosing these
strategies over the Fixed strategy and annuity option. This is a core reason for the
preference of such phased withdrawal strategies over annuitisation in retirement. This
is an important finding as previous studies have overlooked the influence of EIS in
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retirees’ withdrawal strategy selection. This result is consistent with previous studies
that show that subjects prefer early resolution of uncertainty and have RRA greater
than the reciprocal of the EIS.
For different equity allocation levels in the retirement portfolio, I find increased sus-
tainability with increasing equity levels. Chances of ruin for the Fixed withdrawal
strategy is significantly minimised when the equity levels are increased from conser-
vative through balanced to a growth portfolio. The average withdrawals and terminal
values for the remaining phased withdrawal strategies increase with increasing equity
allocation. This finding is in agreement with works such as Cooley et al. (2001)
who assert that a retirement fund should have at least 50% allocation to equity to
be sustainable. Asset allocation does not change the order of preference for the al-
ternative strategies. The Life Expectancy strategy ranks top among the alternative
strategies, with the Percent of Wealth strategy being the second preferred strategy
and the Fixed strategy being the least preferred phased strategy; preferred only to
the life annuity.
When government sponsored pensions are present, I find the Life Expectancy with-
drawal to dominate the other withdrawal strategies, with the Percentage of Wealth
withdrawal being preferred at low RRA and high EIS. Life Expectancy withdrawal
dominates for a wide range of RRA and EIS levels and the second preferred strategy is
the Percentage of Wealth. The Fixed withdrawal strategy is next in the ranks, with
the Annuity being the least preferred strategy. In the absence of pension income
however, the Life Expectancy withdrawal continues to dominate the other with-
drawal strategies with the Fixed withdrawal strategy preferred at low risk averse
levels. The Fixed withdrawal also becomes the second preferred strategy after the
Life Expectancy for a broad range of RRA and EIS. The absence of pensions shifts
plan dominance to the Fixed Withdrawal over the Percentage of Wealth withdrawal.
I find the inclusion of a pensions model such as the means-tested Age Pension in-
cluded in this study to serve as a buffer for retirees’ withdrawals, increasing with less
disposable wealth and vice versa. This makes high volatile wealth dependent strate-
gies such as the Percentage of Wealth attractive. The absence of pensions reveal the
extent of volatility and in many cases, the low levels of withdrawals for retirees on this
strategy when returns are low. On the other hand, the absence of pensions show the
stability from the Fixed withdrawal, which is useful for retirement planning, making
it more attractive for retirees compared to the Percentage of Wealth strategy. This
finding makes the presence of pensions a significant determinant of retiree’s choice of
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drawdown strategy in retirement.
Finally, I find the presence of bequest motives among retirees has influence on their
distribution plan choice. Retirees choose annuities over phased withdrawals only if
they have no bequest motives. When retirees have no bequest motives and derive all
their utility from their withdrawals, they prefer stability in consumption over vary-
ing and volatile consumption. Annuities dominate the phased withdrawal strategies,
with the Fixed withdrawal being the most attractive phased withdrawal strategy.
The presence of pensions makes the Fixed withdrawal more attractive for moderate
to high risk averse retirees as it increases the average withdrawal level with minimum
change in standard deviation and the chance of ruin is eliminated by the pensions.
The two least preferred strategies at high risk averse levels, the Life Expectancy
and Percentage withdrawals, have high deviations about the mean consumption level
even in the early years of retirement. In the absence of bequest motives however, the
Life Expectancy and the Percentage of Wealth withdrawals are the dominant phased
withdrawal strategies for the long term.
The results should be interpreted with caution, as one has to be mindful about the
study’s limitations. I assume the annuitisation decision is made at retirement and
study the life utility paths until age of death to compare its performance with other
withdrawal strategies. Future studies could price annuities at all ages in retirement,
giving the retiree the choice of annuitising at any given age. The retiree may however
need the forward-looking approach I use in this study to determine when there are
significant utility gains from annuitising to switch to annuities. Also, this study
assumes an incomplete annuity market where the level income life annuity, is the
only available annuity. A fruitful line of research could be to explore the inclusion
of other annuity types such as deferred annuities in my settings as this may yield
different and interesting results.
Appendix
3.A Withdrawal Strategies
The four different withdrawal strategies used in this study are carefully chosen with
varying properties to meet the needs of different retirees. They present an assortment
of choices for retirees of different risk preferences. The dynamics of the various
strategies over time are presented in Figure 3.A.1.
Figure 3.A.1: Withdrawal Strategy Patterns
This figure shows the withdrawal patterns of the four different strategies; the Fixed withdrawal path
is shown with a line with stars; Percentage of Wealth withdrawal path by a line with circles; the Life
Expectancy withdrawal path by a line with triangles and the SPIA payouts with a solid line. The
plot represents the average of 10,000 simulated withdrawal paths for a $500,000 initial investment.
The Fixed withdrawal strategy, whereby the retiree receives a fixed cash amount
annually, replicates the SPIA. There are two sides to holding a fixed withdrawal
strategy; there is always a chance of financial ruin, which will occur when returns
on the retirement wealth are very low or negative over long periods as the level of
income does not change to reflect changing wealth levels. Nevertheless, when returns
are high and the portfolio grows steadily, the retiree continues to maintain her level
of withdrawal, foregoing a large amount of potential consumption and leaving large
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amounts of wealth at her death. This should be appealing to retirees with substantial
bequest potential. The decreasing levels observed over time are a reflection of the
accumulating wealth at older ages leading to a lower pension income, thereby de-
creasing the level of income on average.
The Percent of Wealth withdrawal does not run to ruin even in times of poor re-
turns. The level of consumption however increases or decreases with respect to the
growth of the fund size. It is attractive to retirees who are not willing to take the
chance of possible financial ruin. The major disadvantage with this strategy is that
extreme volatility in returns causes equal variation in the level of consumption. The
stepwise increasing in the level of income is commensurate with the minimum with-
drawal amounts specified under Australia’s current legislation. The Life Expectancy
withdrawal begins with a lower annual payout, which rises above the other with-
drawal strategies in the early years of retirement. It peaks in the mid-eighties and
declines thereafter, although the withdrawal fraction increases with age. The de-
creasing income levels are due to less remaining wealth in the retiree’s account after
the consistently large withdrawals. It has low terminal values, ensuring an efficient
consumption based on the individual’s remaining life expectation. Finally, the SPIA
provides a fixed income amount over the lifetime of the individual. The individual
will only fully annuitise if she has no bequest motives.
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Table 3.A.1: Dominating Withdrawal Strategies
I rank the alternative withdrawal strategies according to their expected utilities. I denote the
Percentage of Wealth withdrawal by P, the Fixed withdrawal by F, the Life Expectation by L and
Annuitisation by A. I present Panels A and B showing the dominant strategies conditional on retiree
surviving to age 92 and unconditional on retiree’s survival capped at age 100 respectively for the
50-50 Growth/Defensive strategy.
Panel A Dominating Withdrawal Strategies at age 92
RRA\EIS 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
2 P,L,F,A P,L,F,A P,L,F,A P,L,F,A P,L,F,A
3 P,L,F,A P,L,F,A P,L,F,A P,L,F,A P,L,F,A
4 A,P,F,L A,P,L,F A,P,L,F A,P,F,L A,P,F,L
5 A,F,L,P A,F,L,P A,F,L,P A,F,P,L A,F,P,L
7 A,F,L,P A,F,L,P A,F,L,P A,F,L,P A,F,P,L
10 A,F,L,P A,F,L,P A,F,L,P A,F,L,P A,F,P,L
Panel B Dominating Withdrawal Strategies at age 100
RRA\EIS 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
2 L,P,F,A L,P,F,A P,L,F,A P,L,F,A P,L,F,A
3 L,P,A,F L,P,A,F L,P,A,F L,P,A,F L,P,A,F
4 L,A,P,F L,A,P,F L,A,P,F L,A,P,F L,A,P,F
5 L,A,P,F L,A,P,F L,A,P,F L,A,P,F L,A,P,F
7 L,A,P,F L,A,P,F L,A,P,F LA,P,F L,A,F,P
10 L,A,P,F L,A,P,F L,A,P,F L,A,P,F L,A,P,F
3.B Summary of Portfolio Values for Alternative Asset
allocations given Improving Mortality Expectations
Chapter 3 82
T
a
b
l
e
3
.B
.1
:
S
u
m
m
ar
y
of
P
or
tf
ol
io
V
al
u
es
fo
r
S
im
u
la
te
d
R
et
u
rn
s
fo
r
30
/7
0
G
ro
w
th
/D
ef
en
si
ve
a
ss
et
s
fo
r
D
ec
re
as
in
g
M
or
ta
li
ty
E
x
p
ec
ta
ti
on
s
P
a
n
el
A
C
o
n
d
it
io
n
a
l
o
n
su
rv
iv
in
g
to
a
g
e
8
6
A
v
er
a
g
e
W
it
h
d
ra
w
a
l
T
y
p
e
A
v
er
a
g
e
w
it
h
d
ra
w
a
l
P
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
o
f
ru
in
E
n
d
in
g
P
er
ce
n
ti
le
s
o
f
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
o
f
en
d
in
g
p
o
rt
fo
li
o
(S
ta
n
d
a
rd
d
ev
ia
ti
o
n
)
R
u
in
P
o
rt
fo
li
o
5
2
5
5
0
7
5
F
ix
ed
3
7
,0
1
5
(5
,6
3
7
)
3
.8
9
%
7
6
8
,5
6
4
2
6
,1
0
5
3
4
0
,1
4
3
6
4
3
,1
0
7
1
,0
5
0
,0
8
0
P
er
ce
n
t
o
f
W
ea
lt
h
4
2
,4
4
0
(1
5
,4
9
5
)
0
%
7
6
0
,4
3
1
3
3
6
,4
5
0
5
2
0
,1
8
5
6
9
7
,1
3
7
9
2
2
,7
6
0
L
if
e
E
x
p
ec
ta
n
cy
6
2
,2
9
6
(2
4
,2
2
2
)
0
%
4
2
4
,3
6
3
2
2
2
,4
2
8
3
1
4
,1
4
4
3
9
6
,5
1
6
5
0
2
,6
2
1
S
P
IA
4
0
,0
2
6
(0
)
0
%
0
0
0
0
0
P
a
n
el
B
.
C
o
n
d
it
io
n
a
l
o
n
su
rv
iv
in
g
to
a
g
e
9
2
A
v
er
a
g
e
W
it
h
d
ra
w
a
l
T
y
p
e
A
v
er
a
g
e
w
it
h
d
ra
w
a
l
P
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
o
f
ru
in
E
n
d
in
g
P
er
ce
n
ti
le
s
o
f
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
o
f
en
d
in
g
p
o
rt
fo
li
o
(S
ta
n
d
a
rd
d
ev
ia
ti
o
n
)
R
u
in
P
o
rt
fo
li
o
5
2
5
5
0
7
5
F
ix
ed
3
6
,6
6
8
(6
,2
7
2
)
9
.9
6
%
8
9
6
,0
9
1
-
1
4
5
,6
4
7
2
4
2
,4
0
5
6
7
9
,2
7
5
1
,2
9
8
,9
2
0
P
er
ce
n
t
o
f
W
ea
lt
h
4
7
,6
3
1
(2
1
,6
4
3
)
0
%
6
9
5
,1
4
0
2
6
6
,2
9
8
4
4
0
,6
3
5
6
2
1
,1
3
0
8
6
1
,8
5
6
L
if
e
E
x
p
ec
ta
n
cy
6
5
,7
5
8
(2
5
,6
6
5
)
0
%
1
9
7
,6
2
3
1
0
4
,2
7
6
1
4
7
,4
5
7
1
8
3
,3
7
0
2
3
5
,4
3
2
S
P
IA
4
0
,0
2
6
(0
)
0
%
0
0
0
0
0
P
a
n
el
C
.
C
o
n
d
it
io
n
a
l
o
n
su
rv
iv
in
g
to
a
g
e
1
0
0
A
v
er
a
g
e
W
it
h
d
ra
w
a
l
T
y
p
e
A
v
er
a
g
e
w
it
h
d
ra
w
a
l
P
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
o
f
ru
in
E
n
d
in
g
P
er
ce
n
ti
le
s
o
f
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
o
f
en
d
in
g
p
o
rt
fo
li
o
(S
ta
n
d
a
rd
d
ev
ia
ti
o
n
)
R
u
in
P
o
rt
fo
li
o
5
2
5
5
0
7
5
F
ix
ed
3
5
,9
9
6
(7
,0
9
8
)
1
9
.9
1
%
1
,1
0
3
,5
1
3
-
5
9
3
,9
6
0
2
1
,0
0
7
7
6
7
,3
5
2
1
,7
3
3
,9
9
0
P
er
ce
n
t
o
f
W
ea
lt
h
5
2
,8
8
7
(2
7
,0
4
5
)
0
%
4
9
2
,6
8
4
1
4
9
,1
4
4
3
0
3
,2
9
3
4
1
8
,6
8
9
5
8
6
,6
2
1
L
if
e
E
x
p
ec
ta
n
cy
6
0
,4
5
9
(2
4
,0
0
3
)
0
%
3
7
,8
5
6
2
6
,6
0
1
3
1
,8
9
1
3
6
,5
4
6
4
1
,2
2
6
S
P
IA
4
0
,0
2
6
(0
)
0
%
0
0
0
0
0
Chapter 3 83
T
a
b
l
e
3
.B
.2
:
S
u
m
m
ar
y
of
P
or
tf
ol
io
V
al
u
es
fo
r
S
im
u
la
te
d
R
et
u
rn
s
fo
r
70
/3
0
G
ro
w
th
/D
ef
en
si
ve
a
ss
et
s
fo
r
D
ec
re
as
in
g
M
or
ta
li
ty
E
x
p
ec
ta
ti
on
s
P
a
n
el
A
C
o
n
d
it
io
n
a
l
o
n
su
rv
iv
in
g
to
a
g
e
8
6
A
v
er
a
g
e
W
it
h
d
ra
w
a
l
T
y
p
e
A
v
er
a
g
e
w
it
h
d
ra
w
a
l
P
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
o
f
ru
in
E
n
d
in
g
P
er
ce
n
ti
le
s
o
f
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
o
f
en
d
in
g
p
o
rt
fo
li
o
(S
ta
n
d
a
rd
d
ev
ia
ti
o
n
)
R
u
in
P
o
rt
fo
li
o
5
2
5
5
0
7
5
F
ix
ed
3
4
,7
8
6
(5
,9
6
5
)
4
.6
0
%
1
,6
9
3
,3
3
0
1
1
,2
8
8
6
1
7
,0
0
0
1
,2
4
1
,8
6
7
2
,3
0
7
,3
7
5
P
er
ce
n
t
o
f
W
ea
lt
h
5
4
,5
0
2
(3
4
,7
0
2
)
0
%
1
,2
7
5
,7
7
2
3
6
0
,5
9
7
6
9
7
,3
3
7
1
,0
5
9
,3
2
4
1
,6
0
5
,2
2
6
L
if
e
E
x
p
ec
ta
n
cy
7
8
,6
0
7
(4
7
,7
3
6
)
0
%
6
5
2
,3
7
5
2
3
3
,7
7
2
3
9
5
,8
1
4
5
5
9
,7
3
7
8
0
5
,4
2
1
S
P
IA
4
0
,0
2
6
(0
)
0
%
0
0
0
0
0
P
a
n
el
B
C
o
n
d
it
io
n
a
l
o
n
su
rv
iv
in
g
to
a
g
e
9
2
A
v
er
a
g
e
W
it
h
d
ra
w
a
l
T
y
p
e
A
v
er
a
g
e
w
it
h
d
ra
w
a
l
P
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
o
f
ru
in
E
n
d
in
g
P
er
ce
n
ti
le
s
o
f
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
o
f
en
d
in
g
p
o
rt
fo
li
o
(S
ta
n
d
a
rd
d
ev
ia
ti
o
n
)
R
u
in
P
o
rt
fo
li
o
5
2
5
5
0
7
5
F
ix
ed
3
4
,1
1
3
(6
,1
8
9
)
8
.4
0
%
2
,6
4
6
,8
6
2
-
1
9
9
,6
0
5
7
2
3
,3
4
4
1
,7
8
6
,9
7
8
3
,6
3
8
,0
9
9
P
er
ce
n
t
o
f
W
ea
lt
h
6
7
,5
9
1
(5
3
,5
8
1
)
0
%
1
,3
7
0
,4
6
3
3
1
1
,9
9
9
6
6
4
,7
5
8
1
,0
7
1
,9
4
6
1
,7
8
8
,4
4
2
L
if
e
E
x
p
ec
ta
n
cy
8
7
,6
4
4
(5
4
,0
1
5
)
0
%
3
3
0
,7
4
1
1
1
3
,4
4
1
1
9
1
,1
3
4
2
7
5
,7
9
0
4
1
5
,2
5
9
S
P
IA
4
0
,0
2
6
(0
)
0
%
0
0
0
0
0
P
a
n
el
C
C
o
n
d
it
io
n
a
l
o
n
su
rv
iv
in
g
to
a
g
e
1
0
0
A
v
er
a
g
e
W
it
h
d
ra
w
a
l
T
y
p
e
A
v
er
a
g
e
w
it
h
d
ra
w
a
l
P
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
o
f
ru
in
E
n
d
in
g
P
er
ce
n
ti
le
s
o
f
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
o
f
en
d
in
g
p
o
rt
fo
li
o
(S
ta
n
d
a
rd
d
ev
ia
ti
o
n
)
R
u
in
P
o
rt
fo
li
o
5
2
5
5
0
7
5
F
ix
ed
3
3
,0
6
9
(5
,8
7
0
)
9
.9
3
%
6
,0
3
4
,2
3
8
-
5
2
6
,2
6
2
1
,0
1
5
,8
9
8
3
,7
4
7
,0
4
6
7
,9
7
7
,6
6
8
P
er
ce
n
t
o
f
W
ea
lt
h
9
3
,6
9
4
(9
4
,6
4
9
)
0
%
1
,3
4
3
,6
5
3
2
7
6
,3
9
6
5
0
8
,4
6
4
1
,0
0
8
,3
6
3
1
,6
7
2
,7
1
3
L
if
e
E
x
p
ec
ta
n
cy
8
8
,2
1
6
(5
9
,1
3
1
)
0
%
5
8
,7
6
9
3
0
,3
5
7
3
8
,6
7
2
4
9
,8
0
4
6
9
,1
2
7
S
P
IA
4
0
,0
2
6
(0
)
0
%
0
0
0
0
0
Chapter 4
Portfolio Choice for Retirees
with Bequest Motive: The Case
for Deferred Life Annuities
4.1 Introduction
Lifetime annuities provide longevity insurance in retirement, ensuring that retirees
do not outlive their wealth. Despite the impact of government support and the ben-
efits of annuitisation that are well documented in literature, there is considerable
evidence of annuity aversion among investors (Blake et al., 2003). This has led to
what economists call the ‘annuity puzzle’. The actuarially unfair pricing of annuities
is one of the important reasons attributed to this aversion of annuities by retirees
according to Friedman and Warshawsky (1990). They find that the annuity yield is
depressed due to the loading factor imposed by the life companies to cater for trans-
action costs and adverse selection among annuitants. Brown (2001) argues that the
aversion to annuities could be attributed to investors’ knowledge of their subjective
survival probabilities. Therefore, investors in poor health will avoid purchasing an-
nuities since the decision to purchase annuities is irreversible. According to Bernheim
(1992), the presence of bequest motives can also discourage annuitisation. Individ-
uals will avoid locking in wealth through annuitisation but rather hold liquidity to
meet their bequest needs.
In order to mitigate some of the above problems with traditional annuities, annu-
ity providers in recent years have introduced innovative products such as deferred
annuities. Unlike immediate annuities, which begin paying income to the annuitant
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almost immediately after purchase, the deferred annuities allow the buyers to shift
the commencement of the payment to an agreed future date. Whilst no money is re-
turned to heirs if the annuitant dies before the payout begins, the upside to surviving
the deferring period is that the retiree receive higher mortality credits (additional re-
turn above the risk-free rate of return on the annuity income) from the redistribution
of annuitised wealth among surviving participants from annuitants who died during
the deferring period. In effect, purchasing a deferred annuity is a far less expensive
proposition relative to an immediate annuity with identical payouts.
The inclusion of immediate annuities in retirement planning is deliberated exten-
sively in previous studies (Ameriks et al., 2001; Blake et al., 2003; Horneff, Maurer,
Mitchell, & Dus, 2008; Horneff, Maurer, & Stamos, 2008). Deferred annuities in re-
tirement, although available in some annuity markets, are less discussed in retirement
literature. Important studies have found the deferred annuity to be preferred to im-
mediate full annuitisation in retirement (Horneff, Maurer, & Rogalla, 2010; Milevsky,
2005; Scott, 2008; Scott, Watson, & Hu, 2007, 2011). Milevsky (2005) introduces a
concept product he called the Advanced Life Deferred Annuity (ALDA), a variant of
the pure deferred annuity contract. This product is indexed for inflation, acquired in
installments and pays off towards the end of the retiree’s lifecycle. Gong and Webb
(2010) show that households would prefer the ALDA to either immediate, postponed,
or self-annuitisation. They also show the deferred annuity to provide the very nec-
essary longevity insurance for retirees at a lower cost. Scott (2008) and Scott et al.
(2011) show that purchasing longevity annuities substantially increases spending in
retirement, it addresses longevity risk and the problem of deciding what portion of
an individual’s assets to annuitise as it usually does not require full annuitisation.
Horneff et al. (2010) derive an optimal lifecycle portfolio choice and investor’s con-
sumption pattern when they are faced with uncertain labor income, a risky capital
market, and mortality risk and have access to deferred annuities prior to retirement.
They introduce gradual annuitisation with deferred annuities until retirement age.
They also use time-varying mortality that exhibits both expected improvements in
future life expectancy as well as stochastic variations around this trend.
In this essay, I incorporate a single premium pure deferred annuity in retirement port-
folio for a Hyperbolic Absolute Risk Aversion (HARA) utility maximising investor
who faces expected mortality improvements, risky capital markets and an incomplete
annuity market at retirement. The retiree has access to a government-sponsored
pension and has bequest and capital preservation needs. She has the option to self-
annuitise or purchase deferred annuities with varying deferred periods with a portion
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of her wealth at retirement age 65 or at some later age. I evaluate and rank the var-
ious investment choices available to the retiree based on the distribution of terminal
utilities she derives from making her investment choice.
This essay makes two important contributions to the literature. Firstly, whilst past
studies discuss the benefits of deferred annuity, they are silent on the suitable length
of the annuity’s deferral period and what influences retirees’ choice of deferred an-
nuities. In this essay, I examine appropriate deferral periods based on retirees’ risk
preferences and desire to increase consumption and terminal utility. Secondly, I con-
sider the appropriate timing of deferred annuities both in the presence and absence
of government means-tested age pension and how the timing of the deferred annuity
purchase affects the length of the annuity deferral period.
Deferred annuities are sold in a number countries including the United States of
America (US), the United Kingdom (UK) and Chile (Ganegoda & Bateman, 2008) .
However, in this essay, I examine them in an Australian setting. Although Australia
has a small annuity market compared to countries such as the US and the UK, the
market has been showing signs of growth in recent times.1 Until recently, Australian
pension rules prescribing minimum withdrawals did not permit deferred earnings to
be eligible for tax benefits. However, the Australian government announced plans
for concessional tax treatment for deferred lifetime annuities commencing from July
2014. This makes it an opportune time to study the efficacy of including deferred
annuities in a retirement portfolio for the Australian retiree. The leading provider of
annuities in Australia, Challenger Life Company, which sells over 95% of all life annu-
ities in Australia, expects the price of a deferred annuity purchased by a 65-year-old
man which begins payouts of $8,000 annually from age 80 to cost as little as $10,000
(Uren, 2012). This is about 10% of the price of an immediate life annuity purchased
at the same age and up to 50% less than purchasing an immediate annuity at age 80
for a similar payout. Purchasing a deferred annuity within a pension portfolio leaves
a larger portfolio size, due to its lower price at purchase, along with an increased
possibility of higher investment returns and the opportunity for higher consumption
before the annuity payments begin. Whilst the model calibration in this essay rests
on assumptions that are realistic in an Australian setting, my results are generally
applicable in other markets.
1Annuity sales since the last quarter of 2011 indicate that the lifetime annuity is gaining popularity
in the market. If the trend continues, 2013 should record the highest annuity purchases in Australia
since 2004 (Plan for Life, 2013).
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Like this study, Horneff et al. (2010) derive portfolio choice and consumption pat-
terns over life-cycle for households with access to deferred annuities. This essay differs
from theirs in two ways. Firstly, I examine the inclusion of deferred annuities in a
more realistic ‘post retirement’ setting as I believe that purchasing annuities before
retirement comes at substantial costs to the investor. The latter constrains the up-
side potential of the retiree’s portfolio by forfeiting possible returns from investable
assets, decreasing her level of wealth at retirement and exposing her to a lower stan-
dard of living.2 Moreover, the option of gradual annuitisation is unavailable in many
markets, including Australia, which renders purchase of deferred annuities prior to
retirement impractical. This strategy also does not take into account the tax bene-
fits that may be available to retirees for purchasing annuities with their retirement
lumpsum after they retire. Instead I propose a single premium deferred annuity that
is purchased whilst an individual is in retirement. The timing and purchase amount
of retiree annuitisation are based on her consumption preferences and her desire to
maximise lifetime utility.
Secondly, Horneff et al. (2010) do not consider the utility from bequest.3 In contrast,
I allow the retiree to use a Constant Proportion Portfolio Insurance (CPPI) strategy
to invest the non-annuitised portion of the retiree’s assets that is able to cater for the
bequest motive of retirees. A CPPI strategy sets a wealth floor level, which denotes
the minimum acceptable level of wealth prior to death. The retiree’s allocations to
risky and risk free assets are based on her portfolio value at all times: increasing (de-
creasing) her risky investments with increasing (decreasing) portfolio value to ensure
that the wealth floor is preserved at all times. This answers the aspect of the annuity
puzzle arising from the presence of retirees having bequest motives. Moreover, the
CPPI model serves as an efficient means of capital preservation which is essential
for retirees in the aftermath of the recent Global Financial Crisis and the resulting
decline in the value of many investment funds. To my knowledge, this is the first
study to incorporate the CPPI model in retirement planning.45.
2Surely at the age of say 40, one would be aiming to grow their wealth rather than decumulate
with annual annuity purchases. The fact that there is almost zero uptake of annuities among investors
prior to retirement proves the point.
3Although they assume that the household spends only part of their wealth in buying annuities
leaving the remainder for bequest, they do not ensure that the bequest is not depleted below a certain
minimum acceptable level.
4This model was proposed by Perold (1986) and Black and Jones (1987) as an alternative to
complex option replication approaches to portfolio insurance.
5The complexity of this strategy along with the periodic balancing may make implementation of
this strategy difficult
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In what follows, I introduce the CPPI model which is used to derive the optimal
consumption and portfolio allocation of risky and risk-free assets in Section 4.2. I
discuss the wealth dynamics in 4.2.1, the setup of the CPPI model in 4.2.2 and de-
ferred annuities in 4.2.3. I also elaborate on consumption and risk aversion in 4.2.4,
government pensions in 4.2.5, mortality dynamics in 4.2.6 and the model calibration
in 4.2.7. The Omega Ratio is discussed in Section 4.2.8. Section 4.3 presents my
findings and Section 4.4 concludes the essay.
4.2 The Model
4.2.1 Wealth Dynamics
For this study, I employ the Constant Proportion Portfolio Insurance (CPPI) Model,
which is augmented to include parameters to meet the decumulation planning. The
retiree with HARA preferences has access to three post-retirement financial assets: a
risky equity fund, a risk-free bond fund and deferred annuities. She has the option
of purchasing deferred annuities on or after her retirement age. The retiree does
not fully annuitise her wealth for two reasons. Firstly, she requires consumption in
the time preceding the annuity payouts and secondly, because she has an expected
bequest level that cannot be violated under any circumstances.
At retirement, the retiree holds an initial wealth, W65 of which she has the option
to purchase a single premium ‘n− year’ deferred annuity worth, Wa. This option is
exercised at any age between 65 and 75 years. Her wealth after the annuity purchase,
the remaining wealth, is represented by W0 . The retiree receives an annual pension
income of Pt, which is indexed annually for inflation. For the analysis with wealth
dynamics, I may often refer to remaining wealth, W0 as the retiree’s initial or starting
wealth and this is used henceforth. The retiree’s initial wealth is determined by
whether or not she purchases annuities at age 65. That is, initial wealth takes the
form of Equation 4.1 when the retiree annuitises at age 65 and Equation 4.2 otherwise.
W0 = W65 −Wa + P65 (4.1)
W0 = W65 + P65 (4.2)
The retiree decides the proportion of her wealth to allocate to the risky and risk-free
assets at retirement and is free to choose her proportion to invest in annuities later in
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retirement. The retiree invests her remaining wealth and pension income in the bond
and equity funds and makes annual withdrawals of size, Ct for consumption. After
purchasing deferred annuities, the retiree’s wealth level at hand at all times prior to
receiving the annuity payments, is a function of remaining wealth and pension in-
come. For simplicity, I assume the pension income is adjusted annually for inflation,
pi, rather than semiannual indexation to the Consumer Price Index (CPI).
Before the annuity payments begin, the retiree’s portfolio changes as:
Wt+1 = Pt(1 + pi) + [Pt+1 + (1− αt)(1 + rf )Wt + αt(1 + st)Wt]− Ct (4.3)
Where rf is the bond return and st is the stock return, α is the proportion of wealth
invested in the risky asset fund.
With the addition of the annuity payments, At after the deferred period, wealth
changes are recorded as:
Wt+1 = Pt(1 + pi) + [At + Pt+1 + (1− αt)(1 + rf )Wt + αt(1 + st)Wt]− Ct (4.4)
Where rf is the bond return and st is the stock return.
When annuity payments begin, the retiree’s wealth at hand is a function of her
current wealth, the annual pension income and the annual annuity payment received.
Since I consider a deferred annuity with fixed payments, the increment in terms of
retiree’s wealth level is constant with an annual fixed upward adjustment. For the two
financial assets available to the retiree, the risk free asset evolves deterministically
with an exponential growth at a constant rate of r. For a unit of the risk free asset
valued at Xt,
dXt
Xt
= rdt (4.5)
I denote the value of a unit of the risky asset by St and the asset follows a Geometric
Brownian Motion with drift µ and volatility σ.
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dS(t) = µS(t)dt+ σS(t)dZt (4.6)
Where dZt is a standard Wiener process.
4.2.2 The CPPI Model
The retiree’s bequest motive informs her choice of wealth “Floor” level, F0 for the
CPPI model. The Floor represents the present value of the retiree’s expected level
of bequest, BT . It is also the minimum amount of remaining wealth a retiree is
willing to accept in her worst-case scenario prior to death. This level of wealth is
determined at the beginning of the portfolio cycle and is less than the initial wealth
level, satisfying the budget constraint,
F0 ≤W0 (4.7)
The initial Floor level selected grows to the guaranteed bequest level at the end of
the investment horizon such that;
Ft ≡ BT e−r(T−t), t ∈ [0, T ] (4.8)
At every time t, for various levels of retiree wealth equal or exceeding the wealth
Floor level, I define a Cushion, K0, as the difference between the retiree’s available
portfolio wealth, Wt and the wealth Floor. This equals the surplus of the retiree’s
available wealth.
The initial cushion represents how much the CPPI investor is prepared to lose, and
will vary with the investors’ initial wealth level.
Kt ≡ max(0,Wt − Ft) (4.9)
The retiree’s portfolio value is therefore, represented at all times by the sum of the
portfolio’s floor level and the portfolio cushion.
Wt = Kt + Ft (4.10)
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According to the CPPI model, the retiree holds a constant multiple, m of the cushion
with leverage greater than 1. This constant multiple is invested in the risky asset.
The value of the multiple determines the type of portfolio insurance.
• For m = 1, the payoff is linear and represents the buy and hold strategy
• For m < 1, the payoff is convex and represents the constant-mix strategy
• For m > 1, the payoff is concave and the CPPI holds.
With the choice of a multiplier parameter, the weight of portfolio invested in the
risky asset is obtained as:
αt ≡ mKt
Wt
(4.11)
α is the proportion of the cushion invested in risky assets. The portfolio value is thus
defined by:
dWt
Wt
=
(Wt −mKt)
Wt
dXt
Xt
+
mKt
Wt
dSt
St
(4.12)
= (1− αt)rdt+ αtdSt
St
(4.13)
As the portfolio value increases, the investor increases her share in the risky assets.
The investor becomes more conservative as the portfolio value declines towards the
set floor and increases her share in the riskless asset whilst decreasing her share of
the risky asset. The portfolio value is kept above the floor at all times, ensuring that
Ft ≤ Wt . At the horizon, the floor is obtained with certainty, and this value may be
equal or greater than the bequest value.
WT ≥ FT ≥ BT (4.14)
4.2.3 Deferred Annuities
The deferred annuities used in this essay provide no death or surrender benefits.
Upon surviving the deferred period, the retiree receives fixed annual payouts whose
level is specified at the time of annuitisation. For an ‘n − year’ deferred whole life
annuity due payable of $1 at the beginning of every year while the retiree age x,
survives the deferred period x + n, onwards, the present value random variable is
represented as:6
6Bowers and Hickman (1997)
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Y =
{
0 if 0 ≤ T < n,
n|a¨T+1−n if T ≥ n
(4.15)
In addition, its actuarial present value is:
E[Y ] = n|a¨x = nExa¨x+n (4.16)
= a¨x − a¨x:n (4.17)
=
∞∑
t=n
vttpx; (4.18)
tpx denotes the conditional probability of an individual age x surviving to age x+t, v
t
is the discount function which is expressed by 1/(1 + r)−t with r being the discount
rate or the interest rate at which the annuity is compounded annually. T denotes
the age of death and n, the length of deferral. I include in the annuity pricing, an
insurance loading factor, L, which increases the actuarial present value of the deferred
annuity. The insurance loading factor covers the insurance company’s commissions,
all expenses and taxes. This amount is multiplied by the pure annuity premium
to arrive at the annuity’s market price (Milevsky, 1998). The work of Mitchell et
al. (2000) assert that the loading factor increases with increasing issue age and this
reasoning is applied to the annuity pricing in this essay. Hence, the market price of
the deferred annuity is given by:
n|a¨x = (1 + L)
∞∑
t=n
vttpx (4.19)
The illiquid nature of annuities makes investors unable to respond to significant
market declines or changes to subjective mortality beliefs. Nevertheless, the retiree
has the benefit of full longevity insurance as well as being able to meet bequest
motives.
4.2.4 Consumption and Risk Aversion
The CPPI investor has consumption preferences assumed to belong to the HARA
type of utility functions. The use of HARA utility enables the setting of a minimum
consumption level that the retiree chooses. This is a non-zero consumption floor for
the retiree whereby her utility increases only when her consumption rises above this
minimum level. This way, I am able to ensure that consumption does not fall below
some reasonable subsistence level in retirement. The inclusion of a consumption floor
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rather than the absolute consumption levels as assumed in CRRA models is moti-
vated by earlier studies such as Litzenberger and Rubinstein (1976). They suggest
that utility is better measured relative to a reference level and increases only when
consumption increases above this reference level. Habit formation literature supports
the notion that the investor’s consumption is not determined by her absolute con-
sumption level but rather by the relative position of her consumption to some ‘stock
of habit’. This stock of habit could be represented by her consumption history or the
history of aggregate consumption, (Campbell & Cochrane, 1995). This consumption
reference could also be set at a level that the investor deems to be a ‘fair’ consumption.
The model is based on the selection of a fair consumption reference point. This
reference is equal to the annual subsistence estimate for retirees as calculated by
the Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia (ASFA) Retirement Standard.
ASFA estimates that a retiree will require $41,190 per year whilst a couple will re-
quire an estimated $56,236 per year for a comfortable retirement. These figures are
effective as at the first quarter of 2013 (ASFA, 2013). A comfortable retirement is
defined as one that enables an older, healthy retiree to be involved in a wide range of
leisure and recreational activities and to have a good standard of living through the
purchase of such things as household goods, private insurance, a decent car and the
like. The estimates are based on the assumption that the retiree or retired couple
owns their own home. I assume that retirees plan to consume a minimum of the
ASFA estimate and derive an increase in utility when annual consumption exceeds
the minimum. This makes the HARA utility an appropriate utility function for my
analysis.
I represent the annual subsistence estimate for the retiree for every year in retirement
by C˜. Ct denotes the actual annual consumption level for the retiree, which is equal
to the higher of 5% of her wealth level and C˜ . γ represents the retiree’s relative
risk aversion level or the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Following earlier studies
by Milevsky and Young (2007) and Kingston and Thorp (2005), I represent the
annual discount rate by r , which I equate to the annual risk-free rate of interest.
Instantaneous force of mortality is denoted by λt for any given age t. The discounted
direct utility at time t which is n years before payouts from the deferred annuity
begin is given by:
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U(C, t;n) =
(Ct − C˜)1−γ
1− γ e
−(rt+∫ x+n+tx+n λsds) (4.20)
=
(Ct − C˜)1−γ
1− γ e
−rt × e−
∫ x+n+t
x+n λsds (4.21)
As long as tpx, the conditional survival probability of an individual age x surviving
t more years, is constant or decreasing with respect to t, the instantaneous force of
mortality is represented in actuarial notation by:
tpx = e
− ∫ x+tx λ(s)ds (4.22)
Resulting in the utility of consumption being given by:
U(C, t) =
(Ct − C˜)1−γ
1− γ e
rt× tpx (4.23)
4.2.5 Pension Income
For the government sponsored pension income analysis used in this study, I refer to
the Australian means-tested Age Pension. Australians who reach the required age
are eligible for this age pension. The current required age for a male is 65 and 64.5
for a female, increasing to 67 by July 2023. The single rate age pension is set to
27.7% of Male Total Average Weekly Earnings (MTAWE). An individual’s pension
income allocation depends on several factors such as the individual being single or
with a partner, and owning a house or not. Most importantly, the pension income
amount is directly linked to the lower of two formal assessments; an income and
asset test. Income levels lower than $152 per fortnight and assets less than $196,750
for a homeowner makes an individual eligible for full rate pension. The maximum
fortnightly income for a single female homeowner as at March 2013 is $808.40. This
rate decreases with increasing level of assets and income, providing the retiree with
a part-rate pension. Beyond an upper threshold, which is $1,768.80 income per
fortnight and $735,750 in assets, the individual is disqualified from receiving any
pension income. The lower threshold for the income test, that entitles an individual
to Full Age Pension, is adjusted in line with the Consumer Price Index on 1 July of
each year. Additional adjustments to the thresholds in March and September affect
individuals on a Part Rate Pension. The individual’s income is based on the lower of
the two tests and is disqualified if she fails either of the tests. The assets and income
tests applied are based on reported figures as at March 2013.7
7For details on current rates, see http://www.humanservices.gov.au/customer/services/centrelink/age-
pension
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4.2.6 Mortality Dynamics
The life table used for the analysis is the Australian Life Tables 2010-2012 (2013).
This life table provides mortality experiences and captures the mortality improve-
ments observations among Australians for the past 25 and 100 years as well as pro-
jected mortality improvements over 25 and 100 years. The table is provided by the
Australia Bureau of Statistics and is extracted from the Human Mortality Database.
Human mortality has decreased significantly in the last century. Findings by Oep-
pen and Vaupel (2002) reveal that female life expectancy in the last 160 years has
been increasing steadily by almost three months every year. According to the United
Nations,8 the current population ageing is unparalleled in the history of humanity.
The population of older people, 60 years and over, at the world level is expected to
surpass the population of children, below 15 years, for the first time in the year 2045.
In the more developed parts of the world, the population of older people exceeded the
population of children in 1998. The United Nations also report that life expectancy
at birth increased by 40% over the 20th Century.
Population ageing is not an Australian issue alone. According to the American Mor-
tality Table, RP–2000 (2000), the probability that a female age 65 will live to age
80 is 70.9%; that of a male is 62.7%. Given a couple who are both 65 years, the
probability of at least one spouse attaining 80 years is as high as 89.1%. With these
high and increasing life expectancies, it has become expedient that we include some
mortality adjustments in retirement planning. Some academics believe that mortality
rates over time follow stochastic processes (Cairns, Blake, & Dowd, 2006; Milevsky
& David Promislow, 2001). To account for mortality improvements, I use the Aus-
tralia mortality improvement rates as provided by the government actuary in the
Australian Life Tables 2008-2010 (2011). I adjust the survival probability rates for
25 year-improvements with reference to the percentage rates.
An analysis of the Life Table used in this study as shown in Figure 4.1 shows that
whilst life expectancy at birth for females is estimated at age 84, we expect one in
every two females age 65 will live to age 87, the median life expectation in retirement.
With the incorporation of the 25-year mortality improvements, we expect the median
life expectation in retirement to increase to age 92. Another significant observation is
that with respect to the life tables, one in every ten females in retirement is expected
to live until age 96. With the improvements used in this study, there is a 10% chance
of a retiree living past age 99. This means we expect one in every ten retirees to live
8World Population Ageing: 1950-2050 (2002).
Chapter 4 96
Figure 4.1: Survival Probabilities showing 25-year Improvements
Figure 1 compares the survival probability (tp65) under the ALT 2008-2010 with the survival
probabilities adjusted for 25-year improvements.
to age 99, requiring a retirement planning horizon for up to 34 years. This requires a
retiree who wants to be 90% certain that her superannuation savings last as long as
she lives to plan her consumption and savings for up to 34 years. All these estimates
are higher than the estimates quoted at birth; they are based on the retiree living to
retirement age and are helpful for retirement planning. The conditionality of these
calculated survival rates makes them an appropriate assessment based on survived
ages in retirement. This should serve as a motivation for individuals to plan for longer
retirement horizons.
The impact of improving mortality has two significant effects on the purchase of de-
ferred annuities. Firstly, with the expectation of decreasing mortality rates, insurance
companies will adjust the prices of annuities accordingly; this means purchasing an-
nuities later will be more expensive because the annuity-loading factor, which caters
for commissions, taxes, adverse selection etc. will be higher. This is an incentive for
early annuitisation and great saving for investors who purchase deferred annuities.
Secondly, decreasing mortality rates means the risk averse investor will derive higher
utilities from future consumption. This makes the purchase of deferred annuities with
payouts in advanced ages an attractive retirement strategy.
Chapter 4 97
4.2.7 Model Calibration
I begin my model with a set of baseline parameter values as shown in Table 4.1.9
I use the Australian Life Tables 2010-2012 (2013) as the standard female mortality
table. At an interest rate of 2% per annum, the prices of an 10, 15 and 20-year pure
deferred whole life annuity paying one dollar per annum at the start of each year
from age 75, 80, 85 for an annuity purchased at age 65 are 10|a¨65=10.80,15|a¨65=7.112
and 20|a¨65=4.05 respectively.
Table 4.1: Baseline Parameters
This table presents the baseline parameters used in the analysis. The wealth levels, consumption
levels, wealth floor and annual pension income are in real dollar terms. The risk free rate, equity
premium and volatility are in percentages per annum. Interest and loading factor for annuity calcu-
lation is also stated as a percentage per annum and the loading increases with age in 0.05 percentage
increment. Starting age and time horizon are stated in years.
Asset Returns
Real risk-free rate, r 0.02
Equity Premium,µ 0.06
Volatility of annual equity return,σ 0.18
Preference parameter
Relative risk aversion,γ 2,5,10
CPPI Model
Starting age, 65
Starting wealth, W65 500,000
Annual Pension Income, Pt 19,000
Annuity Purchase Amount, Wa 50,000
Floor 200,000
Minimum Annual Consumption, C˜ 41,160
Time horizon, t 40
Multiplier, m 1.25
Deferred Annuity
Interest rate, i 0.02
Loading factor, L 0.15
I use the baseline parameters for a retiree who annuitises a tenth of her wealth at
retirement. She purchases a 10, 15 or 20-year deferred annuity that begins payouts
when she is 75, 80 or 85 years respectively. She receives annual pension income which
is indexed for inflation, and this income is used for consumption and the remainder
is invested with her retirement portfolio of equities and bonds. She makes monthly
withdrawals at the beginning of the month for consumption.
9Australia’s equity premium for the period 1883 to 2011 has averaged 6% at a 5% significance
level (Handley, 2012). Other baseline parameters are in line with recent literature such as Blake
et al. (2011) and Gomes and Michaelides (2005). The choice of m is discretionary and the CPPI
holds as long as m > 1. I make use of monthly rates derived from the annual statistics to equal the
frequency of retiree’s monthly consumption to avoid bias.
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4.2.8 The Omega Ratio
I measure the performance of the alternative investment options available to the
retiree by the use of the Omega Ratio. The Omega Ratio developed by Keating
and Shadwick (2002) is a preference free performance measurement that ranks and
evaluates portfolios. The Omega is especially suited for financial performance where
investors are interested in the risk and reward characteristics of various investment
options. The entire returns distribution including all higher moments is encoded
in the Omega Ratio. For each return level, Omega provides a probability adjusted
ratio of gains to losses relative to the referenced return. It operates under the simple
rule of investors preferring more to less. Given the choice between two portfolios
with the same predicted return, investors should prefer the portfolio with the highest
Omega Ratio. This maximises the potential for making the desired level of return,
and minimises the probability of extreme losses.
Keating and Shadwick (2002) define the Omega as:
Ω(u) =
∫ b
u [1− F (x)]dx∫ u
a [F (x)]dx
(4.24)
Where (a, b) represents the upper and lower bounds of the range of return distribution
and u is the threshold return. The numerator is one minus the cumulative distribution
function higher than the threshold, u, up to the upper bound of the returns range
and the denominator, F (x) is the cumulative distribution function from the lower
bound of the returns range to the threshold, u.
A high Omega Ratio means that there is more density return on the right of the
threshold level than on the left. I compare the different investment options available
to the retiree by choosing a common threshold as reference and construct the Omega
functions taking the range of terminal utilities as thresholds. The Omega function
is a construction of Omega Ratios taking all points in the terminal utilities range as
thresholds.
I define the Omega function in an equivalent form given by:
Ω(u) =
E[max(R− u, 0)]
E[max(u−R, 0)] (4.25)
For utility level R and benchmark utility level u. F is the cumulative probability
distribution function of the utilities, with F (x) = P [R ≤ x].
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4.3 Results
Retirees choose between purchasing deferred annuities and self-managing their re-
tirement portfolio via the CPPI strategy. They have the option to purchase deferred
annuities for deferred periods of 10, 15 and 20 years. The annuity payout phase
should begin before or by age 85. This means the option of the 20-year deferred
annuity can only be chosen at age 65, whilst the other annuities can be purchased
after some years in retirement. The retirees’ choice of deferral length is primarily
dependent on their belief in their subjective survival probabilities. To model the
survival patterns for the annuitants, I use the 25-year mortality improvements with
respect to the Australian Life Tables 2008-2010 (2011). A retiree who believes to
possess higher than average survival probabilities will prefer a longer deferred period.
Such people believe that based on their health status, age of death of parents, the
continuous advancement in medical care, improvement in nutrition and others, they
may live to very old ages.
Figure 4.1: Portfolio Dynamics
I show the portfolio dynamics for the retiree who does not invest in annuities. I show retiree’s
beginning wealth and its changes over time as well as the percentage of wealth invested in equities
and its value over time. I also show the wealth Floor as well as consumption values for the retirement
plan horizon.
The wealth dynamics shown in Figure 4.1 are a record of one path of the 100,000
simulations used in this study. The blue line represents the value of retiree’s portfo-
lio. This is a two-asset portfolio of risky and risk-free assets. The red line represents
the path of the risky asset fund; I find that the portfolio value tracks the risky asset
fund at all times. Between 20 to 25 years in retirement when the value of the risky
investment decreases, the allocation to risky assets is reduced and the portfolio value
is sustained by its allocation to the risk-free asset, keeping it above the decreasing
risky asset fund value. The yellow line represents the wealth floor, the level of starting
wealth that the retiree hopes to preserve at all times irrespective of market outcomes.
Chapter 4 100
The portfolio value never gets below the wealth floor level in this recorded path and
all others and the retiree is able to hold the accumulated floor value as a bequest level
or preserved capital. The green line represents the retirees’ monthly consumption,
which remains positive throughout the horizon.
Figure 4.2: Terminal Portfolio Values
I show the distribution of the terminal portfolio values (in $) for retirees who purchase 10-year
deferred annuities at age 65 and invest the remainder of their assets according to the CPPI strategy.
The distribution is based on 100,000 simulations. Nsim represents the number of simulations.
Figure 4.2 shows the ending portfolio value distributions for the 10-year deferred an-
nuity purchased at age 65. Of all the simulations, I find that the lowest portfolio value
occurs at $200,000, which is the wealth floor that the retiree sets at the initiation
of the CPPI strategy. The portfolio ending values are log-normally distributed with
a mean around 80% of the starting wealth level. The ending value increases to as
much as $1,500,000 in some cases. The portfolio ending values show a convex profile,
which emerges from the dynamic risk management method employed by the CPPI
strategy. That is, the investor avoids portfolio risks when risky assets are in decline
and increases her share of the risky assets when the trend is positive, thus riding the
bull markets and minimising loss in bear markets.
4.3.1 Varying Annuity Deferring Periods at Retirement
I begin my analysis for a retiree who makes her annuitisation decision at age 65. The
retiree decides whether to buy a deferred annuity or not to annuitise. In case of the
former, the retiree is allowed three choices of deferring periods of 10, 15, and 20 years
and makes a one-off decision. If the retiree decides not to invest in annuities but
self-annuitises, she may choose to withdraw a fixed percentage of her wealth every
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month. Again, in this case, I allow two variations based on whether the retiree has a
lower floor in her consumption plan or not.
Table 4.1: Annuitising at Age 65: Summary Statistics
I present the summary statistics for the simulated monthly consumption levels. No Constraint
represents a strategy of a fixed percentage of wealth withdrawal without regard for a subsistence
level, Lower Constraint represents a similar percentage strategy with a lower consumption constraint
level; both are self-annuitisation strategies. Annuitants may choose between 10, 15 and 20-year
deferred annuities and invest 10% of their starting wealth in annuities.
No Annuitisation Annuitise 10% of wealth at age 65
No Constraint Lower Constraint 10years 15years 20 years
Mean 4584.1 4602.2 4675.5 4826.3 5096.2
Standard Deviation 1070 1032 927.5 1073.7 1387.7
Minimum 2148.6 3430.8 3430.8 3430.8 3430.8
Maximum 20456 24801 19005 22335 21539
5th Percentile 3303.2 3430.8 3578.3 3448.1 3430.8
50th Percentile 4354.3 4352.3 4424 4583.4 5276.4
95th Percentile 6568.4 6548.8 6469.9 6811.1 7554.7
Table 4.1 reports the summary statistics for the distribution of simulated monthly
consumption levels. I find that retirees’ average consumption level increases by in-
cluding a lower constraint. The lower constraint refers to the monthly subsistence
estimated income required by retirees for a comfortable retirement. I also find that
the standard deviation of consumption income decreases whilst the minimum and
maximum values for the self-annuitised investor with a lower constraint are higher
compared to the simple fixed percentage of wealth withdrawal strategy.
For retirees who choose to invest a part of their starting wealth in deferred annuities,
I find that the mean consumption rates increase with longer deferred periods. This
is due to the larger payouts for longer deferred annuities in later ages increasing the
consumption levels and hence the mean consumption. As expected, the standard
deviation also increases with increasing annuity deferral periods. The various per-
centiles also show increasing consumption rates at all levels with increasing annuity
deferral periods. This means in terms of cash values, on average, longer deferral
periods should be attractive compared to shorter deferral periods for retirees if they
seek higher incomes late in life.
I compare the performance of the alternative investment options available to the
retiree by the use of the Omega Ratio. I analyse the options available to the retiree
at age 65. These include self-annuitisation with or without a lower constraint as well
as the option is to annuitise using deferred annuities for deferred lengths of 10, 15
and 20 years.
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Figure 4.3: Omega function for Alternative Investment Choices (A)
I show the Omega functions10for alternative investment choices based on a retiree option to self
annuitise or purchase the deferred annuity with a portion of her starting wealth at retirement age
65 years. The various deferral periods are 10, 15 and 20 years. I measure the performance of the
alternative investments relative to different utility thresholds of all values within the utility range
based on a relative risk aversion level of 2.
Figure 4.3 compares the performance of the alternative investment choices at retire-
ment age 65 by using the Omega function. The Omega function is calculated from
Omega ratios with reference to the expected terminal utilities from the 100,000 simu-
lations for alternative investment choices. I use the full range of the terminal utilities
to calculate the Omega Ratios that form the Omega function in Figure 4.3. The
expected utilities are calculated under HARA preferences with a relative risk aver-
sion of 2 and a minimum consumption defined by the ASFA retirement estimate.11
Retirees have the option of choosing 10, 15 or 20-year deferred annuities. They may
choose not to annuitise their retirement wealth and hold a lower constraint on their
annual consumption withdrawals, withdrawing the maximum of 5% of their remain-
ing wealth or the ASFA estimate, which acts as the lower constraint.
The Omega Ratios at the various thresholds provide a measure of the probability
weighted comparison of potential gains to losses relative to the thresholds. I am able
to rank the investment options based on the magnitude of their Omegas. For the
simple rule of investors preferring more to less, an investment with higher Omega is
preferred to a comparable investment with lower Omega. For a loss threshold of 0.7
for comparative analysis, the choice of which is arbitrary and exogenously specified,
10I use the natural logarithm of the Omega Ratios due to the large variation in the Omega values
over the range of terminal utilities.
11I make analysis for other levels of relative risk aversion and calculate the Omega Ratios for the
corresponding terminal utilities. I omit those figures from this presentation.
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I find Omega ratios of 3.35, 2.27 and 1.03 for the 10, 15 and 20-year deferred annuity
investment options respectively. I find an Omega ratio of 0.021 for self-annuitising
strategy with lower constraint. I omit the option of self-annuitisation without lower
constraint as consumption values lower than the subsistence level results in negative
infinity utility which the risk averse individual will be unwilling to accept.
The Omega function analysis for the full range of utility observations show the 10-
year deferred annuities strategy is preferred to the other investment strategies. Next
in preference, is the 15-year deferred annuity purchased at age 65 and followed by the
20-year deferred annuity strategy. All three annuitisation strategies are preferred to
self-annuitisation. Risk averse retirees will prefer to annuitise and derive high utility
from doing so. They will however prefer a shorter deferral horizon to a longer one.
For the different levels of risk aversion used in this essay, I find that by reducing
the risk aversion levels, retirees tend to lean more towards self-annuitisation while
increasing risk aversion increases the Omega values for the alternative annuitisation
options. A significant observation I make in the evaluation and ranking of the alter-
nate strategies is that retirees do not prefer high consumption with high standard
deviation late in retirement. They choose a short deferral period with reasonably
high consumption with moderate dispersion about the mean consumption.
4.3.2 Varying Annuitisation Delay Times with Equal Deferral
Periods
I continue my analysis for a retiree who makes her annuitisation decision at age 65
or later in retirement at age 70 or 75. The retiree may choose to self-annuitise until
later in retirement and decide at which point to buy a deferred annuity. Retirees
may purchase 10-year deferred annuities at 65, 70 or 75 with payments beginning
at age 75, 80 and 85 respectively. Retirees who choose not to immediately invest in
deferred annuities may participate in the financial market with their starting wealth
for the first five years in retirement and annuitise at age 70. Retirees may delay an-
nuitising for 10 years after retirement before purchasing annuities at age 75. Retirees
may also purchase 15-year deferred annuities at 65 or 70 with payments beginning
at age 80 and 85 respectively. Retirees who are confident of their health status may
choose longer deferral periods to provide enhanced lifetime income later in retirement.
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This delay to annuitising increases the possibility of substantial equity return from
market participation, increasing consumption later in retirement as consumption level
is a direct proportion of available wealth. On the downside, this exposes their in-
vestment to market volatility. The annuity premium paid in all cases is a fraction
of retirees’ starting wealth rather than current wealth to encourage comparison of
annuitisation at retirement age with other times in retirement.
Table 4.2: Annuitising at Different Ages: Summary Statistics (A)
I present the summary statistics for the simulated monthly consumption levels. Annuitants may
choose between 10-year deferred annuities at age 65, 70 or 75 or 15-year deferred annuities at age
65 or 70. Annuitants invest 10% of their starting wealth in annuities.
10-year Deferred Annuities 15-year Deferred Annuities
at Different Ages at Different Ages
Age 65 Age 70 Age 75 Age 65 Age 70
10years 10years 10years 15years 15years
Mean 4676 5118 5406 4826 5546
Standard Deviation 928 1250 1434 1074 1532
Minimum 3430 3430 3430 3430 3430
Maximum 19005 22144 21547 22335 21468
5th Percentile 3578 3662 3659 3448 3662
50th Pecentile 4424 4790 5101 4583 5341
95th Percentile 6470 7499 8074 6811 8333
From Table 4.2, I find that annuitising at age 75 provides significantly higher mean
consumption values than annuitising at age 70 or 65. As expected, dispersion about
the mean payout increases with increasing delay period. A five-year delay to annuitis-
ing increases the standard deviation of monthly consumption relative to immediate
annuitising at age 65, whilst a 10-year delay gives an even higher standard devia-
tion. Comparing percentiles, the 10-year deferred annuity at age 75 provides higher
consumption levels at the 50th and 95th percentiles. This is closely matched by the
10-year deferred annuities at age 70 strategy, which has a higher value at the 5th
percentile. Percentile values for the annuity purchase strategies at age 70 are also
considerably higher than that of a similar strategy at age 65.
For the 15-year annuity deferral strategies, I find annuitising at age 70 to provide
a higher mean consumption than annuitising at age 65. The five-year delay before
annuitising enhances the portfolio value when market returns are high and increases
retirees consumption payouts in latter years. Standard deviation for consumption is
higher for the strategy at age 70 relative to similar strategy at 65. Also, the 15-year
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deferred annuity at age 70 provides higher consumption levels at all percentiles.
Figure 4.4: Omega function for Alternative Investment Choices (B)
I show the Omega function for alternative investment choices for retirees who purchase a 10-year
deferred annuity at age 65, 70 or 75. I measure the performance of the alternative investments
relative to different threshold of all values within the utility range based on a relative risk aversion
level of 2.
I compare the terminal utilities derived from purchasing 10-year deferred annuities at
ages 65, 70 or age 75 in Figure 4.4. The retiree in this case has the option to choose
the length of delay to annuitisation in order to participate longer in the money mar-
kets and maximise her utility. She invests the same proportion of starting wealth in
annuities when it is purchased at a later age.
I find that at the risk aversion level of 2, retirees prefer annuitising at age 65 or
age 70 to annuitising at age 75. The retiree is indifferent between purchasing the
10-year deferred annuity at age 65 and 70 for low thresholds of the terminal utility.
Annuitising at age 65 is preferred to annuitising at age 70 as the terminal threshold
increases with higher Omega values for the former. For different risk aversion levels,
I find annuitising at age 70 becomes less attractive as risk aversion increases. It is
however preferred to annuitising at age 75 at all risk aversion levels. The difference in
Omega Ratios is significant for terminal utilities at all levels of the distribution. For
the loss threshold of 0.7, I find an Omega Ratio of 3.33, 2.80 and 0.16 for alternate
investments with 10-year deferred annuities purchased at age 65, 70 and 75 respec-
tively. For the same deferral periods on annuities, risk averse retirees will prefer early
annuitisation to late annuitisation.
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Figure 4.5: Omega function for Alternative Investment Choices (C)
I show Omega function for alternative investment choices when retirees purchase a 15-year deferred
annuity at age 65 or 70. I measure the performance of the alternative investments relative to dif-
ferent utility threshold of all values within the utility range based on a relative risk aversion level of 2.
I compare the two strategies available to the retiree which include a 15-year deferred
annuity in Figure 4.5. This option is available at age 65 and age 70, the latter after a
five year delay. The retiree may participate longer in the money markets and invest
the same proportion of starting wealth in annuities at age 70. I find that at a risk
aversion level of 2, retirees prefer annuitising at age 65 to annuitising at age 70. For
the loss threshold of 0.7, I find an Omega Ratio of 2.08 for the 15-year deferred
annuity at age 65 and a low Omega ratio 0.50 for annuitising at age 70 for the same
deferral length.
4.3.3 Varying Deferring Periods and Timing of Annuitisation
I make further analysis for a retiree who makes her annuitisation decision regarding
both the deferral period for annuitisation and the timing of the annuity purchase.
The retiree may choose to self-annuitise until later in retirement and decide to an-
nuitise for the available deferral periods. Retirees may purchase 10, 15 and 20-year
deferred annuities at 65 or 10 and 15-year deferred annuities at age 70. Alternatively,
retirees may choose to continue self-annuitising or purchase 10-year deferred annu-
ities at age 75. Retirees who choose not to immediately invest in deferred annuities
may participate in the money market with their starting wealth for five or ten years
in retirement before annuitising. The annuity premium paid in all cases is a tenth of
retirees’ starting wealth.
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Table 4.3: Annuitising at Different Ages: Summary Statistics (B)
I present the summary statistics for the simulated monthly consumption levels for annuitants who
choose between 10-year deferred annuities at age 65, 70 or 75 or 15-year deferred annuities at
age 65 or 70. Alternatively, they may choose to purchase 20-year deferred annuities at age 65 or
self-annuitise and hold a lower constraint. Annuitants invest 10% of their starting wealth in annuities.
No Annuities Annuitise at age 65 Annuitise at Age 70 Age 75
L.C. 10years 15years 20 years 10years 15years 10years
Mean 4602 4676 4826 5096 5118 5546 5406
Std Dev 1032 928 1074 1388 1250 1532 1434
Minimum 3430 3430 3430 3430 3430 3430 3430
Maximum 24801 19005 22335 21539 22144 21486 21547
5th Percentile 3430 3578 3448 3430 3662 3662 3659
50th Pecentile 4352 4424 4583 5276 4790 5341 5101
95th Percentile 6549 6470 6811 7555 7499 8333 8074
I compare my results from Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 in Table 4.3 and observe some
trends in the consumption values for the different strategies. Firstly, self-annuitisation
provides the lowest mean consumption among the various investment alternatives. It
has the highest maximum consumption, which shows the high amount of dispersion
about the mean. The standard deviation of the self-annuitised strategy only exceeds
that of the 10-year deferred annuity at age 65. It is the lowest at the 5th and 50th
percentiles among the alternate strategies. Secondly, there is a significant increase
in mean consumption with increasing annuity deferral periods across all ages. A 20-
year deferred annuity at age 65 provides a higher mean consumption than a 15-year
deferred annuity at the same age. The 15-year deferred annuity strategy provides
higher mean consumption compared to the 10-year deferred annuity at the same age.
A similar relationship is observed between the investment options at age 70. Also,
the 15-year deferred annuity purchased at age 65 beginning payments at age 80 pro-
vides consumption levels which are lower than that provided by a 10-year deferred
annuity at age 70 also beginning at age 80. The 20-year deferred annuity at age 65 is
dominated in terms of consumption value by the 15-year deferred annuity purchased
at age 70. They both begin annuity payments at age 85. This means retirees who
are interested in high levels of consumptions later in retirement may choose to delay
annuitisation to later dates and purchase deferred annuities with short deferral pe-
riods than purchase deferred annuities with longer deferral periods early in retirement.
Figure 4.6 shows Omega functions derived from the monthly consumption of retirees
who choose to annuitise a part of their starting wealth at age 65, 70 or 75. I also
show the Omega function for the self-annuitisation strategy. At age 65, the retiree
has the options of 10, 15 and 20-year deferred annuities whilst the retiree at age 70
only has the option of 10 and 15-year deferred annuities. The retiree at age 75 makes
a choice between purchasing a 10-year deferred annuity or self-annuitisation. I find
that for a risk aversion level of 2, self-annuitisation is clearly dominated by deferred
Chapter 4 108
Figure 4.6: Omega function for Alternative Investment Choices (D)
I show the Omega function for alternative investment choices in retirement for annuitants who
choose between 10-year deferred annuities at age 65, 70 or 75 or 15-year deferred annuities at
age 65 or 70. Alternatively, they may choose to purchase 20-year deferred annuities at age 65
or self-annuitise and hold a lower constraint. Annuitants invest 10% of their starting wealth in
annuities. I measure the performance of the alternative investments relative to different thresholds
of all values within the utility range based on a relative risk aversion level of 2.
annuitisation of different lengths and purchased at different times. The retiree will
choose a 10-year deferred annuity purchase at age 65 over 15 and 20-year deferred
annuity at same age. Comparing this to the retirees’ choice at retirement age 70, I
find the 10-year deferred annuity at 65 to dominate annuitising at age 70. The retiree
is mostly indifferent in the choice between a 10-year deferred annuity at age 70 and
a 15-year deferred annuity at age 65 with both beginning annuity payments at age
80 for a wide range of terminal utilities. At the higher end of the terminal value
distribution, I find the annuitisation strategy at age 70 to dominate that at age 65.
The 20-year deferred annuity at age 65 is preferred to the 15-year deferred annuity at
age 70 whilst annuitising at age 75 is the least in preference. The difference in Omega
Ratios is more significant for terminal utilities in the centre of the distribution and
less significant at the lower and upper tails.
For the loss threshold of 0.7, I find an Omega Ratio of 4.35 for a 10-year deferred annu-
ity strategy at age 75. The Omega Ratios for investment alternatives at age 70 yield
4.72 and 4.46 for the 10 and 15-year deferred annuities respectively. Both strategies
are dominated by the 10-year deferred annuity purchased at 65, with superior Omega
Ratios of 4.76 and 4.71 respectively for the 10 and 15-year deferred annuities. The
20-year deferred annuity strategy has an Omega ratio of 4.57. The self-annuitisation
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strategy is dominated by all annuitisation strategies, giving an Omega Ratio of 3.66
for the same threshold level.
By varying the risk aversion levels, I find the difference in Omega Ratios to decrease
with increasing levels of risk aversion and vice versa. This is expected as retirees
with low levels of risk aversion will want to participate longer in the money market
with the hope of increasing equity premium and increasing the value of their fund
than lose some liquidity through annuity purchase early in retirement. At risk aver-
sion levels lower than 2, the option of 10-year deferred annuity at age 70 becomes
more attractive than annuitisation at age 65. This finding could be explained by
Milevsky and Young (2007) as Real Option to Delay Annuitisation (RODA). They
assert that the uncertainty in future interest rates, mortality rates, insurance loading
and annuity design increase the value of delaying annuitisation. With an expectation
of increased wealth, individuals will accept the increase in wealth as a substitute to
annuitising at retirement age 65. At risk aversion levels of 2 and higher, the utility
derived from waiting to annuitise at age 70 decreases, and the high risk averse re-
tiree is happy to purchase annuities at retirement age 65 rather than take a bet on
receiving equity premium. The retiree does not make significant gains in annuitising
at a later age and will choose a shorter waiting period over a long one. The ranking
of the annuitisation options based on their deferral lengths at specific ages however
do not change for different levels of risk aversion.
4.3.4 Deferred Annuitisation in Absence of Age Pension
Finally, Horneff et al. (2010) incorporate state-organised social security and occupa-
tional pension plans which run as a form of defined benefit scheme. The pension
income of that directly links to the amount of contribution an individual makes.
They begin with a baseline replacement ratio of 68% of final salary and make further
analysis with medium and low replacement rates of 50% and 30% respectively. They
find that for low (high) replacement rates for the pension income, annuity purchases
commence earlier (later) and the fraction of total financial wealth invested in annu-
ities increases (decreases). All the previous results are obtained on the premise of
the availability of pension income. The Australia pension system is fully government
sponsored and not dependent on individual contributions. The level of pension re-
ceived, full or part rate is not fixed but changes in response to retiree’s asset and
income levels from semiannual reassessments.
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To see the impact on a retiree’s choice of investment strategy when they have no
pensions, I perform the analysis in the absence of means-tested pension income. This
new result should be representative of other countries without welfare schemes such
as Australia’s means-tested pension.
Table 4.4: Annuitising at Different Ages with No Pension:
Summary Statistics
I present the summary statistics for the simulated monthly consumption levels. Annuitants may
choose between 10-year deferred annuities at age 65, 70 or 75 or 15-year deferred annuities at
age 65 or 70. Alternatively, they may choose to purchase 20-year deferred annuities at age 65 or
self-annuitise and hold a lower constraint. Annuitants invest 10% of their starting wealth in annuities.
No Annuities Annuitise at age 65 Annuitise at Age 70 Age 75
L.C. 10years 15years 20 years 10years 15years 10years
Mean 3535 3763 3869 4033 4164 3971 3903
Std Dev 359 353 449 659 637 604 544
Minimum 3430 3430 3430 3430 3430 3430 3430
Maximum 10321 12306 13167 15370 12623 13336 12775
5th Percentile 3430 3430 3430 3430 3430 3430 3430
50th Percentile 3430 3777 4012 4446 4482 4363 4226
95th Percentile 4176 4261 4476 4894 4924 4774 4641
Table 4.4 shows the summary statistics derived from simulating the various retire-
ment decumulation strategies in the absence of pension income. Again, I find deferred
annuitisation to provide higher consumption levels relative to self-annuitisation in re-
tirement. The self-annuitisation strategy has lower mean consumption as well as
lower consumption levels across the various percentiles. The 50th percentile of con-
sumption for the self-annuitising strategy is at the subsistence level, which is also
the level of lower constraint. Similar to the observations in the presence of pension
income, I find the mean consumption levels to increase with increasing annuitisation
deferral periods at age 65. The various percentiles also show increasing consumption
levels as I increase the deferral periods for annuities. Annuitising at age 70 shows a
decreased mean consumption for increasing deferred periods.
For annuitisation strategies beginning payments at age 80, that is, the 15-year de-
ferred annuity at age 65 and 10-year deferred annuity at age 70, I find that annuitising
later provides higher consumption levels than early annuitisation. Delaying annuiti-
sation for five years increases the mean consumption levels significantly. The 20-year
deferred annuity at age 65, 15-year deferred annuity at age 70 and 10-year deferred
annuity begin payments at age 85. Comparing these annuitisation strategies, I find
annuitising at age 65 to provide higher consumption income relative to annuitising
later at ages 70 and 75. Unlike previously seen in the presence of pension income,
early annuitisation with longer deferral periods clearly provides higher consumption
than delayed annuitisation. Without the benefit of pension income, retirees seeking a
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higher level of consumption in retirement may choose early annuitisation with longer
deferred periods to late annuitisation or late annuitisation. While annuitising with
10-year deferred annuities at age 70 yields high average consumption, retirees are
better with longer deferred period annuities at age 65 than holding annuities with
deferred periods exceeding 10 years at age 70. Annuitising at age 70 however yields
higher consumption levels than annuitising at age 75.
Figure 4.7: Omega function for Alternative Investment Choices in the
Absence of Pension Income
I show the Omega function for alternative investment choices in retirement in the absence of pension
income. Annuitants may choose between 10-year deferred annuities at age 65, 70 or 75 or 15-year
deferred annuities at age 65 or 70. Alternatively, they may choose to purchase 20-year deferred
annuities at age 65 or self-annuitise and hold a lower constraint. Annuitants invest 10% of their
starting wealth in annuities. I measure the performance of the alternative investments relative
to different thresholds of all values within the utility range based on a relative risk aversion level of 2.
Figure 4.7 shows the Omega function for alternative investment strategies available to
the retiree when she has no pension income. Retirees prefer to self-annuitise longer
and prefer purchasing deferred annuities at age 70 and 75 over annuitising at 65.
Whilst deferred annuitisation continues to dominate self-annuitisation, I find retirees
prefer to delay annuitisation when they have no pension income. Annuitisation with
10-year deferred annuities at age 70 is the preferred strategy among the alternatives;
annuitising at age 75 is preferred to annuitising at age 65. The 15-year deferred
annuity purchased at age 70 in this case is preferred to an equivalent length annuity
purchased at age 65 and the 20-year deferred annuity purchased at age 65 is the
least preferred strategy. For different levels of risk aversion, I repeat the simulations
and find the value of delaying annuitisation to be higher for low to moderate risk
averse retirees. The difference becomes less significant for high risk averse retirees
as they tend to prefer early annuitisation to later. The absence of pensions does not
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alter the annuitisation preferences of the high risk averse retirees as they prefer early
annuitising at retirement age 65 to annuitising later in retirement.
4.3.5 Deferred Annuities in the Absence of Bequest Motives
I have previously assumed retirees have bequest or capital preservation needs and
invest via the CPPI strategy. I analyse retiree investment choice when they have no
bequest motives. I set the asset allocation to a balanced strategy with 50% invest-
ment in the risky asset and the remainder in the risk-free asset. I allow the risk-free
asset to evolve deterministically with exponential growth and the risky asset to follow
a geometric Brownian motion as discussed in Section 4.2.2. Assuming retirees have
no capital preservation or bequest motives, they derive utility only from the con-
sumption they make from their retirement portfolios, preferring more consumption
to less. Government sponsored means-tested age pension is available to all retirees
and the level of pension income received depends on the size of a retiree’s portfolio
balance.
Figure 4.8: Omega function for Alternative Investment Choices in the
Absence of Bequest Motives
I show the Omega function for alternative investment choices in retirement when retirees have no
bequest motives. Annuitants may choose between 10-year deferred annuities at age 65, 70 or 75 or 15-
year deferred annuities at age 65 or 70. Alternatively, they may choose to purchase 20-year deferred
annuities at age 65 or self-annuitise and hold a lower constraint. Annuitants invest 10 percent of
their starting wealth in annuities. I measure the performance of the alternative investments relative
to different thresholds of all values within the utility range based on a relative risk aversion level of 2.
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At retirement age 65, I find retirees to be indifferent between the choice of purchasing
deferred annuities at ages 65 or 70 and self-annuitisation over low thresholds of the
terminal utility. Purchasing annuities at age 75 is the least preferred strategy given
low threshold levels, but performs better than self-annuitisation at higher thresholds.
The safety of the government means-tested aged pension is an incentive for retirees
to self-annuitise in retirement when they have no bequest motives. Annuitisation
at age 65 is preferred to later annuitisation at age 70 and 75. Retirees choose to
purchase deferred annuities of different deferral lengths at age 65 to annuitising later.
The 10-year deferred annuity at age 70 is preferred to 15-year deferred annuity at the
same age. Both strategies are preferred to the 10-year deferred annuity at age 75 for
higher thresholds of terminal utilities. The differences between the alternative strate-
gies are significant for higher terminal utility thresholds but less significant otherwise.
4.4 Conclusion and Discussion
The analysis of deferred annuities in retirement planning presents a new explanation
for the well-documented aversion to life annuities by retirees. With the irreversibility
of annuity purchase and the liquidity lost by retirees who annuitise, there continues
to be an incentive to delay annuitisation. Milevsky and Young (2007) quantify this
option for retirees with Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) preferences, refer-
ring to this as the Real Option to Delay Annuitisation (RODA). The inclusion of
deferred annuities rather than immediate annuities provides some benefit to retirees
in terms of lower purchasing premiums in addition to the absolute cover when retirees
survive the deferred period. This study presents a habit persistence model in terms
of investor preferences, and assumes investors have Hyperbolic Absolute Risk Aver-
sion (HARA) preferences. I also model a decumulation strategy using the Constant
Proportion Portfolio Insurance (CPPI), which ensures that retirees are able to meet
their bequest or capital preservation needs. I incorporate mortality improvements
allowing for the constantly improving mortality experiences. Finally, I evaluate and
rank the performance of the different investment options by the use of the Omega
function with reference to the expected terminal utilities for the various strategies.
Low risk averse retirees will choose self-annuitisation strategy with downside con-
straints over a simple percentage of wealth withdrawal; allowing consumption to
vary over a broad range of values yet ensuring that consumption remains above a
sustenance level. Compared to the benefits of annuitising, I find retirees to prefer
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purchasing deferred annuities at retirement age to provide higher and more utility-
enhancing consumption to any of the two self-annuitising strategies discussed in this
essay. I also find that even at high levels of risk aversion, the retiree is better off
purchasing deferred annuities than self-annuitisation if she is interested in the pos-
sibility of obtaining superior consumption levels leading to superior terminal utilities.
For the length of annuity deferral periods, I find that risk averse retirees prefer a
shorter timeframe to a longer one. At age 65, a retiree prefers a 10-year deferred
annuity to a 15-year deferred annuity, and a 15-year deferred annuity to a 20-year
deferred. At age 70, the 10-year deferred annuity is preferred to the 15-year deferred
annuity purchased at the same age. Retirees prefer to purchase deferred annuities
with longer deferral periods only at retirement age 65 and derive less utility when
they purchase annuities with deferral periods exceeding 10 years later in retirement.
For two strategies that both begin payments at age 85, a 20-year deferred annuity
purchased at age 65 is preferred to a 15-year deferred annuity purchased at age 70.
Since there is no benefit should the retiree die during the deferral period, retirees
are reluctant to purchase annuities with lengthy deferred periods late in retirement.
Instead, retirees choose a short deferral period where they believe their conditional
survival probabilities are still high enough to survive and receive the annuity payouts.
On the timing of annuity purchase, I find that the option to delay annuitisation exists
for retirees of all relative risk aversion levels within the range used in this essay. My
analysis shows that while risk averse retirees choose to annuitise in retirement, the
timing of annuitisation depends on their level of risk aversion. The low risk averse
retirees choose to annuitise later than the retirement age of 65. They gain utility
in the expectation of stochastic improvements in their wealth levels through invest-
ing assets in the financial market for the first few years in retirement. Since their
consumption in the years before the annuity payments begin is a direct function of
wealth level, the low risk averse retiree will bet on increasing consumption through
the financial market in the early years of retirement while they still have high sur-
vival probabilities. There is less option to delay annuitisation, however, for more risk
averse retirees. They prefer early annuitisation to guarantee their income instead of
betting on the financial market in anticipation of equity premium.
The option to delay annuitisation is more valuable in the case of no exogenous pen-
sion income than when government pensions are available. Low to medium risk averse
retirees will prefer to delay annuitising until age 70 or age 75 to bet on the financial
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markets with the possibility of increasing their wealth level before eventual annuiti-
sation later in retirement when there is no pension income. I find the presence of
pension income to be an incentive for retirees at all risk levels to transfer risk to life
companies and benefit from the longevity protection provided by the pension income
and the increased consumption from annuitisation. Deferred annuitisation is more
attractive to retirees who have access to government-sponsored pension than retirees
who do not.
Finally, when retirees have no bequest motives, they prefer annuitising earlier in
retirement to later. Annuities of varying deferral lengths at retirement age 65 are
preferred to annuitising at age 70, while the latter is preferred to annuitising at age
75. At low thresholds of terminal utility, the self-annuitisation strategy performs
better than annuitisation at age 75 although this is reversed for high terminal wealth
thresholds. The certainty of the government pensions makes self-annuitisation at-
tractive as retirees are able to increase their consumption without losing utility from
lowering bequest levels.
By purchasing a deferred annuity with a fixed proportion of initial wealth, I am able
to make comparisons among annuity purchases at different ages in retirement. This is
however, a limitation on the amount of premium invested in annuities as retirees may
choose to annuitise a proportion of their current wealth rather than a proportion of
starting wealth at different ages. Basing their annuity purchase on the wealth at hand
rather than a fixed value determined at retirement age could lead to different annuity
premiums and hence different payout values. Secondly, the estimates in modelling
mortality improvements may serve to limit other possible future mortality scenarios.
Although this serves as an adequate model for future mortality, mortality is not pre-
dictable and the model only tells part of the story. Different mortality experiences
may prompt improved annuity designs, necessitate increasing or decreasing loading
factors, making annuities less or more expensive respectively hence giving incentive
to early or late annuity purchases. Lastly, this study allows annuity payouts to begin
at age 85 at the latest. Although there is no theory for this choice, I believe it serves
as a reasonable age considering that one in two Australian retirees is expected to live
past 85. Future studies may allow annuity payouts to begin at later ages based on
the extent of improvement in mortality rates.
Appendix
4.A Expected Mortality Improvement Rates
Table 4.A.1: Mortality Improvements
Future Percentage Mortality Improvement Factors Females. Life Tables 2008-2010 provided by the
Australian Bureau of Statistics (November 2011).
Age 25 Year Age 25 Year
65 -2.5195 89 -1.148
66 -2.5118 90 -1.0346
67 -2.5014 91 -0.9324
68 -2.4881 92 -0.845
69 -2.4718 93 -0.7725
70 -2.4524 94 -0.7159
71 -2.4297 95 -0.6747
72 -2.4035 96 -0.6335
73 -2.3736 97 -0.5923
74 -2.3398 98 -0.5511
75 -2.3018 99 -0.5099
76 -2.2593 100 -0.4687
77 -2.212 101 -0.4275
78 -2.1808 102 -0.3863
79 -2.132 103 -0.3451
80 -2.0719 104 -0.3039
81 -1.9981 105 -0.2627
82 -1.915 106 -0.2215
83 -1.824 107 -0.1803
84 -1.7247 108 -0.1391
85 -1.6177 109 -0.0979
86 -1.5057 110 -0.0567
87 -1.3887 111 0
88 -1.2687
The mortality improvement calculations are expressed mathematically as:
qt(t) = qx × [1 + Ix
100
](t−2009) (4.26)
Where qt(t) is the mortality rate at age in year t
qt is the mortality rate reported for age x in the 2008-2010 Life Table
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Ix is the rate of improvement at age x shown in Table 4.A.1
4.B Life Annuities - A Review
4.B.1 The Whole Life Annuity-Due
The Whole Life Annuity-due pays a benefit of a unit $1 at the beginning of each
period (year) that the annuitant (x) survives.
The Present Random Variable is denoted as:
Y = a¨T+1 (4.27)
Where T represents Tx, the curtate future lifetime of x
The Actuarial Present Value (APV) of the Whole Life Annuity-due is denoted as:
a¨x = E[Y ] = E[a¨t+1 ] =
∞∑
t=0
a¨t+1Pr[T = t] (4.28)
=
∞∑
t=0
a¨t+1 · t|qx =
∞∑
t=0
a¨t+1 · tpxqx+t (4.29)
=
∞∑
t=0
vttpx (4.30)
4.B.2 Temporary Life Annuity-Due
The Temporary Life Annuity-due or the ‘N −Term′ Annuity pays a benefit of a unit
$1 at the beginning of each year as long as the annuitant (x) survives, for up to a
total of n years, or n payments.
This annuity has a Present Value random variable expressed as:
Y =
{
a¨T+1 , if T < n,
a¨n if T ≥ n
= a¨min(T+1,n) (4.31)
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The Actuarial Present Value (APV) of the Temporary Annuity is denoted as:
a¨x:n = E[Y ] =
n−1∑
t=0
a¨t+1 tpxqx+t + a¨nnpx (4.32)
=
n−1∑
t=0
vttpx (4.33)
4.B.3 The Deferred Whole Life Annuity-Due
The Deferred Whole Life Annuity due pays a benefit of a unit $1 at the beginning of
each period (year) while the annuitant (x) survives from x+ n onward.
The Present Value random variable can be expressed in a number of ways:
Y =
{
0 if 0 ≤ T < n,
n|a¨T+1−n = vna¨T+1−n = a¨T+1 − a¨n if T ≥ n
(4.34)
The Actuarial Present Value (APV) of the ‘N − Y ear′ Deferred Whole Life Annuity
is denoted as:
n|a¨x = E[Y ] =
∞∑
t=n
vttpx (4.35)
= nExa¨x+n = a¨x − a¨x:n (4.36)
4.B.4 The Recursive Relationship between Annuities
a¨x = 1 + vpxa¨x+1 = 1 + 1Exa¨x+1 (4.37)
= 1 + vpx + v
2
2pxa¨x+2 = 1 + 1Ex + 2Exa¨x+2 (4.38)
The E′s are multiplicative, therefore generalising the recursions to:
a¨x =
∞∑
t=0
tEx =
n−1∑
t=0
tEx =
∞∑
t=n
tEx (4.39)
apply change of variable t∗ = t− n
= a¨x:n +
∞∑
t∗=0
nEx · t∗Ex+n = a¨x:n + nEx
∞∑
t∗=0
t∗Ex+n (4.40)
= a¨x:n + nExa¨x+n = a¨x:n + n|a¨x (4.41)
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The Whole Life Annuity is the sum of an ‘N−Y ear′ Term Annuity and an ‘N−Y ear′
Deferred Life Annuity.
4.C The CPPI Strategy
The CPPI exhibits a convex strategy profile payoff. A convex strategy protects the
investor when the risky asset underperforms, although they fail to capture all the
upside when the risky asset rallies. Protecting the downside makes convex strategies
suitable to provide portfolio insurance. I show the evolution of the risky asset and the
total portfolio value for the 10-year deferred annuity purchased at age 65 strategy.
The convexity of the CPPI strategy is discussed in greater depth in Meucci (2010).
Figure 4.C.1: Portfolio Dynamics
I show the Portfolio Value and Risky Investment distributions, and a scatter-plot of the final payoff
of the CPPI strategy over the payoff of the Risky Investment, with the strategy profile showing a
convex profile.
Chapter 5
Lifecycling Strategies in the
Decumulation Phase
5.1 Introduction
There is the need for appropriate investment measures to be taken whilst individuals
receive income and have adequate human capital to build a good portfolio to create
wealth in the accumulation years. Similarly, it is important in retirement that retirees
invest optimally to ensure that they do not outlive their available wealth. Whereas
there is extensive academic research to building a well-diversified and sustainable
investment portfolio during the working life of individuals, the same cannot be said
for dissaving wealth after the individual’s retirement. Increasing life expectancy is
a strong incentive to save and manage adequately one’s retirement wealth. The im-
portance of wealth dissaving strategies after retirement has become more pronounced
with the growth in numbers of the Defined Contribution (DC) plan over the Defined
Benefit (DB) plan.
To sustain retirees’ income in retirement, retirees may purchase life annuities, which
provide periodic income for life. Alternatively, retirees could invest their retirement
wealth in a range of stocks (risky assets) and bonds and cash (non-risky assets) and
make periodic withdrawals to meet their income needs. Whilst the life annuity is
believed to be the only form of retirement benefit that absolutely insures against
longevity risk (Bateman & Kingston, 2007), there remains strong empirical evidence
of annuity aversion among retirees. Retirees choose self-annuitisation for flexibility,
liquidity and control over their retirement wealth. What are the best investment
strategies to help retirees meet their income needs as well as lower the chances of
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portfolio ruin in retirement?
Retirees’ age, health status, risk tolerance levels, as well as the total value of their
assets and their desire to leave bequests may influence their choice of investment
strategy. Self-annuitisation decisions and corresponding investment decisions provide
no investment or longevity protection for retirees. Whatever the overall investment
strategy, diversification of underlying investments in any asset class is essential in
the reduction of investor’s overall risk. Conventional wisdom suggests that investors
ought to be less risk averse at younger ages and invest a high proportion of wealth in
growth assets rather than defensive assets, while investment in growth assets should
decrease as an individual ages and their investment horizon reduces. Studies by Bodie
et al. (1992), Bodie (2003) and Samuelson (1989), among others, support this propo-
sition.
There is the conventional rule of thumb approach to pension investment that states
that the investors should allocate a percentage of 100 minus their current age in stocks
(risky asset) and the remainder in low risk assets such as bonds and cash. There is
also the static Strategic Asset Allocation (SAA) where investors choose to invest
either conservatively, balanced or aggressively in stocks and invest their remaining
wealth in bonds and cash. Their wealth levels are rebalanced frequently to assume
the desired risky, non-risky asset proportions. The lifecycle strategy is probably the
most popularly used investment plan QSuper (2014). The lifecycle approach explic-
itly becomes more defensive with increasing age. Plan participants invest massively
in stock at the onset when the investor is still young, because the younger investor
is able to assume more risk than the older investor, as explained by Utkus (2005),
with the belief that if stocks should decline in the early years of investment, there is
ample time for a retiree to regain losses. This investment is gradually switched to
non-risky assets as the individual nears retirement and the asset mix changes. The
allocation to stocks and bonds and cash is unidirectional, hence investment in stocks
reduces as that in bonds and cash increases.
Empirical studies by Agnew et al. (2003) find US retirement accounts over the pe-
riod 1995-98 to follow this logic, observing a downward trend in allocation to stocks
with increasing age among investors. Other studies find this reduction in stock ex-
posure with increasing age to be insignificant (see Ameriks & Zeldes, 2004; Gomes &
Michaelides, 2005; Poterba & Samwick, 2003). Another school of thought introduces
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us to dynamic asset allocation as an alternative to the conventional strategy of pen-
sion allocation. These examine the shortfalls of the traditional method and propose
that the switch of investment from growth to conservative assets as the plan holder
nears retirement should not happen as a predetermined arrangement by the pension
plan provider but rather take into account several factors, such as the retiree achiev-
ing a specific wealth target to make this all-important switch in asset mix (Basu et
al., 2011).
The optimality of these strategies is questioned in academic literature. Shiller (2005)
suggests the earnings profile of individuals is hump-shaped; young people relatively
earn less income compared to their older colleagues and earnings peak at middle
age. Therefore investing heavily in stock in the early years when there is very little
wealth and conservatively in the later years when earnings are higher does not help
in achieving an optimal allocation. Yet others have argued the optimality of a 100%
stock investment throughout the investment horizon for risk-neutral investors and the
conventional lifecycle investment for risk-averse investors (Haberman & Vigna, 2002).
Blanchett (2007) used Monte Carlo simulations to compare fixed asset allocations to
a wide range of investment paths that reduce the stock allocation during retirement.
He assesses the results using different outcome measures and concludes that fixed
asset allocations provided superior results to allocations which reduce the stock allo-
cation later in retirement. His study however does not consider increasing allocation
to stocks. More recent studies by Arnott et al. (2013) argue that a reverse approach
to the lifecycle/target date fund glidepath with increasing stocks delivers greater ter-
minal wealth levels for investors. They yield higher wealth levels than the traditional
lifecycle approach even at the lower tail of the wealth distribution. Estrada (2012)
comprehensively studies the lifecycle investor glidepath in 19 countries, finding that
the alternative strategies provide higher upside potential, and more limited downside
potential, although with higher uncertainty. Surz (2013) asserts that what matters
most in retirement planning is not the direction of allocations or glidepaths but sav-
ing enough before retirement. He emphasises that no glidepath is able to compensate
for inadequate savings. These studies derive their conclusions based on the results
from the accumulation phase of retirement planning.
Although the focus of this study is on the asset allocation in the retirement phase,
the relevance of the accumulation phase cannot be underscored. Effective asset allo-
cation decisions and changes begin before retirement. The shift in stocks to bonds
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for target date funds or lifecycle participants begins several years before retirement
and allocation changes for static strategy holders typically begin in the periods com-
monly referred to as the transition period. The transition period is often the decade
prior to retirement when an investor begins to assess her ability to meet the basic
objectives of her retirement savings; which is firstly, to maximise the real value of
her retirement nest egg, subject to reasonable risk controls and secondly to minimise
uncertainty around her prospective retirement income. The retirement conversion
plans are also decided in the transition period.
This study contributes to this important debate on investments and asset allocation
in the retirement distribution phase in several dimensions. While previous proposi-
tions of a reverse target date fund style have been limited to the benefits of wealth
outcomes in the accumulation phase, this study proposes a similar approach to invest-
ment in the post-retirement phase. The input of withdrawals for income in retirement
provides a different look at this approach as these approaches not only help measure
the terminal wealth after the investment horizon but also the ability of the approaches
to sustain retirement income to meet retiree’s needs. This further enables a compar-
ison of approaches on a broader base such as portfolio ruin and income shortfall in
retirement.
Secondly, unlike the straight-line linear increase approach considered in previous stud-
ies, I take a step further to include different hybrids of the lifecycle approach besides
the reverse lifecycle. Specifically, I consider two Partial Lifecycle approaches as well
as the Reverse Lifecycle approach. The partial approaches are a hybrid of the static
allocation and the lifecycle approach while the Reverse Lifecycle acts in full reverse
to the typical lifecycle strategy in accumulation phase, increasing assets allocated to
stocks with increasing age and decreasing investment horizon.
Finally, I combine two of the conversion phase approaches as discussed by Schaus
(2010). I examine how much of guaranteed income (annuity income) a retiree is
able to purchase with her terminal wealth resulting from engaging in one of the asset
allocation approaches over the investment horizon with a systematic withdrawal plan.
I exclude the impact of government pensions, making retirees’ income in retirement
entirely dependent on their accumulated wealth at retirement and returns on this
wealth based on the chosen line of investment.
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5.2 Background and Assumptions
5.2.1 Retirement Wealth
A retirees’ accumulated wealth at retirement age is a result of savings and growth
of savings achieved through periodic contributions throughout the accumulation pe-
riod. I do not analyse the lead up to retirement age but assume a retiree has a nest
egg at retirement and this forms the basis of our asset allocation study. Investors
do not purchase annuities immediately at retirement but choose to make systematic
periodic withdrawals from their retirement wealth to meet their consumption needs.
They invest the remainder of their wealth according to a strategy of their choice and
earn returns on their investments. This investment has no longevity or investment
guarantees and may deplete whilst the retiree is still alive.
I begin our analysis with different levels of initial retirement starting with a balance
of $500,000 and adjust upwards and downwards in further analysis to investigate the
impact of differing wealth levels.
5.2.2 Retirement Income
Schaus (2010) provides a comprehensive approach to the retirement conversion phase
for retirees. He discusses three main approaches: the income-only plan, the System-
atic/Partial Withdrawal Plan (SWP) and the Guaranteed Income plan. The first is
usually undertaken by the very wealthy who are able to live off the income they earn
on their savings without the need to spend the principal. The second, which most
retirees face, plan a drawdown plan that consists of income from both the principal
and interest earned on it. The final plan is for the lower risk tolerant or investors in
anticipation of high longevity; they convert all or part of their assets into an imme-
diate or deferred income producing annuity.
I consider the second and third conversion approaches for retirees as the majority
of retirees need to actively manage their retirement wealth and make systematic
withdrawals or purchase guarantees to meet their income needs in retirement. I ac-
knowledge the diverse and varied conclusions on the sustainability of the 4% ‘Golden
rule’ as proposed by Bengen in 1994. Whilst earlier studies firmly supported this
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withdrawal rate (see Guyton, 2004; Guyton & Klinger, 2006; Pye, 2000), recent liter-
ature questions the sustainability of the 4% ‘safe withdrawal rate’ and its ability to
sustain retirement portfolios. Spitzer, Strieter, and Singh (2007) and Spitzer (2008)
suggest that the 4% rule may be an oversimplification while studies by Sharpe, Scott,
and Watson (2007) believe the rule is inefficient. Other studies which oppose the
4% rule include Harris (2009), Pfau (2011), and Drew and Walk (2014). Based on a
comprehensive analysis across 19 countries, Drew and Walk (2014) argue that the 4%
rule does present us with an opportunity to form a baseline which can dramatically
improve the expectations of what is possible in retirement but not a silver bullet
approach to retirement withdrawals.
For our intended investment horizon, I consider a short horizon approach in which
a 4% is sufficiently sustainable. I consider a 20-year investment horizon which is
shorter than what is used in the aforementioned studies that draw conclusions on the
4% withdrawal rule. Using the 4% rule as the baseline, I investigate the sustenance
of other withdrawal sizes ranging between 3%-8% of initial wealth level. At the end
of the investment horizon, the retiree converts her terminal wealth into a guaranteed
income product, specifically a whole life immediate annuity. With the increasing life
expectation, guaranteed income products are increasingly becoming attractive and
I consider how much income a retiree is able to generate from her terminal wealth
based on the investment strategy she chooses at retirement.
Using a fixed income level in retirement may be an over simplification of the pat-
terns of expenditure that might be desired in retirement. Ding (2012) finds that for
wealthy households, expenditure clearly decreases with age. Other studies by Higgins
and Roberts (2011) and Yogo (2009) find utility from consumption to decrease with
increasing age due to health declines. Chen, Scott, and Chen (2007) assert that older
retirees spend less than younger retirees on all items except medical care. Studies by
Rice and Higgins (2009) after controlling for net income, wealth, and other factors,
find the decline in spending with age to be significant. Hatcher (2007) shows increas-
ing age has a negative impact on consumption. In reality however, the decreasing
expenditure may not necessarily be desired, but may be a function of declining wealth
levels and thus ability to consume.
In addition to analysing fixed desired expenditure in retirement, I discuss an alter-
native variable scenario. I therefore investigate a variable withdrawal plan, with the
initial income level set to a percentage of starting wealth, with subsequent income
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levels at 4% of remaining wealth. I analyse how these withdrawal plans affect the var-
ious investment strategies in our analysis and benefit levels over the retirement phase.
5.2.3 Mortality
There has been a significant increase in human longevity in the last century. In both
developed and developing countries, people are living longer than before. Findings
by Oeppen and Vaupel (2002) reveal that female life expectancy in the last century
has been an increasing steadily by almost three months every year. With increas-
ing life expectation is increasing longevity risk associated with retirement planning.
Longevity risk refers to the uncertainty of the age of death and the likelihood of a re-
tiree outliving her wealth. Of relevance to this study are the mortality characteristics
of individuals between retirement age 65, and the terminal age 100. According to the
American Life Table 2011, provided in the National Vital Statistics Report (2014)1,
a couple both aged 65 have an average life expectation of 19.1 years. Independently,
males have a life expectation of 17.6 years while the female counterparts have up to
20.3 years life expectation in retirement. The median life expectation is around 86
years whilst a tenth of the population at 65 years will grow to age 96.
Population ageing is not an American issue alone; many developed countries are
facing similar ageing populations, with Baby Boomers reaching retirement. An anal-
ysis of the Australian Life Tables 2010-2012 (2013) shows the conditional survival
probabilities for retirees rising beyond the life expectancy at birth values. Whilst
the life table estimates the male and female life expectancies at birth as 80 and 84
years respectively, life expectation conditional to surviving to age 65 is 84 and 87
for males and females respectively. A significant observation is that one in every
ten females in retirement is expected to live until age 96. This requires a retiree
who wants to be 90% certain that her superannuation savings last as long as she
lives to plan her consumption and savings for up to 31 years. These are entirely
different from the expectation of life at birth ages and hence requires retirees to plan
for longer horizons. These observations slightly exceed the life expectations in the US.
I assume retirees live until their median life expectation in retirement, hence planning
for a 20-year retirement horizon. The balance of their retirement wealth after this age
1http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr61/nvsr61 06.pdf
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may continue to meet retirement needs if they are alive or bequest needs otherwise.
5.2.4 Asset Allocation
Bengen (1997) advises that if the future market follows the trends of behaviour in the
past, then a retirement portfolio should contain 50-75% stock allocation. Milevsky
and Kyrychenko (2008) demonstrate that investors with downside protection in the
form of longevity puts assume 5% to 30% more risk exposure than the investors with-
out such protection. This evidence shows that in the presence of insurance for asset
allocation in retirement investment, plan participants defy the conventional approach
to investment, where investors’ allocation to risky assets decreases with increasing
age. Other studies by Milevsky (2001) and Ameriks et al. (2001) demonstrate through
simulation, the need for holding a substantial stock allocation in retirement portfo-
lio. Cooley et al. (2001) propose that at least 50% of a retirement portfolio should
be invested in stocks and their findings show increased sustainability of the pension
fund as it tilts more towards stocks. They show that the presence of bonds is mainly
to restrain portfolio volatility and provide liquidity to cover an investor’s living ex-
penses. Hubbard (2006) considers different withdrawal rates given various portfolio
allocation strategies and fixed withdrawal periods, and emphasises the benefits of
holding a stock dominated portfolio.
In contrast to these suggestions, I find the lifecycle strategy, which decreases in stock-
like investments with increasing age, to be a dominating post-retirement strategy in
many markets. In the US, the lifecycle accounts for 77% of retirement plans. In
Australia, lifecycle funds are increasing rapidly, expected to catch up or surpass the
US in the next decade with large funds such as QSuper switching to the lifecycle
strategy as its default investment option (QSuper, 2014). The lifecycle strategy was
implemented with the aim of avoiding insufficient diversification as well as to avoid
investment choices that may be age-inappropriate. While it undoubtedly achieves
these aims, the relevance of having investments following a predetermined glide path
solely dependent on age is simplistic. Other relevant factors such as account balance,
gender and marital status influence expectations regarding income and life expecta-
tion in retirement.
I analyse eight different asset allocation strategies which I fully discuss in Method-
ology. There are four different Static Strategic Asset Allocation strategies ranging
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from a Conservative approach, with total investment in bills and bonds to an Aggres-
sive approach where a retiree completely indulges in stocks. There is the target date
funds approach which I refer to as the Lifecycle approach where the retiree reduces
her allocation to stocks as she grows older and a Reverse Lifecycle approach with in-
creasing allocation to stocks. Finally, there are two Partial Lifecycle strategies which
are hybrids of the static and the target date fund approaches.
5.3 Methodology
5.3.1 Simulation Set-up
I use historical daily returns data on US stock, bonds and bills between 31 January,
1928 and 31 January, 2013, spanning a period of 85 years. I may subsequently re-
fer to stocks as growth assets and bonds and bills as conservative assets through
the remainder of this study. From the data, I am able to obtain four independent
non-overlapping 20-year holding period observations within our dataset. The initial
cohort of retirees begins their investment horizon in 1928 until 1948, when they attain
age 85. There are 66 overlapping 20-year cohorts, with the final cohort beginning
in 1993 and ending in 2013. While the use of overlapping returns has been used
in previous studies (see Bengen, 2001, 2004; Cooley et al., 2001; Hubbard, 2006), I
believe this is insufficient to draw a reliable conclusion.
To cater for the insufficient data, I use block bootstrap resampling to generate 20-
year return time series. The method involves sampling blocks of consecutive values
of the original returns time series, say Xi+1,...,Xi+b where 0 ≤ b ≤ N − b is chosen in
some random way; and placed one after the other in an attempt to reproduce the 20-
year time series. Where b denotes block length and N , the length of the time series.
Specifically, I use a ‘moving block’ bootstrap technique which allows for block over-
lap making the ij′s independent and uniformly distributed on the values 1, ..., N − b.
Since the return matrices hold rows of the different asset class returns, I am able to
preserve the cross-correlation between the asset returns as well as correlation within
the various asset returns within each block. By using historical rolling returns, I
am able to ascertain through historical evidence the success or failure of the various
retirement investment plans. With this information, I am able to adequately cater
for current retirees through making informed decisions about future expectations.
Kunsch (1989) explains in details how and why such a block bootstrap works in his
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seminal paper. More recent use of this methodology is in works by (Basu, Chen, &
Clements, 2014).
I employ a block bootstrap resampling of 5-year length based on the return vectors for
the three asset classes in the dataset. I randomly resample the return vectors with
replacement from the empirical return distribution to generate 20-year asset class
return vectors. I repeat the procedure 10,000 times, creating 10,000 replica return
time series. I allow for monthly income drawdowns from our wealth levels and this
serves as retirement income for the plan participant. The portfolio is immediately
rebalanced after the monthly withdrawal to its target allocation. The level of income
is chosen according to a percentage of wealth approach which is adjusted annually for
inflation. Our simulations are based on retirees choosing one of eight asset allocation
strategies at retirement age and holding that strategy for the remainder of their lives.
The retirement investment plans analysed in this study are:
◦ The static Strategic Asset Allocation plan (SAA): This involves setting target
allocations for various asset classes in retiree’s retirement portfolio and periodically
rebalancing the portfolio back to the original allocations when they deviate from the
initial settings due to differing returns from various assets and periodic withdrawals
made from the portfolio. This is a typical ‘buy and hold’ strategy and the choice
of target allocations depends on the retiree’s risk tolerance level and investment
objectives as well as investment time horizon. The SAA is based on modern portfolio
theory’s rationality of diversifying among various assets to increase overall portfolio
returns. I investigate four SAA allocations: the Conservative, Balanced, Growth and
Aggressive allocations, the choice of which depends on the retiree preferences.
• Conservative: The conservative plan allocates the retirees entire wealth to con-
servative assets, thus holding an equal allocation to bonds and bills. This set
allocation is held through rebalancing after returns and income drawdowns for
the entire investment horizon.
• Balanced : The balanced plan allocates the retirees wealth equally between
growth and conservative assets, holding a static 50% in stocks and the re-
maining 50% in bonds and bills. This is rebalanced monthly throughout the
20-year horizon
• Growth: The growth plan allocates 70% of the retiree’s wealth to stocks and
the remaining is shared between the bonds and bills. This set allocation is held
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by the retiree throughout the investment horizon regardless of the nature of
returns.
• Aggressive: The aggressive plan allocates all the retiree’s wealth to stocks at
retirement. The retiree thus maintains a 100% allocation to growth assets
throughout her horizon with periodic rebalancing to the target allocation.
◦ Lifecycle Strategy (LC): This strategy begins with an equal allocation between
growth and conservative assets, with the growth assets gradually reduced to 0% at
the end of the investment horizon. As the allocation to growth assets is reduced,
the allocation to conservative assets is increased, with the retiree switching to a full
investment in conservative assets by the end of the horizon.
◦ Reverse Lifecycle (RLC): This approach works in an opposite method to the Life-
cycle strategy. The retiree begins investment with a full allocation to conservative
assets at retirement and gradually increases investment in growth assets till the in-
vestment is fully invested in growth assets at the final year in retirement. This is
against the conventional wisdom of increasing investment in conservative assets with
increasing age.
◦ Partial Lifecycle (PLC): This strategy is a variant of the Lifecycle strategy; the re-
tiree holds a fixed allocation to stocks throughout the investment horizon. A constant
fraction of the portfolio, 50% in this case, is held in growth assets. The remaining
50% is invested fully in growth assets at the onset and reduces to a full investment
in conservative assets at the end of the horizon. Thus the retiree holds the 50% allo-
cation to growth assets and invests the remaining balance according to the Lifecycle
plan, decreasing allocation to growth assets with increasing age. This investment
strategy therefore begins with a 100% stock investment, reducing to an equal alloca-
tion to growth assets and conservative assets in the final investment period.
◦ Partial Reverse Lifecycle (PRLC): This is another variant of the Lifecycle strategy,
with the retiree having a fixed allocation to bonds/bills which is held throughout
the investment horizon. This constant fraction of the conservative asset is held at
the beginning of the investment horizon, 50% in this case. The remaining 50% is
invested fully in conservative assets at the onset and reduces to a full investment in
growth assets at the end of the horizon. Thus the retiree holds the 50% allocation
to conservative assets and invests the remaining balance according to the Reverse
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Lifecycle plan, increasing allocation to growth assets with increasing age. This in-
vestment strategy therefore begins with a 100% bonds/bills investment and reduces
to an equal allocation to growth assets and conservative assets in the final investment
period.
5.3.2 Analysis
Firstly, I compare the wealth accumulated in retirement by the alternative investment
strategies after 20 years in retirement. At retirement, retirees’ have life expectancies
of up to 20 years for both sexes in Australia and up to 19 years for both sexes in the
US. For the eight investment strategies, I compare their performances based on their
ending portfolio values. These wealth levels are contingent on the retiree surviving
20 years in retirement and making monthly income withdrawals of 4% of her wealth
levels to meet consumption2. From the wealth estimates of our iterations, I rank the
probabilities of strategies outperforming or underperforming competing strategies.
Next, I calculate the chances of ruin for retirees based on the choice of any of the
eight alternative investment strategies. This is the probability that the retiree ends
with a negative balance after the 20-year investment horizon. The ruin probabil-
ity is calculated on the assumption of the retiree surviving the investment period
and making regular drawdowns from her wealth. Upon exhaustion of the retiree’s
wealth, she may borrow to meet her income needs and has no more wealth to invest.
I compare the investment strategies based on their ruin probabilities to determine
which of the plans has a better chance of being sustainable in the long term. Retirees
seek adequacy and sustainability of their investments to be comfortable in retirement
and will prefer a strategy with a higher chance of lasting as long as they expect to live.
Besides the probability of ruin, I estimate the extent of ruin for the alternative with-
drawal plans. This is the measure of the size of shortfall for the various strategies
when ruin occurs. As the retiree is unable to meet her consumption needs upon port-
folio ruin, I calculate the extent of shortfall based on the timing of ruin of retiree’s
wealth. I measure the size of the portfolio shortfall as the number of years in ruin
relative to the length of the investment horizon needed to meet the retiree’s life ex-
pectancy. I define shortfall years as the final year in the investment horizon less the
ruin year. Justification for this approach is expounded in works by Butt and Deng
2Withdrawal levels of 3%, 5%, 6% and 7% are also analysed, I however present results of the 4%
withdrawal level which serves as our benchmark drawdown level.
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(2012).
Campbell and Viceira (2002) suggest that long term investors consume out of wealth
and derive their utility from consumption rather than from wealth. Arnott et al.
(2013) further echo that for retirement purposes it makes sense to gauge the success
of a portfolio in terms of annuitised income rather than notional portfolio gains or
losses. I consider a shortfall measure which is based on the retiree meeting a certain
level of consumption. I compute income levels that the retiree is able to generate
from her level of terminal wealth at the end of the investment horizon. I compare the
annuity streams provided by terminal wealth values to see how they compare to a
level annuity purchased at retirement date. I calculate benefit shortfall as the differ-
ence between what retirees receive from their guaranteed income and what they will
receive if they annuitised at retirement age. I calculate the probability and extent of
the benefit shortfall when it occurs.
Finally, I go further from analysing preferences based on wealth levels and guaranteed
income from different wealth levels to comparing strategies based on gains and losses.
I incorporate the concept of loss aversion, which is the tendency for individuals to
be more sensitive to reduction in their wellbeing than to increases. Retirees set for
themselves wealth thresholds from which they are able to obtain income adequate
for a comfortable retirement. I refer to a utility function approach as motivated by
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory. The prospect theory utility has a
kink at the origin, with the slope of the loss function being steeper than the slope
of the gain function. I compare a retiree’s choice of alternative investment strategies
for different wealth thresholds.
5.4 Results
Retirees choose one of the eight post-retirement strategies at retirement age 65 and
hold this strategy for the entire investment horizon of 20 years. They make monthly
withdrawals based on 4% of the starting wealth withdrawal level which is annually
adjusted for inflation. I summarise the statistics of the ending wealth in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1 shows the summary statistics of the terminal wealth of the eight investment
strategies. The highest average terminal wealth values are realised for the Aggres-
sive Static Asset Allocation, the Growth and the Partial Lifecycle strategies and this
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Table 5.1: Summary Statistics
This table presents the summary statistics for the eight post-retirement strategies analysed. I show
the ending portfolio averages, the standard deviation, the minimum and maximum values as well as
different percentile distributions of the terminal wealth.
Average SD 25th 50th 75th 90th
Conservative 450,904 356,245 213,611 361,287 587,875 894,454
Balanced 1,253,532 919,305 632,527 1,033,728 1,651,107 2,399,011
Growth 1,744,026 1,471,331 719,188 1,379,486 2,371,598 3,633,884
Aggressive 2,433,408 2,529,092 721,675 1,745,053 3,379,009 5,600,133
LC 764,448 490,969 425,794 665,688 993,614 1,398,461
PLC 1,738,056 1,509,418 676,425 1,404,855 2,410,207 3,678,148
PRLC 671,098 442,019 366,384 560,683 852,087 1,241,063
RLC 1,358,473 1,006,345 650,558 1,122,558 1,824,826 2,660,604
is accompanied by the highest standard deviations. The Reverse Lifecycle strategy
generates a higher average ending wealth level than the Balanced strategy and this
is accompanied by a higher standard deviation. The Conservative strategy has the
lowest average terminal wealth, followed by the Partial Reverse LC and LC, with
respectively increasing standard deviations of terminal wealth as expected. These
strategies provide the most certainty in terms of ending wealth levels at a 4% with-
drawal rate as they have the lowest standard deviations. Whilst all wealth estimates
at the 25th percentile are positive, at the 25th percentile, again the stock dominated
portfolios result in higher terminal wealth values compared to the conservative strate-
gies. A similar trend is observed at the 50th percentile. At the 90th percentile, the
Aggressive strategy is significantly higher than all remaining strategies. The Partial
LC and Growth strategies dominate the remaining strategies with significantly high
wealth estimates, trailed by the Reverse LC and Balanced strategies. The Conserva-
tive strategy, which has no stock allocation, ends with the lowest wealth estimates at
the 90th percentile.
The varying terminal wealth levels associated with the Aggressive and Growth strate-
gies, as well as the Partial LC and to some extent in the Reverse LC strategies are
a depiction of the influence of stocks at different levels in the retiree’s portfolio. The
impact of stocks is significant in the portfolio dynamics as I find extreme differences
in the stock and bond/bills dominated portfolios. Because resampling is done in
blocks and with replacements, a period of poor stock returns such as the GFC can
appear multiple times in a data sample affecting the wealth levels of stock dominated
portfolios. In the same sense, vectors of good returns may also appear several times
in the same time series sample enhancing returns in the stock-dominated portfolio.
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This helps to capture a wider range of future possibilities which are derived from em-
pirical historical data and explain the wide standard deviations in wealth estimates.
Higher stock levels are good for the right tail of the distribution, providing the pos-
sibility of extremely high terminal wealth for retirees. On the left side, however, the
variability in returns acts against retirees as it makes it increasingly difficult for re-
tirement planning compared to balanced and conservative investment strategies. If a
retiree is interested in a portfolio that is able to provide a high wealth level which can
generate a sustainable level of consumption in retirement, a stock dominated strategy
gives a higher chance of meeting this need. Whilst the implementation of high stock
portfolios in retirement remains a sensitive subject for any investor or adviser due
to the uncertainty of the stock markets, it is important to outline the benefits of
such a strategy based on historical successes. The extent to which the strategies out-
perform each other based on the size of their terminal wealth is discussed in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Comparing Performance of Alternative Strategies
I compare the chances of each of the eight strategies outperforming competing strategies. The
probabilities represent the chances of the rows outperforming the columns (columns underperforming
the rows). My performance measure is based on terminal wealth levels based on strategy selected
for retirees in 10,000 simulations. Overall measures the chance of a strategy being dominant among
the remaining strategies in a simulation.
Cons Bal Gro Agg RC PRC PRRC RRC Overall
Conservative 0.00 0.08 0.12 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.10 0.10 0.03
Balanced 0.92 0.00 0.22 0.25 0.93 0.29 0.89 0.38 0.14
Growth 0.88 0.78 0.00 0.27 0.87 0.53 0.86 0.82 0.18
Aggressive 0.84 0.75 0.73 0.00 0.82 0.75 0.82 0.78 0.20
LC 0.86 0.07 0.13 0.18 0.00 0.16 0.63 0.13 0.08
PLC 0.85 0.71 0.47 0.25 0.84 0.00 0.82 0.71 0.17
PRLC 0.90 0.11 0.14 0.18 0.37 0.18 0.00 0.12 0.07
RLC 0.90 0.62 0.18 0.22 0.87 0.29 0.88 0.00 0.14
I compare the chances of a strategy outperforming other competing strategies based
on the levels of terminal wealth after 20 years of investment. The Aggressive strategy,
which has an all stock allocation, significantly dominates the remaining strategies. It
dominates the Growth strategy by 73%, the lowest probability of dominance observed.
This level increases further with other strategies, ranging between 75% compared to
the Partial LC and Balanced strategies to 84% for the Conservative strategy. The
Aggressive strategy hence becomes the most dominating strategy among the eight
competing investment strategies with an overall chance of providing higher wealth
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levels in 20% of the total number of simulations.
Although the Growth strategy is dominated by the Aggressive Strategy, it generates
higher wealth estimates than the Partial LC in over half of the simulations. It also
performs significantly well against the Conservative, Balanced, Partial Reverse LC
and the Reverse LC strategies, dominating in over 78% in all simulations. It also
performs better than the LC in 88% of the simulations, which is the highest level of
dominance over any strategy. The Growth strategy has 18% chance of dominating
competing investment strategies overall and is the strategy with the second highest
ending portfolio wealth levels.
The Partial LC strategy which retains 50% of the investor’s wealth in stocks whilst
the remaining 50% is invested in typical lifecycle style is the third highest dominating
strategy in terms of the terminal wealth levels after 20 years of investment in retire-
ment. Overall, the PLC has a 17% chance of dominating the other strategies in our
total simulations at 4% withdrawal rate, closing trailing the Growth strategy. This
strategy is dominated by the Aggressive strategy 3 times in every 4 simulations and
up to 1 in 2 simulations by the Growth strategy. It however dominates the remaining
strategies with probabilities ranging between 71% for Balanced and Reverse LC to
85% for the Conservative strategy.
The Reverse LC which is in reverse to conventional lifecycle investment approach
(Lifecycle) and increases stock investment as retiree ages and retirement horizon de-
creases performs better than the LC 87% of the time. This is a significant result
considering the high numbers of retirees who default into a lifecycle style investments
and leave their portfolio as such in retirement. The Reverse LC also dominates the
Partial Reverse LC, the Conservative and the Balanced strategies. The Balanced
strategy performs better than the Conservative, the LC and the Partial Reverse LC
with significant probabilities of 90%, 93% and 89% respectively but performs poorly
against the four remaining strategies. The lifecycle strategy in retirement, LC, which
follows the conventional approach of decreasing stock levels with increasing age gener-
ates very ordinary terminal wealth estimates compared to the other strategies. Whilst
it dominates the Conservative strategy in 86% and the Partial Reverse LC at 63%
of the simulations, it falls short to all other remaining strategies. The LC has an 8%
chance of dominating competing strategies overall. The Conservative strategy, which
has no stocks in the retiree’s portfolio, performs poorly compared to the remaining
strategies that include stocks, with as little as 3% chance of dominating the other
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investment strategies overall.
While this analysis is solely based on the terminal wealth levels, I assume retirees,
irrespective of their risk aversion levels and other preferences will always prefer a
higher level of terminal wealth to a lower level. In the Further Analysis section, I test
the impact of varying standard deviation at various wealth levels on retiree’s choice
of strategy, that is, the trade-off between risk and return. The Conservative strategy
which avoids stock investment in retiree’s portfolio turns out to underperform all
competing strategies. The inclusion of stock in the retirement portfolio improves the
portfolio performance, with portfolio performance increasing with increasing stock
levels. The Balanced strategy performs better than the Conservative, the Growth,
better than the Balanced, and the Aggressive better than the Growth strategy. I find
improvement in the retirement wealth levels to have a direct relation with stock levels
in the portfolio. The Aggressive strategy and the Partial LC Strategies which both
begin with 100% invested in stocks and the Growth strategy with 70% stock invest-
ment dominate the remaining strategies in more than half of the total simulations.
The desire for high levels of terminal wealth makes stock investment an attractive
venture for retiree willing to take some level of risk.
5.4.1 Ruin Probabilities
I analyse the performance of the different investment strategies with respect to their
chances of not meeting retirees’ needs in terms of regular income withdrawals and a
positive wealth level at age 85 or both. I first analyse the probabilities of ruin and
later the extent of ruin should it occur. The extent of ruin in this case is quantified
by the length of time, in years, the retiree is unable to meet her income needs. When
ruin occurs a retiree may borrow to meet her consumption but cease to have any
investments. The shortfall years are appropriate as retirees need to borrow over the
ruin years to meet their consumption needs and the number of years portrays the
extent of ruin suffered. I analyse different withdrawal rates ranging between 3%-7%
of initial wealth which I adjust annually for inflation in subsequent withdrawals. I
use the widely accepted 4% of initial wealth as our baseline withdrawal level for com-
parison purposes. I show the ruin probabilities of the various investment strategies
in Figure 5.1.
Chapter 5 137
Figure 5.1: Ruin Probabilities for Alternative Strategies
This figure shows the instances of ruin in the simulations for the different investment strategies
and the probabilities of ruin for the alternative investment strategies for withdrawal rates ranging
between 3%-7% of initial wealth and subsequent withdrawal levels adjusted for inflation.
At low withdrawal rates of 3% and 4% of initial wealth, I find all strategies to have
low probabilities of ruin. The Aggressive strategy has the highest ruin probability,
increasing from 2% to 6% at 4% withdrawal level. The Growth and Partial LC
strategies are the only other strategies that experience ruin at 3% withdrawal. The
Balanced, the LC, the Partial Reverse LC and Reverse LC have lower than 1% chance
of ruin at 3% withdrawal level and up to 99% of simulations not going to ruin at 4%
withdrawal level. At 5% withdrawal rate, I find a steep increase in the ruin prob-
abilities of the Conservative portfolio, soaring to 21%. With the exception of the
Aggressive strategy which has ruin chances of 12% and the Partial LC with 10%, all
remaining strategies have ruin probabilities less than 10%.
At the high withdrawal rates of 6%-7% of initial wealth, I find very pronounced dif-
ferences in the ruin patterns for the different investment strategies. These differences
are mainly seen for varying stock levels of the various strategies. Whilst the instances
of ruin increases for all strategies, the rate of increase is higher for the Conservative,
Partial Reverse LC and LC strategies compared to the remaining strategies. The ruin
probability decreases as I increase our allocation to stock, from Balanced, through
Growth to Aggressive strategies. At 7% of annual withdrawal, the Conservative and
Partial Reverse LC ruin probabilities exceed three quarters of the total simulations
whilst the LC has a ruin probability of 53%. The remaining strategies have ruin
probabilities less than 40% with the Aggressive strategy having the lowest ruin prob-
abilities of 30%.
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At low rates of withdrawal, the conservative portfolios are sustainable and hardly
run to ruin as they have little variability in wealth levels and can squarely meet the
low rates of withdrawal. Whilst the instances of ruin are generally low, I still observe
ruin to be higher for the stock dominated portfolios. As the rate of withdrawal is
increased, ruin chances for conservative strategies significantly increase whilst the
remaining strategies observe ruin but at relatively lower levels. At high rates of with-
drawal, I find the ruin probabilities to increase with decreasing stock levels. With a
high observed number of ruin in the Conservative and Partial Reverse LC strategies,
I find this number to decrease through Balanced, Growth to the Aggressive strate-
gies. The Reverse LC has lower ruin chances compared to the LC whilst the Partial
LC also runs to ruin on more occasions than the Partial Reverse LC. In addition to
calculating the ruin probabilities, I compute the extent of portfolio shortfall should
ruin occur. This answers the question of how large the potential shortfall may be or
how bad is the portfolio ruin. For each of the investment strategies, I measure the
mean shortfall years, the maximum shortfall years and the number of events with ruin
years exceeding the mean shortfall. The mean shortfall years, which is the average
number of years a retiree potentially faces ruin is our measure of shortfall severity. I
show the analysis of shortfall for the different strategies for the different withdrawal
rates in Table 5.3
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At low rates of withdrawal between 3% and 4%, I find the stock dominated portfolios
to experience portfolio ruin more often than the less volatile and conservative strate-
gies. The Aggressive, Growth and Partial LC strategies have high maximum shortfall
years as well as ruin years exceeding the mean. The Partial Reverse LC does not
experience ruin at 3% but has shortfall of up to one year at 4%. At 4% withdrawal,
I find over 200 events of the Aggressive and Partial LC facing ruin years exceeding
5 years and 4 years respectively. The Conservative, LC and the Partial Reverse LC,
the more conservative strategies have mean shortfalls of 1 year whilst the Balanced
and Reverse LC also have low mean shortfalls of 2 years, with 5 and 48 iterations
exceeding their means.
At higher rates of withdrawal, as expected, I find the different strategies to increase
in mean shortfall years as well as the maximum shortfall years. Of significance is
the sharp increase in the numbers exceeding the mean shortfall for the conservative
strategies over the more aggressive strategies. At 7% withdrawal rate, the Conser-
vative and Partial Reverse LC strategies, both with mean shortfalls of 4 years, have
over 4,000 events exceeding this mean shortfall. The Aggressive and Partial LC on
the other hand, with a slightly higher mean shortfall of 6 years, have 1,400 events
exceeding this shortfall level. At an equivalent level of 4 years shortfall, only 1,900 of
the iterations of the Aggressive Strategy and Partial LC exceed this level compared
to 4,000 of the more conservative strategies.
At all rates of withdrawal, the stock dominated portfolios have higher mean shortfall
years compared to the more defensive strategies. This means when portfolio ruin
occurs it is more pronounced for the aggressive investor than the defensive. The
maximum shortfall years are also higher for the stock dominated portfolios than the
balanced and conservative portfolios. Therefore a retiree may experience potentially
severe shortfall by investing in an aggressive strategy, as these strategies exhibit higher
mean shortfall years and higher maximum shortfall years. However, the probability
of facing the high levels of shortfall is relatively low for the aggressive investor. The
retiree who chooses a more defensive strategy, for the lower mean average shortfall
and lower maximum shortfall years has a higher chance of ruin although at a lower
extent. The number of ruins increases at a higher rate for the conservative strate-
gies than the stock dominated portfolios with increasing withdrawal rates. Although
the average ruin levels are low for the conservative strategies, the number of retirees
facing ruin at this and higher levels are exceedingly high with ruin probabilities in-
creasing exponentially as withdrawal rates increase.
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5.4.2 Income Shortfall Analysis
I compare guaranteed income levels that retirees are able to purchase at the end of
the investment horizon with their terminal wealth. This is a fixed income amount a
retiree generates from the terminal wealth after the investment horizon level which
will last as long as she lives. I compare this to an annuity income available to a
retiree who fully annuitises with a Single Premium Immediate Annuity (SPIA) at
retirement which pays a fixed amount of monthly income for life.
The SPIA is calculated with rates made available on CNN Money which provides
annuity income estimates based on individual’s age, gender, residence and invested
premium. Retirees purchase this annuity with their terminal wealth at age 85. The
income generated from this annuity purchased at retirement age 65, with the starting
wealth of $500,00 is $32,500 which is 6.5% of starting wealth. I estimate the income
shortfall as the difference between the retirees’ income from her terminal wealth and
the expected income from a life annuity purchased at retirement. Retirees’ Shortfall
Probability is calculated as:
SP (Ct) = P (Ct < z) (5.1)
The probability that the guaranteed periodic income received by the retiree from her
terminal wealth, Ct, is less than the benchmark z, in this case, the life annuity. In the
absence of any government pensions, retirees that run into ruin have no guaranteed
income after their investment horizon ends. The annuity used in this comparison is
a fixed whole life annuity which the investor purchases at retirement age 65. The in-
come received from the annuity is adjusted for inflation and compared to the income
levels that are obtained from the terminal wealth of retirees who choose to invest in
any of the eight strategies.
Table 5.4: Income Shortfall Probabilities
The probability that income generated from the terminal wealth of individuals after the investment
horizon being less than the expected income from a life annuity purchased at retirement age.
Rate Conservative Balanced Growth Aggressive LC PLC PRLC RLC
3% 40% 7% 8% 12% 13% 11% 13% 7%
4% 67% 17% 17% 19% 33% 19% 43% 17%
5% 85% 34% 27% 27% 57% 29% 71% 32%
6% 93% 54% 40% 36% 76% 40% 87% 50%
7% 97% 70% 54% 46% 89% 51% 95% 68%
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From Table 5.4, for the Conservative strategy, I find large shortfall probabilities rang-
ing between 40%-97% for our range of withdrawals. The Partial Reverse LC is the
next strategy with highest levels of shortfall ranging between 13% for a 3% initial
wealth withdrawal rate to 95% for a 7% withdrawal rate. The Reverse LC has lower
shortfall probabilities at all levels compared to the LC strategy. At low rates of with-
drawal, the Reverse LC performs up to 6 percentage points better than the LC whilst
this difference increases to 21 percentage points at the highest withdrawal rate of 7%.
The Balance strategy does a modest job, with shortfall probabilities ranging between
7% and 70% for the range of withdrawal rates analysed. The Growth, Aggressive
and Partial LC respectively provide the lowest shortfall probabilities compared to
the benchmark annuity.
At the baseline withdrawal rate of 4%, I find the Conservative strategy to have the
highest shortfall probability among the alternative investment strategies, falling be-
low the annuity income threshold 67% of our simulations. The Partial Reverse LC
falls below the benchmark in 43% of our simulations. These two represent the strategy
with the highest non-risky asset dominance. Whilst the LC falls below the annuity
benchmark in 33% of our simulations, I find its inverse, the RLC strategy, to fall be-
low the benchmark by 17%. The Balanced and Growth strategies also fall short of the
annuity level by 17% and this is the lowest shortfalls probability observed. Overall,
I find the instances of benefit shortfall to be highest for the conservative strategies.
The Balanced, Growth and Reverse LC portfolios perform better at low withdrawal
levels than the more aggressive portfolios which begin with all stock allocation. The
reverse is evident at high levels of withdrawal. The Reverse LC strategy significantly
and consistently outperforms the LC strategy whilst the Partial LC also consistently
performs better than the Partial Reverse LC, the more conservative variant.
5.4.3 Severity of Income Shortfall
I measure the severity of shortfall as the size of benefit shortfall over the investment
horizon. Should benefit shortfall occur, I analyse the severity of the shortfall and how
it disperses on average throughout the investment horizon for the different strategies.
The size of the benefit shortfall is calculated with reference to the income level pro-
vided by our benchmark annuity income. To calculate the size and extent of shortfall,
I consider both the probability of shortfall and the average size of shortfall for each
of the strategies considered. This is similar to the metric used in Dus et al. (2005)
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which they refer to as the Shortfall Expectation (S.E.).
SE(Bt) = E(max(z −Bt, 0) (5.2)
Where z refers to the benchmark annuity income level and Bt refers to the benefit
income level derived from retiree’s terminal wealth. The Shortfall Expectation is
therefore the sum of losses weighted by their probabilities. I compare the various
strategies based on their Shortfall Expectations in Figure 5.2.
Figure 5.2: Extent of Income Shortfall
I show the extent of shortfall for the alternative strategies relative to the benchmark income level.
I show the number of hypothethical retirees and the different extents of shortfall for competing
strategies. The strategies with higher stock allocations are represented by the red solid lines and
the blue dashed lines for the lower stock allocated strategies.
I compare the income provided by the terminal wealth resulting from the different
investment strategies to the annuity and evaluate how much these incomes fall short
of the benchmark. There is no income shortfall observed for up to 3,200 of our 10,000
simulations, after which I find the Conservative strategy to experience benefit short-
fall. The shortfall level rises gradually with up to the next 3,000 lives facing benefit
shortfalls of up to 50% of the benchmark annuity income. The shortfall level steadily
increases, reaching 100% for about 2% of the cohort. This is the highest level of
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benefit shortfall experienced among the alternative investment strategies and is gen-
erally the proportion of simulations that run into ruin and need to borrow to meet
consumption. The Aggressive strategy on the other hand has over 80% of the simu-
lations giving income levels that are equal to or greater than the benchmark income.
The remaining simulations which are exposed to shortfall show a steep rise in the
shortfall levels, with about 600 of the 10,000 simulations ending with the maximum
shortfall levels of 100% short of the benchmark.
The Partial Reverse LC has 4,300 lives experiencing benefit shortfall. Of this number,
the level of shortfall increases steadily for the next 1,000 lives and steeply over the re-
maining lives. Less than 1% of the simulated lives experience a total benefit shortfall
as opposed to over 500 lives experiencing total shortfall for the Partial LC strategy.
The Partial LC plan, like the Aggressive strategy, has benefits equal or exceeding the
benchmark in over 80% of our simulations. The remaining face shortfall levels rising
sharply up to 50% of the annuity benchmark for the next 1,000 lives and 100% for
the next 500 lives. Comparing the LC to the Reverse LC, the former has a third of
simulated lives facing benefit shortfalls while the latter has less than a fifth of total
simulations facing benefit shortfall. The rate of increase in shortfall levels is similar
for both strategies but the Reverse LC is slightly steeper than the LC. At 50% of
the benchmark shortfall, there are over 2,000 lives experiencing shortfall for the LC
strategy whilst the Reverse strategy has about half this number of lives experienc-
ing shortfall. About 1% of both strategies face total benefit ruin. The Growth and
Balanced strategies have very little variation in terms of shortfall to the benchmark.
Shortfall occurs in less than 20% of the simulations for both strategies. The extent
of shortfall rises steeply to 100% among the first 1,000 lives to experience shortfall in
both strategies, with the Growth strategy having a steeper rise in shortfall than the
Balanced strategy.
Measuring the severity of shortfall based on how much income from the various
strategies falls short of the benchmark annuity income, there is clear evidence of
outperformance of the benchmark by stock dominating portfolios. The Aggressive,
Growth, Partial LC, the Reverse LC as well as the Balanced strategies have up to
80% of terminal wealth levels providing wealth levels which are equal or higher than
the benchmark income. The steep shortfall curve shows that although severity of
benefit shortfall for the stock dominating strategies reaches 100% in all cases, a lower
number of lives are affected, reducing the probability of extreme shortfall. The de-
fensive strategies provide less protection for retirees who hope to meet a level of
income generated from their terminal wealth. Shortfall is more prevalent for these
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strategies, with the concave shortfall curve showing that many lives experience in-
creasing shortfall levels although the total shortfall level is reached only by a few lives.
5.4.4 Further Analysis
Whilst the stock dominated strategies are beneficial for strong upside potential, they
appear to be very volatile, affecting the extent of ruin on the downside. The more
conservative strategies are more stable and have lower mean ruin levels. To take
this into perspective, I consider investor’s preference of strategy not only based on
return (ending portfolio wealth) and the risk associated with this level of return (the
standard deviation of ending portfolio wealth). I use a utility-of-terminal wealth
approach assuming individuals have preferences over wealth at retirement. Since the
individual’s ultimate concern is that her retirement wealth would be able to provide
income which is equal to or exceeding a sustainable income benchmark, I use a utility
measure that accounts for a threshold level of wealth. This measure is in line with
work by Poterba, Rauh, Venti, and Wise (2007) and is represented as:
U(W ) =
(|W −K|)1−γ
1− γ ifW > K (5.3)
U(W ) = −h(|W −K|)
1−γ
1− γ ifW < K (5.4)
Where
W is wealth,
γ is the relative risk aversion parameter,
h is the loss aversion parameter and K is the threshold wealth for sustenance.
The utility function is consistent with Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect
theory with agents framing their choices in terms of gains and losses or deviations
relative to a threshold level rather than levels of wealth. The utility’s value function
is generally concave on the region of gains and convex in the region of losses. If
the retirement wealth is above the referenced wealth level, the constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA) utility applies. If the retirement wealth falls below the referenced
wealth level, the CRRA utility is adjusted to incorporate the loss aversion parameter
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h, allowing for steeper convexity as the individuals are more sensitive to losses and
hence heavily punish such outcomes.
I calculate the utility levels for each of our 10,000 hypothetical lives, U(Wi), and
I derive the probability weighted expected utility as the expected utility for the
strategy.
E[U(W )] =
N∑
i=1
(U(Wi)) (5.5)
where N is the total number of simulated return paths. Based on simulations, the
expected utilities from different strategies are compared at different threshold levels
and ranked in Table 5.5.
Table 5.5: Ranking of Alternative Strategies based on Utility of Terminal
Wealth
This table presents the ranking of alternative strategies for different RRA levels in the first column
and different wealth threshold levels in the subsequent columns. We rank the eight alternative
investment strategies based on the utilities of terminal wealth. The strategies are represented by
numbers 1-8 as shown below the table.
RRA\THRESHOLD $0 $500,000 $700,000 $900,000
2 2,8,3,6,4,5,7,1 3,8,2,4,6,5,7,1 3,4,6,8,2,5,7,1 4,3,6,8,2,5,7,1
3 2,8,7,5,3,6,4,1 3,8,2,4,6,5,7,1 3,4,6,8,2,5,7,1 4,3,6,8,2,5,7,1
5 8,7,6,5,4,3,2,1 3,8,2,4,6,5,7,1 3,4,6,8,2,5,7,1 4,3,6,8,2,5,7,1
1 7→ Conservative
2 7→ Balanced
3 7→ Growth
4 7→ Aggressive
5 7→ LC
6 7→ PLC
7 7→ PRLC
8 7→ RLC
With zero wealth threshold, a retire will want to avoid ruin and her average utility
is entirely based on her wealth level and the risk associated with such outcome. I
find retirees to prefer the balanced strategies, that is, the Balanced and Reverse LC
plans, to the more conservative and aggressive strategies at low risk averse levels.
These two strategies begin investment with an equal allocation to stock and bonds
and the latter ends with a full allocation to stocks. These strategies not only have low
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chances of ending in negative balances but also very high wealth levels. The Conser-
vative and Partial Reverse LC strategies, although with lower standard deviations,
end in lower wealth balances and have chances of not meeting the threshold. These
two represent the least preferred strategies at low risk aversion level of 2. At high
levels of risk aversion, the Reverse LC is the dominant investment strategy among the
alternatives. The strategy is attractive to high risk averse retirees as it provides low
risk (ruin probability) for its high level of terminal wealth. The Partial Reverse LC
dominates the Conservative strategy at all levels of the risk parameter and becomes
increasingly attractive with increasing risk aversion, becoming the second ranking
alternative at high risk aversion levels. Although the average wealth level for this
strategy only exceeds the wealth level provided by the Conservative strategy, a wealth
threshold of zero makes the wealth size less relevant with its superior ruin levels. The
Balanced and Conservative strategies are the least preferred strategies at high levels
of risk aversion.
When I include thresholds of different levels other than zero, I find systematic changes
in the preferences of retirees based on their terminal wealth distributions. At a mod-
erate threshold of $500,000, I find the Growth strategy to dominate the alternative
strategies. The Reverse LC strategy is the next preferred of the remaining strategies;
next in ranks is the Balanced strategy. When I increase the threshold to $700,000,
the Growth strategy continues to dominate, the Aggressive strategy however becomes
increasingly attractive and is the second ranked strategy. The Partial LC is the third
preferred strategy, increasing in ranks from the previous threshold. At a high thresh-
old of $900,000, I find the Aggressive strategy to top the alternative strategies. The
Growth strategy is moved into second place, while the Partial LC and the Reverse
LC strategies are the subsequently ranked strategies respectively as the threshold is
increased.
The Balanced strategy is less attractive to retirees as threshold level increases. This
strategy is however preferred to the LC and the Conservative strategies at all thresh-
old levels. The Conservative strategy is the least preferred strategy at all threshold
and risk aversion levels in terms of the utility-of-terminal wealth. The LC only ranks
higher than the Balanced strategy and the more aggressive portfolios, thus the Re-
verse LC, Growth, Aggressive and Partial LC, when there is zero threshold and the
retiree has a risk aversion level exceeding 2. With the inclusion of a threshold level,
the LC is dominated by these strategies. At all threshold levels, the Reverse LC
ranks higher than the LC. The Conservative is the least preferred strategy even at
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zero threshold.
Using utility-of-terminal wealth, The Balanced strategy which is static at 50/50 stock
to bonds/bills is the preferred strategy at zero threshold. The more aggressive strate-
gies with higher stock levels are next in preference while the conservative strategies
with low or no stock levels are the least preferred strategies. When I include a
threshold which provides a minimum income level needed for sustenance, the Bal-
anced strategy is no longer the preferred strategy. I find the Growth strategy to be
the preferred alternative at moderate to increasing thresholds. The Aggressive and
remaining strategies with substantial stock components are preferred to the Balanced
and conservative strategies. At high wealth threshold levels, the Aggressive strategy,
which has a 100% allocation to stock, is dominant. The remaining strategies with
substantial stock allocation are preferred to the Balanced, with the latter preferred
to the conservative strategies.
5.5 Conclusion
Investment managers seek to grow their clients’ portfolios in order to meet their in-
come and expense needs in retirement. These needs may include meeting a minimum
sustenance level and living a comfortable lifestyle in retirement. Our analyses show
that the dependence on the lifecycle style investment creating an illusion of security
in retirement should be given a second look. The lifecycle strategy, where investment
managers apply a holistic approach of decreasing retiree’s investment in stocks or
risky assets with increasing age is found to underperform several hybrid strategies
which are more aggressive or increasing in stocks. Utility-of-terminal wealth analysis
including loss aversion shows the lifecycle style strategy to underperform more ag-
gressive static strategic asset allocation models as well as balanced and investments
strategies with periodic increases in stock given different wealth thresholds.
Whilst increasing stock levels of portfolios significantly increases the wealth output
for the right tail of the distribution, there exists a chance of ruin which results from
the overreliance on positive returns of volatile assets. At a 4% level of annual with-
drawal, this chance of ruin is up to 6% for an all stock portfolio, giving the retiree a
94% chance of having a positive ending portfolio with a good potential of this level
being very high. For retirees interested in high terminal wealth and willing to take
up a 6% less certainty in having a positive outcome, they are rewarded with high
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terminal wealth levels. Comparing this to the Conservative strategy, which is an all
bonds/bills allocation, the retiree faces up to 2% chance of ruin but up to 6 times
lower the average wealth level. The Aggressive strategy dominates the Conservative
in 84% of our simulations.
At the widely accepted retirement wealth withdrawal level of 4%, I find a more aggres-
sive strategy such as the Reverse Lifecycle to dominate the Lifecycle by 87% based
on the distribution of terminal wealth levels. Terminal wealth estimates of stock
dominating portfolios emphatically dominate the remaining strategies, with strate-
gies starting with 100% investment in defensive assets being the worst performers,
followed by the Lifecycle strategy. In terms of meeting a benchmark income level,
again I find the stock dominating portfolios to outperform the benchmark in up to
80% of our simulations. The shortfall, which is observed in a fifth of the simulations,
although severe in up to the 5th percentile, the probability of severe shortfall is low.
The defensive strategies however, more often are unable to meet the set benchmark
income with up to 60% of the Conservative strategy holders and 30% of the LC re-
spectively failing to meet the income benchmark.
Lastly, considering the utility-of-terminal wealth, I rank the alternative strategies
based on retirees’ preference to meet certain wealth thresholds in retirement. The
utility function enables retirees to set for themselves a minimum wealth threshold
level and penalise themselves for wealth levels below this threshold. When retirees
are only interested in ending in positive wealth and the only risk is to guard against
portfolio ruin, the Balanced strategy which holds 50% in growth assets and the re-
maining in defensive assets is the preferred strategy. Retirees place more weight on
the Balanced strategy for the high certainty in retaining positive wealth levels cou-
pled with the high wealth values. The Reverse Lifecycle strategy, which increases
allocation to stock over time, is the second preferred strategy. At wealth thresh-
old of $500,000, the Growth strategy is the dominant investment strategy among
the alternatives with the Reverse Lifecycle coming in second. The Growth strategy
continues to dominate the remaining alternatives at a threshold of $700,000, closely
trailed by the Aggressive strategy. At thresholds beyond this level, the Aggressive
strategy is the preferred investment style with the Growth coming in as the second
preferred strategy. At all thresholds, strategies with substantial stock allocation are
preferred to strategies with low stock allocation. The Reverse Lifecycle strategy that
is increasing in stock is preferred to the Lifecycle style strategy decreasing in stock
at all wealth threshold levels.
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I believe that the Lifecycle strategy with decreasing allocation to stock with increas-
ing age needs to be improved. As Baby Boomers move from the accumulation phase
to the decumulation phase and with the change in Defined Benefits to Defined Con-
tribution plans, it is necessary to develop more sophisticated models that will help
investors meet their needs in retirement. In this era of market uncertainty, such a
model should be able to yield return to grow a retiree’s wealth and provide her with
adequate income to live comfortably and should be tailored to the needs of the indi-
vidual investor.
The failure of the Lifecycle strategy to compete with alternative strategies illustrates
the need to grow wealth in retirement. There is the perception of bonds as an absolute
safe asset which helps to protect retiree’s wealth position from unexpected shocks.
This is however detrimental to the retiree’s investment as the stress of periodic in-
come withdrawal demands that the retiree’s portfolio be managed and increased even
in retirement. The possibility of recovering the portfolio after a long period of poor
returns is also severely limited for the Lifecycle strategy as all stock is sold out while
reverse Lifecycle strategies are able to take advantage of the markets when they re-
cover, decreasing the chances of ruin for such strategies.
With this finding of high and increasing equity allocations performing better in retire-
ment, the present challenge is to model products that will be attractive to retirees.
Financial planners and advisors are reluctant to make such suggestions to retirees
because of the perceived inherent risk. This is a major limitation to this finding as
its application has practical difficulties and behavioural biases on the part of retirees
to overcome.
Secondly, the use of historical returns to mimic future returns assumes that future
returns will not be significantly different from past returns. Although this is an
adequate representation, current low interest rates tell a different story. While the
simulations incorporate previous market crisis and acknowlwdges the possibilities of
these recurring in future, future interest rates and asset returns may vary signifi-
cantly from what has been observed in the past. Long periods of low interest rates,
low returns and low yields may significantly impact on the results of this study and
more importantly on the investment decisions of retirees.
Appendix
5.A Portfolio Ruin and Income Shortfall Analysis
Table 5.A.1: Portfolio Ruin Count
The count of occurences of portfolio ruin for alternative strategies at various income withdrawal rates.
Conservative Balanced Growth Aggressive RC PRC PRRC RRC
3 PERCENT 2 1 34 207 1 140 0 2
4 PERCENT 167 66 271 614 73 494 12 112
5 PERCENT 2081 447 745 1163 636 1031 568 529
6 PERCENT 6062 1623 1690 1913 2445 1898 4345 1679
7 PERCENT 8462 3732 3079 2986 5336 3058 7622 3588
Table 5.A.2: Income Shortfall Count
The count of occurences where simulated retirees’ income level generated from the terminal wealth
after 20-year investment horizon are less than the expected income from the SPIA purchased at
retirement age 65 for 10,000 simulations.
Conservative Balanced Growth Aggressive RC PRC PRRC RRC
3 PERCENT 3953 654 834 1185 1298 1091 1344 734
4 PERCENT 6712 1743 1660 1859 3292 1885 4261 1720
5 PERCENT 8470 3368 2741 2675 5670 2869 7071 3165
6 PERCENT 9344 5353 4031 3579 7599 3952 8692 4981
7 PERCENT 9741 7006 5391 4645 8868 5109 9473 6754
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Conclusions and Future Work
6.1 Summary of Research
This thesis explores an important phase in retirement planning that is otherwise less
discussed, the decumulation phase. In particular, I analyse investment strategies
available to retirees in their retirement drawdown years. My first study explores a re-
tiree’s withdrawal strategy choice when she has access to pensions that depend on her
available wealth level, such as the Means-Tested Age Pension in Australia. Previous
studies in this context have made reference to the CRRA utility, which assumes EIS to
be the inverse of RRA and have largely ignored the impact of pensions on retirement
drawdown choice. These studies find the Percentage of Wealth strategy, where the
retiree consumes a fixed percentage of her available wealth at all drawdown periods to
be the dominant strategy. Recent studies have shown the relationship between RRA
and EIS to be different from directly inverse with individuals preferring early resolu-
tion to late resolution of uncertainty. This study models retiree’s preferences based
on Epstein-Zin utility, which enables a disentangling of the two preference parame-
ters and incorporates the impact of pensions. I find that expected utility decreases as
RRA levels increase for any given level of EIS. I find that the decrease in utility for
increasing RRA is steep for the Annuity, decreasing in steepness for the Fixed, Per-
centage of Wealth through to the Life Expectancy strategy in that order. Retirees’
preference for phased withdrawals over annuities is an exhibition of RRA levels higher
than the inverse of EIS and this is consistent with prediction by recursive preferences.
For the range of portfolios considered in the analyses, I find that increasing the level
of equities, from conservative through balanced to a growth portfolio increases the
chances of sustainability for the long horizon investment and vice versa. Whilst the
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chance of ruin is minimised for the Fixed withdrawal strategy, the average withdrawals
and terminal values for all the alternative phased withdrawal strategies increase with
increasing equity allocation. This finding is in agreement with works such as Cooley
et al. (2001) who assert that a retirement fund should have at least 50% allocation to
equity to be sustainable. Asset allocation does not change the order of preference for
the alternative strategies. The Life Expectancy withdrawal plan, where the retiree
consumes a fraction of wealth proportional to her remaining life expectation is the
preferred drawdown choice across a broad range of RRA and EIS parameters, with
the Percentage of Wealth strategy being the second preferred strategy and the Fixed
strategy being the least preferred phased strategy; preferred only to the life annuity.
In the presence of pensions, I find the Life Expectancy withdrawal to dominate the
other withdrawal strategies, with the Percentage of Wealth withdrawal being pre-
ferred at low RRA and high EIS. Overall, Life Expectancy withdrawal dominates for
a wide range of RRA and EIS levels, and the second preferred strategy is the Percent-
age of Wealth. The Fixed withdrawal strategy is next in the ranks, with the Annuity
being the least preferred strategy. In the absence of pension income however, the
Life Expectancy withdrawal continues to dominate the other withdrawal strategies
with the Fixed withdrawal strategy preferred at low risk averse levels. The Fixed
withdrawal also becomes the second preferred strategy after the Life Expectancy for
a broad range of RRA and EIS. The absence of pensions shifts plan dominance to the
Fixed Withdrawal over the Percentage of Wealth withdrawal. I find the inclusion of
a pension model such as the means-tested Age Pension included in this study to serve
as a buffer for retirees’ withdrawals, increasing with less disposable wealth and vice
versa. This makes high volatile wealth dependent strategies such as the Percentage
of Wealth attractive. The absence of pensions reveals the extent of volatility and in
many cases, the low levels of withdrawals for retirees on this strategy when returns
are low. On the other hand, the absence of pensions shows the stability from the
Fixed withdrawal, which is useful for retirement planning, making it more attractive
for retirees compared to the Percentage of Wealth strategy. This finding makes the
presence of pensions a significant determinant of retiree’s choice of drawdown strat-
egy in retirement.
Again, I find that retirees’ choice of alternative withdrawal plan depends on their
decision to bequeath. Retirees choose annuities over phased withdrawals only if they
have no bequest motives. When retirees have no bequest motives and derive all their
utility from their withdrawals, they prefer stability in consumption over varying and
volatile consumption. Annuities dominate the phased withdrawal strategies, with the
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Fixed withdrawal being the most attractive phased withdrawal strategy. The pres-
ence of pensions make the Fixed withdrawal more attractive for moderate to high
risk averse retirees as it increases the average withdrawal level with minimum change
in standard deviation and the chance of ruin is eliminated by the pensions. The two
least preferred strategies at high risk averse levels, the Life Expectancy and Percent-
age of Wealth withdrawals have high deviations about the mean consumption level
even in the early years of retirement. In the absence of bequest motives however, the
Life Expectancy and the Percentage of Wealth withdrawals are the dominant phased
withdrawal strategies for the long term.
The second study, set in the Australian context, examines the benefits of including
deferred annuities in a retirement decumulation plan. While deferred annuities are
unavailable in Australia for taxation reasons, their introduction in the annuity mar-
ket and legislation regarding this is imminent. Previous studies on deferred annuities
have drawn from the US and Germany among other well-developed annuity markets.
While these studies tout the benefits of the deferred annuity, they are silent about
the appropriate length of the deferral period or when these annuities should be pur-
chased. This study analyses this gap in the presence of retirees possessing bequest
motives or capital preservation needs and having HARA preferences. I find that risk
averse retirees derive more utility in purchasing deferred annuities over immediate
annuitisation and self annuitisation in the decumulation phase.
Low risk averse retirees will choose self-annuitisation strategy with downside con-
straints over a simple percentage of wealth withdrawal, allowing consumption to
vary over a broad range of values yet ensuring that consumption remains above a
sustenance level. Compared to the benefits of annuitising, I find retirees to prefer
purchasing deferred annuities at retirement age to provide higher and more utility-
enhancing consumption to any of the two self-annuitising strategies discussed in the
study. I also find that even at high levels of risk aversion, the retiree is better off
purchasing deferred annuities than self-annuitisation if she is interested in the possi-
bility of obtaining superior consumption levels leading to superior terminal utilities.
In the case of annuity deferral periods, I find that risk averse retirees prefer a shorter
timeframe to a longer one. At age 65, a retiree prefers a 10-year deferred annuity
to a 15-year deferred annuity, and a 15-year deferred annuity to a 20-year deferred.
Retirees prefer to purchase deferred annuities with longer deferral periods only at
retirement age 65 and derive less utility when they purchase annuities with deferral
periods exceeding 10 years later in retirement. For two strategies that both begin
payments at age 85, a 20-year deferred annuity purchased at age 65 is preferred to
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a 15-year deferred annuity purchased at age 70. Since there is no benefit should the
retiree die during the deferral period, retirees are reluctant to purchase annuities with
lengthy deferred periods late in retirement. Instead, retirees choose a short deferral
period where they believe their conditional survival probabilities are still high enough
to survive and receive the annuity payouts.
I find that the option to delay annuitisation exists for retirees of all relative risk
aversion levels within the range used in this essay. My analysis shows that while risk
averse retirees choose to annuitise in retirement, the timing of annuitisation depends
on their level of risk aversion. The low risk averse retirees choose to annuitise later
than the retirement age of 65. They gain utility in the expectation of stochastic
improvements in their wealth levels through investing assets in the money market
for the first few years in retirement. Since their consumption in the years before
the annuity payments begin is a direct function of wealth level, the low risk averse
retiree will bet on increasing consumption through the money market in the early
years of retirement while they still have high survival probabilities. There is less op-
tion to delay annuitisation, however, for more risk averse retirees. They prefer early
annuitisation to guarantee their income instead of betting on the equities market in
anticipation of equity premium. The option to delay annuitisation is more valuable
in the case of no exogenous pension income than when government pensions are avail-
able. In the absence of pension income, retirees prefer to self-annuitise longer with
the possibility of increasing their wealth before eventual partial annuitisation later in
retirement. Low to medium risk averse retirees will prefer annuitising at age 70 or age
75 to annuitising at age 65. I find the presence of pension income to be an incentive
for retirees at all risk levels to transfer risk to life companies and benefit from the
longevity protection provided by the pension income and the increased consumption
from annuitisation.
Finally, when retirees have no bequest motives, they prefer annuitising earlier in
retirement to later. Annuities of varying deferral lengths at retirement age 65 are
preferred to annuitising at age 70, while the latter is preferred to annuitising at age
75. At low utility thresholds, the self-annuitisation strategy performs better than
annuitisation at age 75 although this is reversed for high thresholds. The certainty
of the government pensions makes self-annuitisation attractive as retirees are able to
increase their consumption without losing utility from lowering bequest levels.
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The third study examines the performance of the commonly nominated default pen-
sion plan, the lifecycle fund against other alternative investment strategies in the
decumulation phase. I compare the terminal wealth levels of the alternative strate-
gies after 20 years of investment with periodic income drawdowns of rates between
3% and 7% per annum. I also examine the chances of ruin and the extent of ruin for
the alternative strategies and rank them accordingly. I find under different shortfall
measures that the lifecycle fund in retirement consistently underperforms other in-
vestment plans which hold substantial stock allocations as well as plans that increase
in stock over time. The Lifecycle plan only outperforms the all-defensive fund, com-
prised of bills and bonds. I perform further analysis using utility functions motivated
by prospect theory, including the influence of loss aversion, in which retirees penalise
themselves for not attaining certain wealth thresholds.
Whilst increasing stock levels of portfolios significantly increases the wealth output
for the right tail of the distribution, it creates a chance of ruin which results from the
overreliance on positive returns of volatile assets. At a 4% level of annual withdrawal,
this chance of ruin is up to 6% for an all stock portfolio. For retirees interested in
high terminal wealth and willing to take up a 6% less certainty in having a positive
outcome, they are rewarded with high terminal wealth levels. Comparing this to the
Conservative strategy, which is an all bonds/bills allocation, the retiree faces up to
2% chance of ruin but up to 6 times lower the average wealth level. The Aggressive
strategy dominates the Conservative in 84% of our simulations based on terminal
wealth levels after 20 years investment in retirement. The Reverse Lifecycle strategy
which has increasing allocation to stock over time dominates the Lifecycle by 87%.
Terminal wealth estimates of stock dominating portfolios emphatically dominate the
remaining strategies, with strategies starting with 100% investment in defensive assets
being the worst performers, followed by the Lifecycle strategy. In terms of meeting
a benchmark income level, which in this case is a fixed life annuity purchased at
retirement age 65, again I find the stock dominating portfolios to outperform the
benchmark in up to 80% of our simulations. The shortfall, which is observed in a
fifth of the simulations, although severe in up to the 5th percentile, has a lower prob-
ability of occurring relative to strategies with lower stock allocations. The defensive
strategies however, more often are unable to meet the set benchmark income with
up to 60% of the Conservative strategy holders and 30% of the Lifecycle respectively
failing to meet the income benchmark.
Lastly, considering the utility-of-terminal wealth, I rank the alternative strategies
based on retirees’ preference to meet certain wealth thresholds in retirement. The
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utility function enables retirees to set for themselves a minimum wealth threshold
level and penalise themselves for wealth levels below this threshold. The setting of
thresholds may be useful when the retiree hopes to generate certain income levels
in retirement or meet aged-care costs later in life. When retirees are only interested
in ending in positive wealth and the only risk is to guard against portfolio ruin, the
Balanced strategy which holds 50% in growth assets and the remaining in defensive
assets is the preferred strategy. The Reverse Lifecycle is the second preferred strategy.
At a wealth threshold of $500,000, the Growth strategy which has 70% of retiree’s
investment allocated to stock is the dominant strategy. This strategy dominates at
the moderately high threshold of $700,000; at wealth thresholds exceeding this level,
the Aggressive strategy, which is an all-stock portfolio is preferred. The Growth
strategy becomes the second preferred strategy at high wealth thresholds. At all
wealth threshold levels, strategies with substantial stock allocation are preferred to
strategies with low stock allocation. The Reverse Lifecycle strategy that is increasing
in stock is preferred to the Lifecycle style strategy decreasing in stock at all threshold
levels in this study.
6.2 Policy Implications
The choice of drawdown strategy has several implications for governments, policy
makers and retirees as a whole. With the decrease in mortality and constantly im-
proving life expectancy due to improved health systems and increased awareness,
planning for a longer retirement horizons has become particularly important. Gov-
ernments face the task of deciding on policies such as compulsory annuitisation or
appropriate mandatory drawdown rules for retirees to ensure that they do not out-
live their savings and depend solely on government support. According to Financial
Services Inquiry’s (FSI) interim report,1 the (Australian) retirement phase of super-
annuation is underdeveloped and does not meet the risk management needs of many
retirees. The inquiry wants to explore whether rules should be introduced to encour-
age retirees to buy retirement income products, introduce a default ‘investments’
option for retirees or mandate the use of certain retirement income products such as
annuities (Yeates, 2014)
The impact of pensions on retirement drawdown choice is also relevant for govern-
ments and policy makers as full government-funded policies such as the Age Pension
are increasingly becoming unsustainable. The need for regulations regarding pension
1The third government review into Australia’s financial system lead by former Commonwealth
Bank chief, Mr David Murray. It is 16 years since Mr Stan Wallis AC led a similar inquiry.
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allocation should be openly discussed as it directly affects retirement planning and
the retiree’s choice of drawdown strategy. This study makes an important contribu-
tion in this respect, specifically, with regard to the retirees’ preference for the Life
Expectancy over a wide range of preference parameters and reasonable utility ex-
pectations. This means the Australia system may be able to learn from the United
States, who uses this strategy as a ‘default’ drawdown strategy in defined contribu-
tion plans including Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs).
The findings of the second study also present some important policy implications.
Firstly, despite the finding that deferred annuities are preferred to immediate and
self-annuitisation, delaying the purchase of deferred annuities is utility enhancing
and public policies regarding decumulation legislations need to consider this. Com-
pulsory annuitisation even with deferred annuities may lead to substantial utility
losses if not implemented at the right time. However, mandatory annuitising after a
period of phased withdrawal may be appealing for a wide range of risk averse indi-
viduals. While compulsory immediate annuitisation is perceived to give poor value,
annuitising after age 85 is better value. In this respect, the promotion of deferred
annuities such as those discussed in this study and beginning payment late in re-
tirement will be of immense value to retirees and provide an effective decumulation
option in retirement.
Secondly, the introduction of deferred annuities on the Australian market is necessary
for innovative and sustainable decumulation plans and provides a utility enhancing
alternative to self-annuitisation options. It also serves the interest of retirees who
have substantial bequest needs as it allows them to receive the benefits of longevity
insurance through annuitisation without necessarily fully annuitising all their avail-
able wealth.
Financial planners and investment managers look to help their clients meet their ob-
jective of living a comfortable retirement; avoiding portfolio ruin and drawing down
a sustainable income level from their wealth periodically. Based on this premise, I
argue that the popular default strategy, the Lifecycle plan, is flawed. For several rea-
sons discussed in this thesis, many retirees do not exercise their investment options
and rely on the default strategy as an endorsement by the plan provider. Using a
dataset of daily market returns on stocks, bills and bonds spanning the last 85 years,
there is strong evidence to show that a lifecycle style investment underperforms sev-
eral alternative investment plans under common shortfall measures. Default plans in
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retirement savings accounts therefore need to be improved; the conventional wisdom
supporting the lifecycle style investment as being suitable in the retirement phase
should be looked at more critically for the benefit of the majority of retirees.
6.3 Limitations and Avenues for Future Research
A number of issues regarding this thesis require further attention. Firstly, I make ex-
tensive references to life annuities throughout this thesis. While the annuity pricing
estimation may be accurate in the Australian context, I acknowledge the actuarially
unfair market due to adverse selection as well as mortality heterogeneity may result
in some variations when this study is implemented in different regions and popula-
tions. Also, as expressed in Section 3.5, I assume the annuitisation decision is made
at retirement and compare this to other options that are selected at retirement age
by the retiree. Future studies could price annuities at all ages in retirement, giving
the retiree the choice of annuitising at any given age. Furthermore, the assumption
of the female survival probabilities in the computing of annuity rates may be ‘unfair’
to males as they possess lower survival probabilities, have lower life expectations and
may be entitled to higher annuity income levels. Alternatively, future studies may
use unisex life tables which use the average of survival expectations for both sexes,
albeit with the risk of underestimating the length of female life expectation.
Secondly, I assume a retiree’s portfolio is made up of her savings in the DC plan and
make no provision for wealth outside retirement fund. Future research may include
the role of savings outside the retirement plan as this may have some influence on a
retiree’s drawdown plan and ultimately her asset allocation. Home ownership, owner-
ship of other assets and income from alternative sources may also influence individual
investment decisions. In the context of bequest motives, wealth outside retirement
plans may play a significant role in meeting this need; making the DC plan savings
insensitive to the retiree’s desire to leave an estate.
Finally, the role of human capital in the allocation of retiree’s investable assets is not
considered in this thesis and may be an avenue for further study. For the purpose of
this thesis, I assume individuals retire at age 65. While people work well beyond this
age, others work part-time or casually after age 65 which may impact their decisions
on asset allocation and investments. Human capital refers to the net present value
of an individual’s future labour income. Labour income is assumed to be a bond-like
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asset which is fairly stable over time and may be significant in an individual’s asset
allocation selection. Young plan members are likely to have high significant human
capital and lower human capital as they age; and compensate for this bond-like asset
by holding high levels of stock at younger ages and decreasing the allocation to stocks
over time. This seems to be an appealing justification for the lifecycle style in pension
plans. The riskiness of such human capital and its correlation with the financial asset
is still being explored in economic literature. There are also no quantitative studies
exploring the human capital effect in the decumulation framework and this remains
an avenue for future research.
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